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The federal securities laws do not contain an express private right of ac-
tion for violations of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule l0b-
5.1 The private right of action under rule lOb-5 emerges from judicial impli-
cation. 2 Thus, the measure of damages must be implied as well. In the ab-
sence of clear statutory guidance,3 the United States Supreme Court and the
lower federal courts seem to have embraced a variety of damage theories,
1. 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1988). The rule was promulgated pursuant to § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Act). 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). Section 78u(d) of the Act of
1934 authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to file an injunction action
against defendants violating the Act or any rule or regulation promulgated under its authority.
15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1982). In addition, violators of rule lOb-5 face potential administrative
and criminal sanctions. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a)-(c) (1982).
2. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 982-83 (1988).
3. Although 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982) limits recovery to "actual damages," the
Supreme Court has held that this limitation does not preclude a measure of recovery in excess
of mere compensation. See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 660-63 (1986).
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including the benefit-of-the-bargain measure,4 the out-of-pocket rule,' dis-
gorgement, 6 and rescission.7
The benefit-of-the-bargain measure is generally understood as the differ-
ence between the represented value of the security purchased or sold and the
fair value of the security on the date of the trade.' Out-of-pocket relief,
which has been termed the "traditional" lOb-5 measure of recovery, 9 repre-
sents "the difference between the fair value of all that the [plaintiff] received
and the fair value of what he would have received had there been no fraudu-
lent conduct.''l This measure constitutes the disparity between the fair
value of the security purchased and the fair value of the consideration paid,
generally measured at the time of the transaction."1 Disgorgement, as it ap-
plies to the securities laws, returns to the plaintiff the amount of the defend-
ant's unjust enrichment. Under the disgorgement theory, the plaintiff
recovers the defendant's profit resulting from the fraud, rather than the
plaintiff's losses.' 2 Finally, rescission, by contrast, is the judicial act of un-
doing a transaction. Rescission typically precedes restitution, which restores
each party to its pre-transaction condition. 3
4. See infra text accompanying notes 8, 24-34.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 9-11, 35-65.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 12, 66-71. Some have celebrated this process. See
A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE lOb-5 § 260.03[a], 11-17 (2d ed. 1988).
Jacobs asserts:
The major principles guiding judges were deterrence of l0b-5 violations and compen-
sation of victims. Additionally, judges tried to (1) return the parties to the status quo
ante, (2) permit a claimant to recover the fruits of a fraud, (3) make a defrauded
individual whole, (4) encourage meritorious suits by adopting a generous measure of
damages, (5) assess damages against a public company without bankrupting it, and
(6) find measures of damages which were neither so severe that judges would not use
them nor so inflexible that they obstructed enforcement of lOb-5 duties.
Id. (footnote omitted). Others have found utter chaos in the law of damages. See Thompson,
The Measure of Recovery Under Rule lOb-5." A Restitution Alternative to Tort Damages, 37
VAND. L. REV. 349 (1984). Others have found no law of damages at all. See FEDERAL SE-
CURITIES CODE § 1723 commentary (1980). Still others have found a consistent and "opti-
mal" damages theory amidst the apparent chaos. Easterbrook & Fischel, Optimal Damages in
Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611 (1985). No one as yet has argued that the various
damage theories are alternate methods of quantifying materiality.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 13, 77-152.
8. See A. JACOBS, supra note 6, § 260.03[c][v], at 11-45 (citing D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 9.2, at 595 (1973)).
9. Id. § 260.03[c][ii], at 11-23.
10. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972).
11. See A. JACOBS, supra note 6, § 260.03[c][ii], at 11-25.
12. See Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 155.
13. See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 659 (1986); see also infra text accompany-
ing notes 77-152 (discussion of case).
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This Article surveys the United States Supreme Court and lower federal
court cases addressing these various measures of recovery under rule lOb-5.
Although these cases announce a variety of different damage theories and
labels, they apply a singular damage rule. This Article contends that the
singular measure of damages in rule lOb-5 actions is a quantification of the
materiality of the defendant's misstatement or omission. Courts use the var-
ious damage theories only to the extent that these theories prove useful in
approximating the materiality of the defendant's misstatement or omission.
Section I of this Article demonstrates that a misstatement or omission is
material if it creates any disparity between the price at which the plaintiff
burchased or sold a security and the real value of that security at the time of
the transaction. The materiality of the misstatement or omission constitutes
both the degree of the disparity and the amount of the damages. Section II
concludes that the United States Supreme Court has accepted the various
theories of recovery only to the extent that these theories approximate the
materiality of the defendant's misstatement or omission. Section III reviews
the relevant federal circuit court cases and concludes that, despite their ap-
parent differences, the circuits agree that damages are limited to a quantifica-
tion of materiality. Finally, the Article concludes by crystallizing the case
law into a unitary rule of damages.
I. QUANTIFYING MATERIALITY,
This Article contends that the measure of damages in rule lOb-5 cases
rests upon a quantification of the materiality of the defendant's misstatement
or omission. While under rule lOb-5 a material misstatement or omission is
a necessary and, perhaps, a sufficient condition for liability,14 the very fact
that this liability requires a material misstatement or omission provides the
basis for the assumption of this thesis. Accordingly, the quantification of
materiality requires an analysis of the particular misstatement or omission,
the materiality of which has rendered the defendant liable.
According to the Supreme Court, a material misstatement or omission
requires a "substantial likelihood" that the disclosure of the omitted or mis-
stated fact "would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of
the reasonable" purchaser or seller of securities. 5 Information is material if
14. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471-77 (1977) (breach of duty absent a
material misstatement or omission not actionable). I have argued so in other contexts. See M.
KAUFMAN, SECURITIES LITIGATION: DAMAGES (1989); Kaufman, Living in a Material
World: Strict Liability Under Rule lob-5 (forthcoming: Capital University Law Review, Vol.
19).
15. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 983 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
[Vol. 39:29
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its disclosure at the time of a securities transaction "would have been viewed
by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of
information [already] made available." 6 Resolving the question of material-
ity17 requires the determination of whether, under all of the circumstances, a
strong probability exists that the information would have significantly al-
tered the process by which the reasonable investor made the decision to
purchase or sell the securities.' 8
In TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., the Supreme Court stressed that
a section 14(a) plaintiff need not prove that the withheld or misleading infor-
mation would have actually "caused" him to change his vote.' 9 A rule lOb-
5 plaintiff, however, must prove that the information was so significant as to
create a substantial likelihood of altering the "total mix" of information
available to a reasonable investor when deciding whether to buy or sell se-
curities, to show that the information similarly affected his decision in some
way.2° Information that affects the reasonable investor's investment decision
may alter the very decision to invest. At a minimum, such information will
alter the price at which a reasonable investor decides to invest in securities.
Hence, in light of the Supreme Court's definition of materiality, a material
misstatement or omission is one that alters the price at which a reasonable
investor would have decided to purchase or sell securities. If, for example, a
defendant sells stock by misstating the true financial condition of the issuer,
the misstatement is deemed material only if a reasonable buyer would have
paid less for the stock had the buyer known the truth. If, however, a reason-
able investor would not have paid less for the stock absent a defendant's
misstatement, either because he would otherwise have known the true finan-
cial status of the company or would not have cared, then the misstatement is
not material.
The materiality of a defendant's misstatement or omission depends on
whether the statement or silence creates a disparity between the price at
which a reasonable investor actually traded securities (the transaction price)
and the price at which a reasonable investor would have traded securities
had he known the truth (the "true or real value").2' Material misstatements
or omissions thus create a disparity between the price at which a reasonable
16. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 445, 448-50.
19. Id. at 449. See also section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(a) (1982) (solicitation of proxies in violation of rules and regulations).
20. TSC Indus, 426 U.S. at 449.
21. Any quarrel with this definition of "value" exceeds the scope of this Article, and is
inconsequential to the Article's thesis.
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investor traded securities and the true value of those securities at the time of
the transaction. This incongruity is referred to as the price-value disparity.
In order to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under rule l0b-5,
the plaintiff must show that the defendant's misstatement or omission cre-
ated a detrimental or adverse disparity between the price at which he traded
securities and the true value of those securities.22 In other words, a material
misstatement or omission must create a negative price-value disparity.
23
The quantification of materiality, therefore, is measured by the disparity,
created by the defendant's precise misstatement or omission, between the
purchase price and the real value of the securities which the plaintiff traded.
While the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have used a variety of
damage theories, they have done so only in an effort to approximate the
amount of that disparity.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S SUBTLE EMBRACE OF MATERIALITY
The Supreme Court has offered little explicit guidance to the lower courts
regarding the proper measure of damages under rule lOb-5. This section
analyzes the few Supreme Court cases relevant to the issue of rule lOb-5
damages. These cases stand for the general proposition that out-of-pocket
damages typify recovery for rule lOb-5 violations.24 This section illustrates,
however, that the Supreme Court has subtly rejected each of the various
theories of damages in its pure form. The Court has instead demonstrated
its willingness to accept whichever theory best quantifies the materiality of
the defendant's misstatement or omission in any given case as the proper
standard of recovery for rule lOb-5 violations.
A. Benefit-of-the-Bargain Rejected as a Measure of Materiality
Before the adoption of the federal securities laws, the Supreme Court
voiced its disapproval of the benefit-of-the-bargain measure of damages for
22. While the innocent dissemination of a misstatement that creates a disparity between
the transaction price and the value of a security could conceivably benefit the recipient, that
recipient of a material misstatement will not be able to state any claim for relief under rule
lOb-5 because the disparity was favorable. Suppose, for example, the seller unwittingly de-
presses the transaction price by understating the issuer's rosy financial future. Under the defi-
nition of materiality espoused in this Article, that understatement would be material because it
would have created a disparity between the transaction price and the true value of the stock.
Yet, that positive disparity would not give rise to a cause of action for damages.
23. This definition of materiality is indistinguishable from a definition of harm or loss.
Indeed, as I have suggested elsewhere, see, e.g., M. KAUFMAN, supra note 14, the proper mea-
sure of damages in securities cases is a quantification of the materiality of the misstatement or
omission.
24. See A. JACOBS, supra note 6, § 260.03[c][ii], at 11-30.
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securities fraud. In Smith v. Bolles,25 the plaintiff alleged that defendant
sellers had induced him and other investors to buy worthless mining stock
by falsely representing that the stock had great value. The investors
purchased stock at a price between $1.50 and $2.00 per share. They claimed
that "had the [stock] been as represented by defendant it would have been
worth at least ten dollars per share" and sought to recover $40 per share as
the benefit of their bargain.2 6 Although the trial court instructed the jury
that the plaintiff's damage theory was correct, the jury nonetheless returned
a general verdict in an amount that represented only the purchase price of
the shares, plus interest.2 7
The Supreme Court reversed.2 8 It reasoned that damages are properly
measured by the price the plaintiff paid for the stock reduced by any "value"
that the stock in fact had at the time of sale.29 The difference between the
value of the consideration that the plaintiff relinquished and the real, as op-
posed to represented, value of what the plaintiff received, represented the
measure of damage. The Court asserted that the difference between value
paid and value received necessarily represents " 'the natural and proximate
consequence of the act complained of.' ,30
The acts complained of in Bolles really involved two kinds of misrepresen-
tations about the value of the stock sold. First, the defendant represented
that the mining property was not "wholly worthless.",3 1 Second, the defend-
ant stated that the stock might be worth $10 per share in the future.32 The
Court essentially concluded that the first misrepresentation was material.
Statements from insiders about the value of mining property do have a sub-
stantial likelihood of assuming importance to the reasonable investor. The
price that the plaintiff and other investors paid for their stock reflected their
25. 132 U.S. 125 (1889).
26. Id. at 127.
27. Id. at 129-30.
28. Id.
The measure of damages was not the difference between the contract price and the
reasonable market value if the property had been as [the defendant represented]. ...
What the plaintiff might have gained is not the question, but what he had lost by
being deceived into the purchase .... [Tihe defendant was liable to respond in such
damages as naturally and proximately resulted from the fraud. He was bound to
make good the loss sustained, such as the moneys the plaintiff had paid out and
interest, and any other outlay legitimately attributable to defendant's fraudulent con-
duct; but this liability did not include the expected fruits of an unrealized
speculation.
Id.
29. Id. at 130.
30. Id. (quoting 2 GREENLEAF § 256).
31. Id. at 127.
32. Id.
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judgment as to the value of the mining property. Thus, the proper measure
of recovery could reflect the disparity between the price paid by the investors
and the value that the investors received because a material misstatement
created that disparity. This disparity is simply a quantification of the mate-
riality of the defendant's first misstatement.
The second misrepresentation, however, that the property value may in-
crease and the property and the stock might in the future command $10 per
share, was not material. The Court suggested that a reasonable investor
would not allow such "puffing" to affect his investment decision. The
Court's classic statement that damages cannot include "the expected fruits
of an unrealized speculation" represents nothing more than that when the
defendant asserts facts that create only "speculation," such facts are not ma-
terial. 33 Any disparity between the fair value of stock received and the ex-
pected fruits of an unrealized speculation would not be "legitimately
attributable to defendant's fraudulent conduct," that is, not attributable to
the materiality of the misstatement or omission.3 4 The Court, therefore, re-
jected the benefit-of-the-bargain measure not so much because it is specula-
tive, but rather because the facts that gave rise to such speculation lacked
materiality. The decision recognized that the proper measure of damages for
securities fraud rests upon a quantification of the materiality of the defend-
ant's misstatement or omission.
B. The Out-of-Pocket Rule as a Measure of Materiality:
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States
Since the enactment of the federal securities laws, the Supreme Court has
offered similar guidance on the proper measure of damages for liability
within the specific context of rule lOb-5. The Court's declaration in Affili-
ated Ute Citizens v. United States3 5 provides the starting point for this
guidance:
In our view, the correct measure of damages under [section] 28 of
the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a), is the difference between the fair
value of all that the ... seller received and the fair value of what he
would have received had there been no fraudulent conduct . . .
except for the situation where the defendant received more than
33. Id. at 130.
34. Id.
35. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
[Vol. 39:29
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the seller's actual loss. In the latter case damages are the amount
of the defendant's profit ....
In Affiliated Ute, the Affiliated Ute Citizens (AUC), an association of
mixed-blood Indians, filed suit against a bank, its employees, and the United
States, alleging that all had violated ule 10b-5. Through First Security
Bank of Utah, AUC's transfer agent, the plaintiffs sold 1,387 shares of stock
in Ute Distribution Corporation (UDC) to two bank employees and to
thirty-two other "whites.",37 They sold a total of 120 shares from 1963-1965
at $300 to $700 per share.3 8 At the same time, the price range on transfer of
the shares between "whites" was between $500 and $700 per share.3 9 De-
fendants Gale and Haslem, bank employees, received commissions for their
services in connection with the transfer of the UDC stock from the plaintiffs
to the whites. They also solicited contracts for open market purchases of the
stock.
The United States District Court for the District of Utah found that Gale
and Haslem acquired, with bank approval and governmental awareness,
UDC stock for themselves from the plaintiffs at less than open market value
and had sold it or transferred it to customers for sale to others at the higher
market price." The district court found each of the defendants liable and
assessed damages by finding that the UDC stock was worth $1,500 per share
at the time of sale.
The district court based the damage computation upon a complex series of
factors. It considered the value of the oil shale, gas, and coal underlying the
plaintiffs' reservation. It also calculated the plaintiffs' potential interest in
damage awards stemming from the Indian Claims Commission and the as
yet unadjudicated claims against the government as part of the assets of
UDC.4 1 Furthermore, the court analyzed the specific price at which, the
plaintiffs sold to whites and the fact that the defendants pressured the plain-
tiffs, who were without investment expertise, to sell. Experts testified that
the stock was worth more than $700 per share.42 Considering all of those
factors, the district court concluded that the measure of damages for each
36. Id. at 155 (citing Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 748 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 951 (1968); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879
(1965)).
37. Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 146. Ute Distribution Corporation (UDC) was created by
the Ute Partition Act to manage oil, gas, and mineral rights. Id. at 143.
38. Id. at 147.
39. Id.
40. See Reyos v. United States, 431 F.2d 1337 (10th Cir. 1970), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part sub nom. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
41. Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 155.
42. Id. at 156.
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seller represented the difference between the fair value of the UDC stock at
the time of sale ($1,500) and the fair value of what each seller had received.
Hence a plaintiff who sold to, or transferred through, the defendants, stock
at $300 per share would receive $1,200 per share as damages.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, however, re-
versed the district court's theory of liability and remanded the case for a
recomputation of damages.43 The court of appeals concluded that the trial
court erred in valuing the shares at $1,500 for computing damages. More-
over, the court asserted that the trial record did not support the proposition
that the defendants depressed the market value.' The court then an-
nounced what it perceived to be the correct measure of rule lOb-5 damages:
The measure of damages for breaches of duty under Regulation
lOb-5 is the profit made by the defendant on resale of stock
purchased from the plaintiffs. If no resale was made or if the resale
was not at arm's length, then the measure is the prevailing market
price at the time of the purchase from the plaintiffs.45
The court anchored the damage figure in the "profit" received from the re-
sale because it believed that the plaintiffs had properly shown liability only
against the bank and its employees for sales from which they received a
higher resale price.46 If, for example, defendant Gale had purchased plain-
tiffs' stock at $300 and resold it for $1,500, the court would measure the
damages the same way the district court measured damages - $1,200 per
share. But if Gale had received less in the open market for the stock, then
the court would correspondingly reduce the plaintiffs' damages.
The court of appeals was willing to accept the district court's primary
measure, the difference between the value of the plaintiffs' stock and the
amount they received, but only if the defendants had not resold the stock.
Nonetheless, the court of appeals rejected the district court's $1,500 mul-
tifactorial price tag. Instead, it instructed the lower court to rely on the
"prevailing market price" to determine the stock's fair value. That prevail-
ing market price was between $500 and $700 per share. Thus, according to
the Tenth Circuit's damage measure, the plaintiffs would receive a maximum
of $400 per share in damages, unless the defendants actually exacted a profit
greater than that generally available in the open market.
43. Reyos, 431 F.2d at 1349.
44. Id. at 1348.
45. Id. at 1348-49.
46. Id. at 1347.
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Damages Under Rule lOb-5
The United States Supreme Court confronted these two very different
views 47 and reconciled the two damage measures in favor of the plaintiffs. It
reasoned that the plaintiffs could receive either the difference between the
fair value they received and the fair value they would have received absent
the fraud (the district court's figure), or if the defendants' profit would be
greater, then that measure could be used.48 The Court also accepted the
lower court's factual finding that the "fair value" of UDC stock at the time
of sale was $1,500 per share. 49 Hence, under the particular facts of Affiliated
Ute, the Supreme Court's damage measure allowed the plaintiffs to recover
between $1,000 and $1,200 per share.
In reaching this result, the Supreme Court gave considerable deference to
the district court. It agreed with the district court that the plaintiffs' pro-
posed "fair value" of $28,000 per share was "unrealistic and speculative."50
It also agreed that the lower court could draw reasonable inferences when
determining a "fair value" and was not restricted to actual sale prices in a
market so isolated and thin as this one.51
The Court relied on two principles, revealed by its citations, to support its
conclusion: first, the district court generally is entitled to deference regard-
ing its factual findings; 2 and, second, the district court should begin with
the market price: "the price at which property would change hands in a
transaction between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under
any compulsion to buy nor to sell and both being informed."5 3 The Court
relied on the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit in O'Malley v. Ames for this second principle.54 Moreover, Ames
suggested that, in the absence of evidence of purchase and sale transactions,
a court should use the price commanded for the stock in an open market to
determine fair value.55 In the absence of either traceable transactions or an
47. Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 154-56. Specifically, these views were first, the district
court's determination of the difference between the fair value of the shares at the time of sale
less the fair value of what the seller received, and second, the court of appeals' determination
of the amount of profit made by the defendant on resale, if any, less the amount the plaintiff
received for the sale. Reyos, 433 F.2d at 1348-49. If the defendants did not resell the stock, or
if the resale was not at arm's length, then the plaintiff stood to receive only the market price at
the time of the sale less the amount paid to the plaintiffs. Id.
48. Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 155.
49. Id. at 155-56.
50. Id. at 155.
51. Id.
52. See Bigelow v. RICO Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946); Harry Alter Co. v.
Chrysler Corp., 285 F.2d 903, 907 (7th Cir. 1960).
53. O'Malley v. Ames, 197 F.2d 256, 257 (8th Cir. 1952).
54. Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 155; see also Ames, 197 F.2d at 257-58 (providing a list of
factors that may be considered to determine fair market value).
55. Ames, 197 F.2d at 258.
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open market for the stock, however, courts should "consider all the circum-
stances connected with the corporation in determining its fair market
value."5 6
Relying on Ames, the Supreme Court approved the district court's mul-
tifactorial valuation process in an isolated and thin market." Presumably,
in light of Ames, the market price would suffice as a measure of "fair value"
in an open, well-developed, and efficient market. But absent that market, the
Supreme Court will allow district courts to exercise their discretion in affix-
ing value to stock. Thus, in Affiliated Ute, the Court found itself in agree-
ment with the district court's approach.5"
Finally, the Supreme Court seemingly approved a measure of value that
reflected not only a weighing of numerous factors, but also a balance be-
tween the sale prices of the stock and the "ultimate worth" of the interest
underlying the shares. Affiliated Ute ultimately produced a "rule" with
which to measure damages in a lOb-5 case involving selling plaintiffs. The
rule measures the greater of: (a) the difference between the fair value of all
that the seller received and the consideration paid; or (b) the difference be-
tween the consideration paid to the defendant and the resale price actually
received or that could have been received in the market. In calculating the
"fair value" of the stock sold, the Court approved an approach that begins
with actual transaction prices if available, or with market prices if the sale
56. Id. These circumstances include: corporate assets; corporate earnings; dividends;
earning power of the corporation; prospects of the corporation; book value; bid and asked
quotations; comparable sales; and any other factor which an informed purchaser or an in-
formed seller would take into account. Id.
57. Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 155.
58. Id. at 155-56. That approach involved an analysis of the following factors:
[Tihe existence of extensive oil shale deposits on the reservation; the possession by
those deposits of substantial present value and of great potential value; the presence
of gas, coal and other minerals; the administrative cost deposit retained by the
United States with respect to each member of the tribe; each [plaintiff's] remaining
interest in the 1965 award by the Indian Claims Commission; the existence of claims
against the United States not yet fully adjudicated; and the specific prices at which
UDC shares were sold by mixed-bloods and between white persons. The court noted
that prices paid for the shares were somewhat influenced by the improper activities of
[the defendants]; by the excess of sellers over buyers; by the fact that the typical
Indian seller was not so well informed about the potential value of the stock as was
the typical non-Indian buyer; by the fact that the Indian seller was under heavy
economic pressure to sell; by opinion evidence as to worth in excess of $700 per
share; and by the fact that some portion of the depressant factors in the market was
attributable to the defendants. On the other hand, the court noted that not all the
market's depressant factors were so attributable to the defendants and that the tribe
itself, despite the opportunity so to do, had declined to purchase UDC shares at
prices ranging from $350 to $700.
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occurred within an efficient, well-developed market. Conversely, where no
market exists, the approach permits the district court to engage in a discre-
tionary balancing of factors.
The portability of this rule carries two impediments. First, it applies only
to cases where the sellers have been defrauded, begging the issue of its appli-
cability to other lOb-5 situations. Second, the "rule" in Affiliated Ute is flex-
ible enough to allow indiscriminate application, thereby undermining any
real guidance potentially offered by the Supreme Court.
Perhaps the real guidance provided by Affiliated Ute is that the proper
measure of damages rests upon the "materiality" of the defendant's omis-
sions. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment that the
bank's employees, by misstating a material fact, had violated rule l0b-5.59
But the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' conclusion, holding
instead that the defendants also had a duty to disclose the material fact that
they "were in a position to gain financially from their sales and that their
shares were selling for a higher price in that market."'  Once the Court
found that the bank had an affirmative duty to disclose as agent for the
plaintiffs, it concluded that the failure to disclose a material fact established
the "requisite element of causation in fact."'"
The measure of damages emanates from the material facts involved. The
"cause" of the plaintiffs' losses, in the Court's judgment, was not that they
individually "relied" to their detriment upon the conduct of the defendants.
Reliance need not be shown in a case "involving primarily a failure to dis-
close."62 Rather, the plaintiffs' sale of their stock at prices lower than those
available in the market produced the losses. The material fact omitted by
the defendants was that the market price was higher than the price they were
willing to pay to the plaintiffs. The defendants failed to disclose to the plain-
tiffs the "fair value" of the stock, instead suggesting that the amount they
paid to the plaintiffs equaled the fair value of the stock.63 Thus, the Court's
measure of damages in the case functionally equals the definition of material-
ity. As such, proof of the materiality of the omission also serves as proof
that the defendants' conduct caused the plaintiffs' losses.
59. Id. at 152. The misstatement was "namely, that the prevailing market price of the
UDC shares was the figure at which their purchases were made." Id.
60. Id. at 153.
61. Id. at 154.
62. Id. at 153.
63. Id. at 155. The material omission, therefore, was the disparity between the "fair value
of all that the mixed-blood seller received and the fair value of what he would have received
had there been no fraudulent conduct." Id. Note that the "fair value" discussed by the Court
in this context corresponds to the value this Article has discussed as the "true or real value."
See supra text accompanying note 21.
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Moreover, the materiality of the omission supplies proof of the amount of
the plaintiffs' losses. The plaintiffs sold their stock at prices between $300
and $500 per share. They were not told the "fair value" of the stock, which
the district court found to equal $1,500 per share. The district court arrived
at that fair value figure by balancing a number of factors. Those factors
simply assess the materiality of the defendants' omissions. The defendants
breached their duty to disclose material facts from which the plaintiffs could
reasonably have determined the fair value of the stock.' The very factors
that the Court deemed material to determine the stock's fair value also
guided the plaintiffs' investment decisions. Thus, the $1,500 per share figure
settled upon by the lower court and approved by the Supreme Court resulted
from quantifying and weighing the facts regarding the fair value of the stock.
Moreover, this measure of damages also considered that some of the facts
were not "material" in the legal sense that their disclosure would have taken
on importance, or altered the total mix of relevant information available, to
the reasonable investor.65 Indeed, the plaintiffs had enough information
available to them to know that their stock was worth at least the price at
which they sold it. Accordingly, not all of the facts that the Court used to
determine fair value would have altered the total mix of information avail-
able to the plaintiffs because some of it was, or reasonably should have been,
already available to them. The fair value of what the plaintiffs received re-
flected information already available to them. The fair value that the plain-
tiffs surrendered consists of an aggregate of all facts relevant to the stock's
value. A material, fact affects the fair value of the stock, but is a fact not
already part of the total mix of information available to the reasonable inves-
tor. The difference between the value actually received by the seller based on
facts already available to it and measured by the price received, and the fair
value of the stock that emerges from all facts affecting the stock's value and
measured at $1,500, reflected the material facts not disclosed to the plain-
tiffs. The measure of damages, therefore, rested upon a quantification of the
materiality of the defendants' nondisclosures.
C. Disgorgement as the Proper Yardstick of Materiality
Even in the situation where the defendant receives more than the seller's
actual losses, and thus damages equal the amount of the defendant's profit,
the measure of those damages still reflects the materiality of the defendant's
64. Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 155-56. For a list of the factors, see supra note 58.
65. Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 156 ("the [district] court noted that not all the market's
depressant factors were so attributable to the defendants and that the tribe itself, despite the
opportunity so to do, had declined to purchase UDC shares at prices ranging from $350 to
$700").
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nondisclosures.66 The Supreme Court considered the disgorgement theory
of damages in Affiliated Ute because the court of appeals previously had
considered it appropriate. In the earlier case, Reyos v. United States, the
Tenth Circuit concluded that disgorging the defendants' profit represented
the only proper measure of damages where the buyers had defrauded the
sellers.67 A decision from another circuit, Janigan v. Taylor,6 8 set forth the
reasoning behind this position. The Supreme Court ultimately relied upon
Janigan in Affiliated Ute for its alternative damage formula.69 In Janigan,
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit explained that a
fraudulent buyer should not benefit from an even unexpected windfall profit
on the securities purchased because the unanticipated profit resulted from
fraud.7" Rather, the profit more appropriately belonged to the defrauded
seller.7
The Janigan measure of damages is designed for situations where the
plaintiff sells stock which increases greatly in value after the sale, even if the
defendants could not foresee the amount of the increase. The theory, how-
ever, depends upon a showing that the defendants acquired the stock by
fraud; that is, by a material misstatement or omission. In Janigan, the de-
fendant served as president, general manager, and director of Boston Electro
Steel Casting, Inc. (BESCO). He purchased stock from his shareholders
without disclosing the material fact that the corporation had undertaken
changes that would revitalize it. At the time of sale, the "market" price of
BESCO stock coincided with the price that the defendant offered the plain-
tiffs. Yet, two years later the stock's value multiplied.72 If the court mea-
sured the damages as the difference between the market price of BESCO
66. Reyos v. United States, 431 F.2d 1337, 1348-49 (10th Cir. 1970), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part sub nor. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
67. Id. at 1348-49.
68. 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
69. Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 155.
70. Janigan, 344 F.2d at 786.
[I]f the property is not bought from, but sold to the fraudulent party, future accre-
tions not foreseeable at the time of the transfer even on the true facts, and hence
speculative, are subject to another factor, viz., that they accrued to the fraudulent
party. It may, as in the case at bar, be entirely speculative whether, had plaintiffs not
sold, the series of fortunate occurrences would have happened in the same way, and
to their same profit. However, there can be no speculation but that the defendant
actually made the profit and, once it is found that he acquired the property by fraud,
that the profit was the proximate consequence of the fraud, whether foreseeable or
not. It is more appropriate to give the defrauded party the benefit even of windfalls
than to let the fraudulent party keep them.
Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 783.
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stock at the time of sale and the price paid to plaintiffs, damages would have
been negligible. However, the Janigan court did not reject this measure of
damages because of its inconsequential amount. Rather, the court rejected
the measure because it had nothing to do with the materiality of the nondis-
closures involved. In Janigan, the court deemed material the facts regarding
the changes reasonably anticipated to increase the company's profitability,
facts that the defendant failed.to disclose.73 The fair value of the stock at the
time of sale was not the market price, but rather what the market price of
the stock would have been had the market known the defendant's informa-
tion. Thus, the defendant's resale price, including his profit intake, provided
a more accurate method for measuring the stock's fair value. The defend-
ant's profit actually serves as a surrogate for the difference between the unin-
formed price paid to plaintiffs and the higher, informed price received from
the market.
For example, assume that in Affiliated Ute a plaintiff sold his UDC stock
at $500 per share to defendant Gale at a time when the otherwise prevailing
market price also stood at $500 per share. Suppose then, that Gale retained
the stock long enough to sell it at a $200 per share profit. A court could
measure damages in either of two ways. On the one hand, the plaintiff could
recover the $1,000 per share difference between the amount received ($500)
and the fair value relinquished ($1,500). However, if a court determined
that the fair value equalled the market price at the time of sale ($500), then
the plaintiff would have suffered no damages because he had received that
price. Consequently, the defendant's omission would not have been mate-
rial. On the other hand, if the defendant omitted material information not
only about the market price, but also about factors that affected the future
value of the stock, then the "price-value disparity"74 would be more than
negligible, although not reflected in the present fair value. Thus, relying on
Janigan, the Supreme Court, in Affiliated Ute, provided an alternative
measure.
75
In this instance, the plaintiff could recover the difference between the price
received for the stock and the price at which the defendant resold the stock.
In order to recoup the resale profit, however, the plaintiff must first prove
that the defendant fraudulently acquired the stock from him. Once the
plaintiff establishes this fraud, the court will assume that the defendant's
resale profits were a "proximate consequence of the fraud."' 7 6 Therefore, the
profit must ultimately have resulted from the material misrepresentation or
73. Id. at 786.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
75. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972).
76. Janigan, 344 F.2d at 786.
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omission that constituted the fraud. Any contrary rule would allow sellers
to recover any time buyers received subsequent profits.
For example, in the hypothetical above, the plaintiff could have recovered
the measure of Gale's resale profit because a material misstatement or omis-
sion produced the profit. Under this theory, so long as fair value is mea-
sured by all material facts, and not the market price alone, and so long as
defendant's profit resulted from a material misstatement or omission, the
measure-of-profit recovery will never exceed the price-value disparity.
Therefore, even the Supreme Court's alternative profit-recovery measure of
damages demands a quantification of the materiality of the misstatement or
omission, regardless of the foreseeability of the consequences.
D. Rescission as a Measure of Materiality
1. Randall v. Loftsgaarden
The United States Supreme Court further magnified the role of materiality
in measuring damages in Randall v. Loftsgaarden." In Loftsgaarden, the
Court held that, in cases brought under the federal securities laws, a success-
ful plaintiff need not offset a rescissory damage award by any tax benefits the
plaintiff may have received from the tax shelter investment.78 The petition-
ers in Loftsgaarden, limited partners in a motel venture promoted as a tax
shelter, brought suit against the general partners79 after an investigation ini-
tiated by the limited partners revealed that the general partners had sold
them a worthless investment.8 0 Alleging that the respondents' offering plan
used to solicit the petitioners' investments contained material misrepresenta-
tions and omissions, the petitioners asserted causes of action under section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 and section 12(2) of the Se-
curities Act of 1933.82 After trial in the United States District Court for the
District of Minnesota, a jury found that the petitioners had been defrauded,
and awarded damages in an amount equal to the consideration paid for their
limited partnership interests, plus prejudgment interest.8 3
77. 478 U.S. 647 (1986).
78. Id. at 667.
79. Loftsgaarden was the president and sole shareholder of Alotel, Inc., another respon-
dent. Together, they formed the general partnership. Id. at 650.
80. Id. at 651. After finding the initial offering of respondent unacceptable, the petitioners
invested in a revised proposal. Id.
81. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982); see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1985) (SEC Rule lOb-5).
82. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 651; see also Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 771(2) (1982).
83. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 652.
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On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held
that under a rescissory theory, any tax benefits received by the petitioners as
a result of their investment should be subtracted from their recovery.8 4 The
court, therefore, vacated the district court's award of damages.8 5 On re-
mand, the district court reduced the petitioners' damages, 6 but both peti-
tioners and respondents appealed again.8 7 The Eighth Circuit, sitting en
banc, reaffirmed its original decision and directed the computation of tax
benefits.8 8 The Supreme Court then accepted the case to resolve the tax
benefits issue.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, first focused on section 12(2)
of the Securities Act, which gives a defrauded securities investor the right
"to recover the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon,
less the amount of any income received thereon."8 9 The Court held that the
language of section 12(2) was sufficiently clear to invoke the "plain lan-
guage" canon, 90 and concluded that tax benefits are not "income received"
within the meaning of section 12(2) and, therefore, could not be used to
offset rescissory damages.9 ' The respondents had urged the Court to inter-
pret the language of section 12(2) in light of the common law remedies of
rescission and restitution, which aim to restore the parties to their precon-
tract positions, and thus require the plaintiff to return everything of value
received in the transaction.9 2 The Court held, however, that this argument
fell short of the showing necessary to overcome the plain language of section
12(2). The Court also rejected the argument that tax benefits constitute a
84. Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 181 (8th Cir. 1982) (Austin I).
85. Id. (the Eighth Circuit reasoned that proper application of the "actual damages prin-
ciple" of sections 12(2) and 10(b), required reducing the rescissory damages by any value that
the plaintiffs received as a result of the fraudulent transaction); see also Garnatz v. Stifel, Nico-
laus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1361 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978).
86. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 653. "On remand, the District Court ... calculated each
petitioner's damages as the purchase price of his partnership interest plus simple interest, mi-
nus net tax benefits." Id.
87. Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 768 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1985) (Austin II) (en banc), rev'd sub
nom. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647 (1986).
88. Id. at 960-61.
89. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982); Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 655.
90. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 685 (1980) (explaining "plain language" canon);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 n.33 (1976) (same).
91. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 656. In its interpretation of the definition of "income re-
ceived," the Court looked to the Internal Revenue Code for guidance. Because the receipt of
tax deductions or credits is not itself a taxable event, the Court concluded that "income" under
section 12(2) did not contemplate such tax benefits in the absence of "compelling evidence" of
congressional intent to the contrary. See also United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837
(1975).
92. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 658.
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reduction in consideration paid by the petitioners and therefore must offset
any recovery.93
The Court also asserted that the respondents misconstrued the purpose of
rescissory damages under section 12(2) as requiring only the return of the
parties to their status quo ante.94 According to the Court, section 12(2) at-
tempts to encourage full disclosure and deter fraud to the same degree that it
attempts to compensate defrauded investors. 95
The Court next focused on the respondents' argument regarding section
28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, which governs the measure of damages
in actions brought under section 10(b). The respondents successfully argued
to the court of appeals that section 28(a), by limiting a plaintiff's recovery to
his "actual damages," requires a court assessing damages under a section
12(2) rescissory remedy to restrict damages to the net economic losses suf-
fered by the plaintiff.96 The Supreme Court again disagreed. In the Court's
view, Congress designed the federal securities laws not only to compensate
defrauded investors but also to deter fraud, and "[t]his deterrent purpose is
ill-served by a rigid insistence on limiting plaintiffs to recovery of their 'net
economic loss.' " The parties in Loftsgaarden did not object to a rescissory
measure of damages; thus the Court left undecided the issue whether, and
under what circumstances, rescissory damages are available under section
10(b).98
93. Id. at 659-60. In addition, the Court concluded that the common law ignored tax
benefits for the purposes of a rescissory remedy under the "direct product" rule, which re-
quires returning only the gains that are the "direct product" of the transaction. Tax benefits,
the Court reasoned, accrue only when combined with other income produced by the investor,
and, therefore, are not deemed a "direct product" of the transaction at common law. Id. at
658.
94. Id. at 659.
95. Id.; see also S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933). The Court also rejected the
respondents' alternative characterization of tax benefits as a return of or a reduction in "con-
sideration paid," reasoning that Congress did not intend the term to apply to anything other
than the money or property given by the investors in exchange for the security. Loftsgaarden,
478 U.S. at 659-60.
96. Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 768 F.2d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), rev'd sub nom.
Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647 (1986).
97. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 664 (quoting Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp., 744 F.2d
935, 940 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated, 478 U.S. 1015 (1986)).
98. Id. at 666-67. The Court stated:
We also have no occasion in this case to decide whether, assuming that a rescissory
recovery may sometimes be proper under [section] 10(b), plaintiffs in such cases
should invariably be free to elect a rescissory measure of damages rather than out-of-
pocket damages. Consequently, we do not consider whether courts may ever refuse
to allow a rescissory recovery under [section] 10(b) where the 'premium' for expected
tax benefits represented a large portion of the purchase price, in which event the out-
of-pocket measure might yield a significantly smaller recovery.
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The distinction between the proper measures of damages under section
12(2) of the Securities Act and under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
formed the basis for Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion. 99 Justice
Blackmun concluded that, because the respondents were found liable under
both sections 12(2) and 10(b), petitioners were entitled to choose the more
favorable rescissory measure of damages: that available under section
12(2). In Justice Blackmun's view, however, the proper measure of dam-
ages in a case brought solely under section 10(b) is normally the investor's
out-of-pocket losses. 1o Under Justice Blackmun's analysis, when liability in
a tax shelter case stands solely upon a section 10(b) violation, a court should
examine the investor's purchase price to ascertain what portion of that price
was paid for the investor's tax benefits and what portion was paid for the
underlying asset.' 2 When the fraud relates only to the underlying asset the
defendant's liability would extend only to the part of the purchase price rep-
resenting payment for the asset, and not for that part representing tax bene-
fits the investor received.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan agreed with the Eighth Circuit that both
sections 10(b) and 12(2) require a court to reduce a plaintiff's rescissory
damages in the amount of his tax benefits.'0 3 Criticizing the majority's reli-
ance on the Internal Revenue Code (IRC or Code) in interpreting the mean-
ing of "income received" under section 12(2), Justice Brennan argued that
an examination of common law equitable rescission provided more appropri-
ate guidance to discern the meaning of this phrase."° At common law, re-
scission and rescissory damages sought to restore the parties to their
precontract positions. Common law rescission required the defrauded plain-
tiff to return the property, money, or other benefits for which he bargained,
and required a defendant to return the consideration, plus the value of any
other direct benefits, such as interest, received from the plaintiff. Applying
these common law principles, Justice Brennan concluded that the petition-
ers' award must be offset by their tax benefits under a rescissory theory."10
Id.; see also Salcer, 744 F.2d at 940 & n.5.
99. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 667 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 668.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 670 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 671-72.
105. Id. at 672-73. Justice Brennan wrote:
[T]he facts that an investment is marketed as a tax shelter and that the investor
generally pays a higher price for a tax sheltering investment than he would for one
simply producing future growth or income, indicates that the tax shelter aspect of the
investment is a bargained-for part of the agreement, rather than an incidental benefit.
It would be ignoring reality to maintain that the economic benefit that flows to an
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The tenor of the majority's analysis in Loftsgaarden, however, revealed an
unspoken basis for the decision. The Court primarily argued that the plain
meaning of section 12(2) mandates the conclusion that "income received"
does not include tax benefits and, therefore, tax benefits need not offset the
recovery of the consideration paid. However, the language of section 12(2)
is not "plain." Indeed, Loftsgaarden argued that the statutory language
plainly represented an attempt to codify the common law theory of rescis-
sion, which required the complete restoration of the parties to their pretran-
saction position.10 6 Prior to the transaction, petitioners did not have tax
benefits. Accordingly, Loftsgaarden argued, the plain meaning of the stat-
ute's codification of rescission dictated that a plaintiff could not retain his
tax benefits.
The Supreme Court responded to this competing interpretation of the
plain language of the statute by declaring that congressional intent allowed
the Court to "infer that Congress chose a rescissory remedy when it enacted
[section] 12(2) in order to deter prospectus fraud and encourage full disclo-
sure as well as to make investors whole."' 0 7 Thus, the Court ultimately re-
lied upon legislative intent, rather than the plain language of the statute,
without any reference to the legislative history. Instead, the Court but-
tressed its argument that the "income received" language of section 12(2)
does not include tax benefits by referring to the Internal Revenue Code. 108
The Code, the Court reasoned, distinguishes between income received and
tax benefits used to offset income.'°9 The Code, however, defines income in
broad terms that include indebtedness."' Yet, even if the Code did draw
such a narrow distinction, the fact that the provision containing this distinc-
tion post-dated section 12 attenuates the relevance this distinction might
otherwise hold for securities analysis. The lack of support for the Court's
result in the language of section 12(2) seems propelled mostly by the major-
ity's desire to maximize the deterrent force of the federal securities laws.
investor from a tax shelter investment is not as direct a benefit of his bargain as are
dividends that flow from a securities investment.
Id. (citations omitted). Justice Brennan did not accept the majority's view that Congress' use
of the terms "income received" under section 12(2) required a different result. Rather than
looking to the tax code definition of "income," Justice Brennan thought it proper to rely on an
ordinary dictionary meaning under which "income" encompasses any monetary gain or bene-
fit. Id.
106. Id. at 656-59.
107. Id. at 659.
108. Id. at 657 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 61 (1982)).
109. Id.
110. Id.; 26 U.S.C. § 61 (1982) (definition of income).
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One can also explain the Court's holding as an implicit acceptance of a
measure of damages for section 10(b) based upon the materiality of the mis-
representation or nondisclosure at issue. The Court assumed, without decid-
ing, that a "rescissory recovery may sometimes be proper on a [section]
10(b) claim...." 1 Based on that assumption, the Court proceeded to find
that the limitation on "actual damages," as provided by section 28(a)'s limi-
tation for violations of the 1934 Act, did not preclude a rescissory recovery
in a proper case.' 12
In his concurring opinion, however, Justice Blackmun spelled out his posi-
tion on section 10(b) damages in greater detail." 3 Justice Blackmun agreed
with the minority that when rescission properly remedies the fraud, tax ben-
efits should not play any role. But he did caution that "normally, however,
the proper measure of damages in a 10(b) case is an investor's out-of-pocket
loss; that is, 'the difference between the fair value of all that [the plaintiff]
received and the fair value of what he would have received had there been no
fraudulent conduct.' ,114 Thus, Justice Blackmun first elevated the out-of-
pocket measure of damages set forth in Affiliated Ute to make it the normal
or general rule. Then, by substituting "the plaintiff" for the phrase "mixed-
blood seller" in Affiliated Ute, Justice Blackmun indicated his belief that the
Affiliated Ute principle applies equally to defrauded sellers and defrauded
buyers." 15
Yet, the Affiliated Ute out-of-pocket damages principle, which applies
equally to defrauded buyers and sellers, requires a court to undertake a
quantification of materiality. "'In determining damages, Justice Blackmun
recognized that the investor who invests in a tax shelter may fall victim to
two kinds of material misstatements or omissions: "First, the promoter may
have misled him with respect to the level of potential tax benefits .... Sec-
ond, the promoter may have misled him with respect to the value of the
underlying asset."' '" Justice Blackmun concluded that the measure of dam-
ages must be tied to the materiality of the particular omission. Here, the
111. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 662.
112. Id. at 662-63.
113. Id. at 667 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 668 (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972)).
115. Id.
116. Id. Justice Blackmun instructed lower courts on how to determine damages:
To ascertain out-of-pocket loss requires taking into account all the elements that go
into the price of a tax shelter. That price will reflect both the value of the underlying
asset... and the value of the tax write-offs that the construction and operation of the
underlying assets will generate.
Id.
117. Id. at 669 (citations omitted).
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investors did not allege any material misstatements or omissions regarding
the tax consequences of their investments. Instead, they claimed that de-
fendants materially misstated the profitability of the underlying asset. Thus,
the petitioners sustained injuries, if at all, because the respondents materially
misstated the fair value of the underlying asset. The precise measure of
damages, then, must reflect the material misstatement involved.
81 8
In Loftsgaarden, petitioners received something of value, tax benefits, and
they received at least a low-quality asset. Justice Blackmun suggested that
to return to the plaintiffs their entire purchase price in such a case'would
result in awarding them an amount unrelated to the materiality of the mis-
representation. Instead, Justice Blackmun concluded, "[t]he proper measure
of recovery in such a case is therefore the part of the purchase price attribu-
table to payment for an asset that was never received."'  Justice Black-
mun's example demonstrated that this proper measure is rooted precisely in
the materiality of the misstatement or omission.12
0
118. Id. Justice Blackmun defined the limited injury:
But this injury - the difference between the value of what he received and the value
of what he was promised - is represented, not by the entire purchase price, but
rather by that portion of the purchase price which went toward a high-quality under-
lying asset when what was received was a lower-quality asset.
Id.
119. Id.
120. In the example, Justice Blackmun demonstrated that the amount a defrauded investor
may recover depends upon whether the investor was materially misled regarding both the
underlying asset and the tax benefit. If the misstatement materially impacted only a portion of
the investment, then damages relating only to that portion may be recovered. Consequently,
Justice Blackmun suggested that a court should quantify the damages according to the propor-
tional damage caused by the misstatement with respect to the whole investment. The follow-
ing hypothetical illustrates the point:
Investor A, who invests in a non-tax sheltered security, pays $100 for shares in a corporation
that runs hotels, expecting to receive $10 in dividends each year plus $5 in appreciation of the
value of the stock. Investor B pays $110 for a comparable share in a partnership that runs
hotels, expecting to receive in addition to the same amount of income and appreciation in the
value of the partnership, $25 in deductions to offset income from another source. The addi-
tional $10 premium that investor B pays is directly attributable to the receipt of tax benefits
rather than asset benefits. Id. at 668-70 nn. 1-2. Suppose both investors fall victim to material
misrepresentations about the value of the underlying assets which render the assets worthless.
If investor A sued under section 10(b), Justice Blackmun declared the investor would be enti-
tled to damages of $100. If investor B actually received the promised tax benefits, he too
would be entitled only to $100, despite the fact that investor B paid $110. The measure of
recovery for both investors is "that part of the purchase price of the security that represented
payment for the asset that was claimed to be worth $100 (and] was in fact worthless." Id. at
670 n.2.
Investor B received from the defendant two material facts: (1) the fair value of the asset was
worth $100 and (2) the fair value of the tax benefits was $10. The investor's potential exposure
was $110, and, as the Court suggests, if both facts were false, the measure of recovery would be
$110. That figure quantifies two material omissions. But, as was true in Loftsgaarden, where
1989]
Catholic University Law Review
Viewed another way, when tax benefits factor into the purchase price, the
total mix of information significant to a reasonable investor expands, making
the defendant's misstatement less significant and resulting in a smaller dam-
age figure relative to the purchase price. Where tax benefits do not factor
into the bargain, the mix of information significant to the reasonable investor
contracts, making the defendant's misstatements more significant and result-
ing in a larger damage figure relative to the purchase price. More than
merely rejecting a pure rescissory measure of damages in such section 10(b)
cases,'Justice Blackmun's concurrence signals the importance of the materi-
ality of the defendant's misstatement or omission to the measure of damages.
2. Tax Benefits: Are They Material?
The opinion of the majority of the Court and Justice Blackmun's concur-
rence in Loftsgaarden reveal little about the type of situations in which re-
scission would provide a proper section 10(b) remedy. The Court stated
that, "[t]he issue whether and under what circumstances rescission or a re-
scissory measure of damages is available under [section] 10(b) is an unsettled
one."'' The Court then found "authority" among the lower courts to allow
the section 10(b) plaintiff, "at least in some circumstances," to elect between
rescission and out-of-pocket damages, 12 2 and to support the view that sec-
tion 28(a) does not preclude such an election under the proper circum-
stances. 123 Yet, Justice Blackmun's concurrence left open the possible issue
of the propriety of a court's refusal to allow a rescissory remedy under sec-
tion 10(b) at least where "the 'premium' for expected tax benefits repre-
sented a large portion of the purchase price, in which event the out-of-pocket
only the fair value of the underlying asset was misstated, the measure of damages is lower
because the information misstated relative to the whole investment was not as material.
The final hypothetical further buttressed the assertion that Justice Blackmun's damage prin-
ciple quantifies the materiality of the misstatement. Id. If the underlying asset is not worth
zero, but $40 per share, the measure of damages would be $60 for both investors. Here, dam-
ages are decreased because the defendant's misstatements are not as material. Defendant
promised and delivered a tax benefit worth $10 and promised and delivered an asset worth at
least $40. If the plaintiff purchased at $50 per share, there would have been no material mis-
statement and, therefore, no damages. But if the defendant told the plaintiff that the shares
were worth $110 (or if the market received information to that effect), when in fact they are
only worth $50, then there has been some material misstatement and damages are measured
accordingly. The precise misstatement in such a case was that the asset was worth $100 when
in fact it was only worth $40. Whatever falsehoods defendant communicated altered the price
at which the investor was willing to buy the securities. The falsehoods altered the total mix of
information available to the investor by $60 per share.
121. Id. at 661.
122. Id. at 662.
123. Id. at 662-63.
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measure might yield a significantly smaller recovery."' 24 As Justice Black-
mun's examples made clear, in those cases rescission would result in a mea-
sure of recovery inconsistent with the material misstatements that are the
subject of liability.125 The Court hinted, therefore, that a rescissory remedy
under section 10(b) would not be appropriate where it would result in a
measure of damages not precisely related to the defendant's material mis-
statement or omission.
That result fosters the illusion of a marked distinction between damages
recoverable under section 12(2) and those recoverable under section 10(b).
Loftsgaarden held that "[section] 12(2) does not authorize an offset of tax
benefits received by a defrauded investor against the investor's rescissory re-
covery." 126 The Court suggested, by contrast, that section 10(b) may au-
thorize such an offset when a significant portion of the price of the security is
attributable to tax benefits. 127 Therefore, the Court appears generally will-
ing to tolerate a rescissory damage recovery under section 12(2), even when
it may exceed the plaintiff's economic losses, but it seems reluctant to toler-
ate a similar "windfall" under rule lOb-5.
Once one dispels the arguments about the plain language of section
12(2),121 two possible bases for the Court's authorization of windfall dam-
ages under that section emerge. First, the Court may believe so strongly that
"rescission adds an additional measure of deterrence as compared to a
purely compensatory measure of damages"' 29 that it willingly tolerates
windfall damages under section 12(2). Second, the Court may believe that
the possibility of tax benefits from securities investments is immaterial as a
matter of law. The latter presents the more sound hypothesis.
The Court's deterrence rationale for the rescissory remedy under section
12(2) does not explain its result. Such a policy-based, liberal construction
has been repeatedly rejected by the Court 3° in light of the statute's remedial
purposes. Moreover, the same rationale, based upon the greater deterrent
value of recovery in excess of economic loss, applies equally to section 10(b)
actions. If plaintiffs were allowed to recover their full consideration in sec-
tion 10(b) actions involving tax benefits, that too would add "an additional
measure of deterrence as compared to a purely compensatory measure of
124. Id. at 667 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun stated that the recovery
under section 10(b) may be reduced where "tax consequences provided a major inducement to
investment." Id. at 670.
125. Id. at 668 nn.1-2; see also supra note 120.
126. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 668.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 124-25.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 89-93.
129. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 659.
130. See, e.g., Pinter v. Dahl, 108 S. Ct. 2063, 2082 (1988).
19891
Catholic University Law Review
damages." 13' An argument suggesting that congressional language justified
the Court's authorization of the additional deterrent measure under section
12(2) fails because the Court argued only that Congress remained silent on
the issue, leaving it to the Court to determine the proper result.13 2 Yet, the
Court suggested that the congressional silence underlying section 10(b) may
be construed to require an offset of tax benefits. This rationale is an anomaly
within the Court's characteristic treatment of legislative silence, and fails to
explain any distinction between damages under section 12(2) and those
under section 10(b).
a. The Majority: Tax Benefits Are Immaterial
The result the majority of the Supreme Court reached in Loftsgaarden
must be founded upon its implicit assumption that tax benefits are immate-
rial. The Court agreed with arguments presented by the United States and
the SEC as amici curiae that tax benefits, because they accrue only in con-
junction with taxes owed and other income generated by the investor, do not
produce a benefit attributable exclusively to the securities transaction in-
dependent of other intervening transactions by the investor. 133 Accordingly,
the fair value of all that the investor receives does not include tax benefits.
On the other hand, the Court found that the fair value of the consideration
paid by the investors also did not include tax benefits. 134 Thus, according to
the Court's logic, tax benefits would likewise have no impact upon the Affili-
ated Ute out-of-pocket measure of damages. The difference between the fair
value of all that the plaintiffs received and the fair value of the consideration
they relinquished would not reflect tax benefits at all.
The Court did not base, then, its rationale for excluding tax benefits in the
calculation of damages on their theoretical incompatibility with the rescis-
sory measure of damages under section 12(2). Indeed, pure rescission,
which requires returning both parties to their pretransaction condition, may
require an offset. Rather, the Court constructs its argument upon the prem-
ise that tax benefits have no place in determining the fair value of securities
or consideration. Because the calculation of the difference between the fair
value of the securities and the fair value of consideration is equivalent to a
131. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 659.
132. See id.
133. Id. at 658. In addition, both Hon Industries, Inc. and Envitex Realty filed amici briefs
with the Court, Hon Industries urging reversal and Envitex Realty urging affirmance. Id. at
649.
134. Id. at 660 ("The consideration given by petitioners in exchange for their partnership
interests took the form of money, not tax deductions, and the fact that [investors] received tax
deductions from which they were able to derive tax benefits therefore cannot constitute a re-
turn of that consideration.").
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quantification of the materiality of the misstatement or omission,' 35 the
Court's judgment that tax benefits have no place in that calculation results in
a judgment that such benefits are not material to the purchase or sale of
securities.
That the Court felt obliged to argue that its position does not defy eco-
nomic reality' 36 further supports this interpretation of its decision. The eco-
nomic reality at the time of the decision suggests that realizing tax benefits
primarily motivated investing in limited partnerships. 37  The Supreme
Court itself noted that some lower courts recognized an investor's right to
sue for securities fraud when the defendant misrepresents the tax benefits of
the investment. Such a cause of action indicates the materiality of those
benefits.' 38
Yet, the Supreme Court rejected those cases and the so-called economic
reality approach. First, the Court found no evidence "that Congress in-
tended tax benefits to be treated as 'income received' " when it drafted sec-
tion 12(2).' 31 Second, the Court rejected the notion that tax benefits
constitute a separate asset, severable from the partnership interest and inde-
pendently valuable."4 Third, and most significant, the Court recognized
that tax benefits are not liquid; they cannot be transferred freely from one
person to another apart from the partnership interest.' 4 ' This lack of both
severability and liquidity makes it impossible to attach a reasonable or objec-
tive market value to a tax benefit because each investor's benefits would dif-
fer from one taxable year to the next. The lack of certain and determinable
fair value for tax benefits makes it impossible to assess the significance such
benefits might hold for the "reasonable" investor. Thus, the Court essen-
tially held that tax benefits are not material. 1
42
135. See supra text accompanying notes 113-18.
136. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 665-66.
137. Id. at 665.
138. Id. (citing Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 938 (1982)).
139. Id. at 657.
140. Id. at 665-66.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 667. In other words, the Court suggested that the materiality of statements or
omissions about tax benefits is impossible to assess in any given case. Id. The Court really had
to decide, however, whether tax benefits are always or never material; perhaps by a case-by-
case method. The Court decided that tax benefits were never material because assessing the
materiality of tax benefits is difficult on a case-by-case basis, and computing the amount of
damages if tax benefits were found material presents difficulties. The Court recognized that
calculating damages based upon the materiality of tax benefits presented "formidable difficul-
ties in predicting the ultimate treatment of the investor's claimed tax benefits." Id. at 665.
The Supreme Court in Loftsgaarden, therefore, authorized the lower courts to ignore tax bene-
fits in their calculation of damages under section 12(2) not because consistency with a rescis-
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b. Justice Blackmun: Tax Benefits Are Sometimes Material
In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun questioned whether tax benefits are,
as the majority suggested, always immaterial. 4 3 First, he agreed with the
majority that tax benefits should not be considered in calcdlating "income"
or "consideration" under section 12(2) or section 10(b). He also agreed that
the disparity between fair value received and relinquished typically repre-
sents the proper measure of section 10(b) damages. Furthermore, he con-
curred that the materiality of the misrepresentation is tantamount to the
unreceived portion of the purchase price attributable to an asset. 144
Justice Blackmun observed, however, that in calculating the price-value
disparity, all of the constituent elements of the tax shelter's price should be
considered, including the value of the tax writeoffs themselves. 145 Unlike
the majority, Justice Blackmun believed that the level of potential tax bene-
fits could be separately valued and qualified as a portion of the fair value that
the securities buyer received. 146 He reasoned that an investor could be mate-
rially misled about the value of those tax benefits, as well as about the value
of the underlying asset. Therefore, Justice Blackmun found that tax benefits
could be material in some cases. 1
47
c. Justice Brennan: Tax Benefits Are Always Material
While the majority concluded that tax benefits are never material and the
concurrence observed that they may sometimes be material, Justice Brennan
dissented because he perceived that tax benefits are always material to tax
shelter investment decisions. 148 Justice Brennan concluded that under both
section 12(2) and rule lOb-5, the benefits that purchasers receive from their
investments should be considered in calculating the disparity between fair
value paid and fair value received.' 49 Justice Brennan claimed that eco-
nomic realities support the view that "a major portion of what the investor
bargains for and purchases in a tax shelter is the tax benefit."' 5 ° Thus, tax
sory measure of damages demands it, but rather because tax benefits are immaterial as a matter
of law.
143. Id. at 669 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 668.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. Justice Blackmun wrote a separate opinion "merely to explain why it may be
proper to take tax benefits into account in a case brought solely under [section] 10(b) and [r]ule
lOb-5 of the SEC, a question the Court leaves open." Id. at 667 (citation omitted).
148. Id. at 670 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 672.
150. Id.
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benefits are a major portion of the fair value that the investor receives.",
Justice Brennan therefore concluded that tax benefits are material and that
the Court should have considered the petitioners' tax benefits when calculat-
ing the difference between the fair value received by the investor and the fair
value that the investor relinquished.'5 2
Throughout Loftsgaarden, the Justices clearly found the distinction be-
tween the statutory measure of damages under section 12(2) and the implied
measure of damages under section 10(b) insignificant. Most understood sec-
tion 12(2) as a rescissory measure of damages and section 10(b) as an out-of-
pocket measure of damages. In calculating the section 12(2) rescissory mea-
sure, however, courts must measure the price-value disparity between the
consideration paid and the income received. If a majority of the Court had
found promised tax benefits to be a material part of an investment, then it
would have included them in the section 12(2) calculation of the fair value of
the income received. The same may be said of the measure of damages
under rule lOb-5. If, as a majority of the Court believed, tax benefits are not
material, then, as under section 12(2), courts should not factor them into the
section 10(b) damages calculation. Hence, despite their different labels, sec-
tion 12(2) and rule lOb-5 employ identical measures for damages: the differ-
ence between the fair value of all that the investor received and the fair value
of all that the investor paid at the time of purchase or sale. Stated differ-
ently, damages under both section 12(2) and rule lOb-5 equal a quantifica-
tion of the materiality of the misstatement or omission.
E. The Basic Decision
In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,153 the Supreme Court amplified the theme that
quantifying the materiality of a defendant's misstatement or omission prop-
erly measures the damages under rule 10b-5. Although the Basic Court ex-
pressly declared that its decision "is not to be interpreted as addressing the
proper measure of damages" '154 in fraud-on-the-market cases, the Court's
reasoning does reflect a proper theory of damages.
Basic, Inc. (Basic), a publicly-traded company, had engaged in merger ne-
gotiations with Combustion Engineering.155 During these negotiations, Ba-
sic publicly issued three statements "denying that it was engaged in merger
negotiations." '56 However, Basic ultimately accepted Combustion's merger
151. Id.
152. Id. at 674.
153. 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988).
154. Id. at 992 n.28.
155. Id. at 980-81.
156. Id. at 981 (the statements are set forth by the Court in footnote 4).
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offer. '57 Consequently, a group of former Basic shareholders, who sold their
stock after the release of the merger denial statements and before the subse-
quent tender offer for the outstanding shares, brought a class action suit
against Basic."5 ' The plaintiffs in Basic sought certification of a putative
class consisting of all those who sold their stock in Basic during the span of
time between the public statements and the suspension of trading in Basic
stock. The complaint alleged that Basic and its directors violated rule lOb-5
when they materially misled the plaintiffs by issuing the public denials of
pending merger talks.15 9
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio certi-
fied the plaintiffs as a class because "common questions of fact or law
predominated over particular questions pertaining to individual plain-
tiffs." '1 60 However, the court granted the petitioners' motion for summary
judgment, reasoning that any misstatements made by Basic were not mate-
rial.'16  The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed
with the district court regarding the class certification, but reversed the
granting of summary judgment, holding that Basic's statements regarding
the merger negotiations were "misleading," and, therefore, were material as
a matter of law.162 The Supreme Court granted certiorari 163
to resolve the split ...among the Courts of Appeals as to the
standard of materiality applicable to preliminary merger discus-
sions, and to determine whether the courts below properly applied
a presumption of reliance in certifying the class, rather than requir-
ing each class member to show direct reliance on Basic's
statements. 1
64
The Supreme Court first decided to adopt the TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc. 165 standard of materiality to determine whether a party's
misstatement or omission violates section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.1 6 6 The
Court then applied the standard to the dispute in Basic. 167 The Court re-
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 981-82.
161. Id. at 982.
162. Id.; see also Levinson v. Basic, Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 748-49 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated and
remanded, 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988).
163. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 479 U.S. 1083 (1987).
164. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 982.
165. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
166. Id. at 449. "An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding [whether or not to sell her
shares]." Id.
167. 108 S. Ct. at 983-88.
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jected several of petitioner's policy arguments favoring a "bright-line rule"
specifically applicable to the disclosure of information in premerger negotia-
tions. It held that any omission or misstatement that had a substantial likeli-
hood of taking on significance to the reasonable investor and significantly
altering the total mix of information available to that investor constituted
actionable fraud under section 10(b).1 61 Under this definition of materiality,
the majority reasoned that "materiality depends on the significance the rea-
sonable investor would place on the withheld or misrepresented informa-
tion." 1 69 Consequently, it remanded the case "for reconsideration of the
question [of] whether a grant of summary judgment [was] appropriate on
this record."1 7°
The Court thus addressed the propriety of the lower courts' reliance on
the presumption set forth in the fraud-on-the-market theory. 7' This theory
creates a rebuttable presumption that, in the currently voluminous securities
market, a plaintiff allegedly defrauded by a public misstatement relied on
that misstatement when either selling or purchasing securities. 172 The Court
held that "[b]ecause most publicly available information is reflected in mar-
ket price, an investor's reliance on any public material misrepresentations
... may be presumed for purposes of a Rule lOb-5 action. ' ""
Having held that an investor's reliance on a public misstatement may be
presumed under the fraud-on-the-market theory, the Court then adopted the
court of appeals' holding that the presumption could be overcome if the peti-
tioners could rebut the five factors comprising the plaintiffs' prima facie
showing, 74 or "show that the misrepresentation in fact did not lead to a
168. See id. "Disclosure, and not paternalistic withholding of accurate information, is the
policy chosen and expressed by Congress." Id. at 984.
169. Id. at 988.
170. Id. (footnote omitted).
171. Id.
The fraud on the market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and
developed securities market, the price of a company's stock is determined by the
available material information regarding the company and its business .... Mislead-
ing statements will therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do
not directly rely on the misstatements .... The causal connection between the de-
fendants' fraud and the plaintiffs' purchase of stock in such a case is no less signifi-
cant than in a case of direct reliance on misrepresentations.
Id. (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted)).
172. See id. at 990-92.
173. Id. at 992.
174. Id. at 992 n.27. The court of appeals established five threshold facts that a plaintiff
must plead and prove in order to establish a loss. Basic, 786 F.2d at 751. The Supreme Court
modified these five into four by adopting the TSC standard of materiality.
[I]n order to invoke the presumption, a plaintiff must allege and prove: (1) that the
defendant made public misrepresentations; (2) that the misrepresentations were ma-
terial; (3) that the shares were traded on an efficient market; (4) that the misrepresen-
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distortion of price or that an individual plaintiff traded or would have traded
despite his knowing the statement was false."' 7 5 Thus, severing the link be-
tween a defendant's conduct and a plaintiff's losses rebuts the reliance
presumption. 
1 76
The Court's reasoning suggests that whether and how much the respon-
dents "lost" as a result of Basic's premerger misstatements equals the mate-
riality of Basic's misstatements or omissions. The Court found that, because
the class of plaintiffs showed that the defendants made material misrepresen-
tations in a public market, they "established the threshold facts for proving
their loss."'177 Loss is established at the "threshold" because material mis-
representations are those that distort or affect the price at which securities
are sold. Thus, the amount of loss is established because material misrepre-
sentations create a disparity between the fair value that the investor paid and
the fair value that he received - the price-value disparity.
The Court's reasoning further manifested the relationship between the loss
and the materiality of the misstatement or omission when it determined that
a defendant could refute the face amount of a plaintiff's losses by breaking
the causal link between the "alleged misrepresentation and either the price
received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market
price ... ,,17' To illustrate the point, the Court stated: "if petitioners could
show that the 'market makers' were privy to the truth about the merger
discussions. . . ,and thus that the market price would not have been affected
by their misrepresentations, the causal connection could be broken ....
Significantly, at this point in its discussion the Court penned its footnote
disclaiming any intention to address the proper measure of damages in
fraud-on-the-market cases. 180 The Court thereby recognized the direct con-
nection between the materiality of the defendants' misstatements and the
measure of damages. Where the defendants' conduct affected neither the
fair value received by the investor nor the fair value paid out by the investor,
that conduct was immaterial. Conversely, if the plaintiffs could show that
tations would induce a reasonable, relying investor to misjudge the value of the
shares; and (5) that the plaintiff traded the shares between the time the misrepresen-
tations were made and the time the truth was revealed.
Given today's decision regarding the definition of materiality, . .. elements (2) and
(4) may collapse into one.
Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 992 n.27 (citation omitted).
175. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 992; see also 786 F.2d at 750 n.6.
176. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 992.
177. Id.; 786 F.2d at 751.
178. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 992.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 992 n.28.
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the defendants' conduct created an adverse price-value disparity, that con-
duct would be material and the plaintiffs would have established their
lOSS. 18 '
The proper measure of damages in rule lOb-5 cases such as Basic, there-
fore, depends upon a quantification of the materiality of the defendant's mis-
statements or omissions. In Basic, the damages issue was twofold. First, the
plaintiffs had to demonstrate that the question of damages could be resolved
either on a class-wide basis or by creating subclasses for damages purposes.
Attempting to decertify the class as the litigation proceeded, the defendants
argued that individual questions of damages predominate over questions of
law and fact common to all members of the class.'1 2 Second, the plaintiffs
should have undoubtedly presented the related claim that damages could
and should be calculated on a class-wide basis by taking the difference be-
tween the tender offer price and the price at which they sold their shares.
Thus, if a plaintiff had sold stock during the class period of $26 per share
and the tender offer price was $46 per share, his damages would be $20 per
share.
A quantification of the materiality of the nondisclosures, however, re-
quires more than simply subtracting the tender offer price from the price
received. In the language of Affiliated Ute 183 and Loftsgaarden, 18 4 damages
equal the difference between the fair value of all that the seller received and
the fair value of all that the seller would have received absent the material
omission. In Basic, the Supreme Court supplied factors for assessing the
materiality of the omission of a contingent or speculative event such as a
merger:
Generally, in order to assess the probability that the event will oc-
cur, a factfinder will need to look to indicia of interest in the trans-
action at the highest corporate levels .... [B]y way of example...
board resolutions, instructions to investment bankers, and actual
negotiations between principals or their intermediaries may serve
as indicia of interest. To assess the magnitude of the transaction to
the issuer of the securities allegedly manipulated, a factfinder will
need to consider such facts as the size of the two corporate entities
and of the potential premiums over market value.18 5
181. Id.
182. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (stating the prerequisites to establishing and maintaining
a class action suit).
183. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); see also supra text ac-
companying notes 35-65.
184. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 661-62 (1986); see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 77-152.
185. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 987.
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While these factors hold particular interest for the investor because they
carry direct relevance in an evaluation of the issuer's stock, as the fraud-on-
the-market theory suggests, the probability that an event such as a merger
will occur and its magnitude to the issuer will affect the trading price of the
stock. A remote contingency of little or no magnitude to the issuer will only
slightly affect the trading price, if it does so at all. On the other hand, if a
merger is probable, and will have a tremendous effect on the issuer, the stock
price will respond accordingly. The probability-magnitude test, therefore,
provides one way to adjudge the effect of the defendant's omission on the
price at which stock trades. The fair value of the stock, which the Basic
plaintiffs relinquished, reflected, as it did in Affiliated Ute, factors such as the
probability and magnitude of contingent events. If the plaintiffs prove that
the defendants' omissions were so material, given the probability and magni-
tude of the merger, that the fair value of their stock at the time of sale was
really $46, then they may receive, as the measure of the materiality of the
omission, the difference between that fair value and the value they actually
received.
By contrast, defendants trying to sever the link between their omissions
and a plaintiff's losses will endeavor to show that those omissions did not
affect the price at which the plaintiffs sold; that is, they were not material.
The Court, in Basic, offered guidance on how to prove the absence of dam-
ages to defendants trying to sever the link.' 6 A defendant may demonstrate
that: (1) if she had made the requested disclosures, it would not have af-
fected the fair value that a plaintiff received because it would not have al-
tered the total mix of information already available to her or would not have
significantly affected her investment decision; or (2) if the defendant dis-
closed the pertinent information, the fair value which the plaintiff relin-
quished would not have been affected.' 8 7 If the plaintiff, for example,
wanted to get out of the market for Basic stock regardless of contingent
events, then the disclosure of those events would not have taken on signifi-
cance in its investment decisions. Alternatively, if the plaintiff already knew
of the contingent events, or if the market had communicated that knowledge
to the plaintiff, then the disclosures would not have altered the total mix of
information already available to it.' 8
Although these damages inquiries seem individualized, they are not. In a
fraud-on-the-market case, the market price impounds all information avail-
able to the reasonable investor. 189 Even an investor who sells regardless of
186. Id. at 992.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 988-89.
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the market price receives an amount for his stock that reflects material non-
disclosures. Not even the most unreasonable investor can say that his deci-
sions are unaffected by material nondisclosures. Even if the investor is privy
to the truth about material contingent events, the materiality of the nondis-
closures to the market will affect the price that he receives for his stock.
Indeed, where leaks have occurred and trading accelerates, the market price
reflects that degree of available information as well, decreasing the price-
value disparity. Because the determination is so dependent upon an objec-
tive standard of materiality, a court can resolve the issue of damages on a
class-wide basis with the help of expert testimony.
In quantifying the materiality of the defendant's misstatement or omis-
sion, the disparity between the fair value received and the fair value relin-
quished by the plaintiff is the lodestar. District courts possess considerable
discretion in calculating the fair value of stock. They may, guided by expert
testimony, consider a number of factors, including the value of the underly-
ing assets owned by the issuer, the transaction price, market prices over a
period of time, the supply and demand for the stock, and external depressant
factors in the market. 190 The courts, though, may not factor the tax benefits
of the investment into the fair value calculation. Likewise, the courts may
not consider the "expected fruits of an unrealized speculation" because those
are also immaterial as a matter of law.' But in assessing the effect of con-
tingent or speculative events upon the fair value of stock, the courts should
weigh the magnitude of the events to the issuer against the probability of
their occurrence.' 9 2 On the other hand, in calculating the fair value of the
price paid for stock, a court has the relatively simple task of determining
consideration, making sure only that the fair value of the consideration is
not reduced by anticipated tax benefits. 9 3
By calculating in this manner the difference between the fair value of con-
sideration paid and the fair value of stock received, the lower courts will
arrive at a damages figure that represents only the amount by which the
defendant's misstatement or omission altered the total mix of information
already made available to the plaintiff through the market or otherwise. The
lower courts should use this price-value disparity as a way to quantify the
materiality of the defendant's misstatement or omission.
190. See generally Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
191. See id.; Smith v. Bolles, 132 U.S. 125, 130 (1889); see also supra notes 25-34 and
accompanying text.
192. Basic, 108 S. Ct. at 987; see also supra text accompanying notes 177-79.
193. See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647 (1986); see also supra text accompanying
notes 77-152.
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III. RULE lOb-5 DAMAGES IN THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
Absent explicit Supreme Court guidance, the lower federal courts have
applied, indeed have created, a variety of damage measures for rule lOb-5
liability. Finding clarity or consistency among the circuits is virtually im-
possible, particularly because some circuits have not yet addressed many sig-
nificant rule 10b-5 damage issues. Nevertheless, this section endeavors to
identify a common theme running through the lower court decisions. The
lower federal courts have given a variety of labels to their damages theories.
Those labels, however, represent only different ways to achieve a quantifica-
tion of the materiality of the defendant's misstatement or omission.
A. The First Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit adheres to the
general measure of damages for section 10(b) liability: "the difference be-
tween the fair value of what the seller received and the fair value of what he
would have received in the absence of fraudulent conduct" 194 measured as of
the date of the sale. 95 Plaintiffs generally may recover "such outlays as
were legitimately attributable to the defendant's conduct, but not damages
covering 'the expected fruits of an unrealized speculation.' ,196
The First Circuit, however, recognizes an exception to this general rule
when stock is not purchased from, but sold to the fraudulent party. If, in
that case, the defendant buyer gains more than the plaintiff seller loses, dam-
ages are "that portion of the defendant's profits as are not due to the defend-
ant's own special efforts after the fraud occurred."' 9 7
In Holmes v. Bateson, the court applied the general rule;198while in Jani-
gan v. Taylor, the court applied the exception.199 The court's application of
these principles to the facts of both cases, however, reveals that the differ-
ence in the measure of damages is only an attempt to quantify the material-
ity of the defendant's misstatements and omissions.
194. Holmes v. Bateson, 434 F. Supp. 1365, 1388 (D.R.I. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 583 F.2d 542, 562 (1st Cir. 1978).
195. See Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
196. Id. (quoting Sigafus v. Porter, 179 U.S. 116, 125 (1900)).
197. Holmes, 583 F.2d at 562 (quoting Holmes, 434 F. Supp. at 1388 (citing Janigan, 344
F.2d at 786)); see also Kravitz v. Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 203, 216 (D.
Mass. 1978).
198. Holmes, 583 F.2d at 562.
199. Janigan, 344 F.2d at 786-87.
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1. Holmes v. Bateson
In Holmes, the executors of Howard Holmes' estate brought a rule lOb-5
action against Holmes' former partners, Bateson and Bronson, and the
Maguire Corporation, alleging that they "'willfully participated in a scheme
... designed to communicate false and misleading information about the
condition, status, affairs and prospects of the [Maguire] Corporation and
Partnership so as to cause the sale by plaintiffs of the Holmes shares of the
Corporation.' "200
Maguire, an engineering firm, operated as a partnership in Rhode Is-
land.2 °1  However, in January 1969, the partnership incorporated to avoid
continuing losses resulting from cash flow problems.20 2 The shareholders of
the new corporation then decided that they needed to agree on "some
method of determining the value of the stock in the event of death.,
20 3
"Holmes, Bateson, and Bronson agreed... 'that should anything happen to
any one of them, until such agreement was entered into, that the determina-
tion of the value of the deceased or withdrawing or discharged partner
would be as if they were still a partnership.' "204 Holmes died shortly there-
after, owning a 41.7% interest in the corporation.20 5
Bronson and Bateson, on behalf of the corporation, entered into a settle-
ment agreement with Holmes' estate for a total of $81 5,000.206 The partners
arrived at this figure, which represented Holmes' share of both the partner-
ship and the corporation and included loans made to the corporation by
Holmes and his estate, through a complex computation system.20 7
200. 583 F.2d at 545 (quoting Complaint).
201. Id. In addition to Holmes, Bateson, and Bronson, the partnership included a fourth
partner, Nelson, whose relevance to this case was limited to the terms of his sellout arrange-
ment. Id. at 545 n.2.
202. Id. at 546. Overall, the partnership was considered a promising enterprise, yet poor
accounting practices continually plagued it. To avoid these problems, the partners individu-
ally transferred certain assets to the newly formed corporation and received, in exchange, a
share of the new corporation's stock. Id. The corporation issued 850 shares of common stock;
Holmes received 350 shares, and Bronson and Bateson each received 250 shares; Nelson
elected to have his 26% interest bought out and received $400,000 for that interest. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 546-47. The preexisting partnership had devised a method for distributing a
deceased or withdrawing partner's interest in the business. Id. at 547.
205. Id. The corporation was also indebted to Holmes for $244,000. Id.
206. Id. at 550. The Maguire corporation owed the estate $581,603.62. "Payment was to
be made in seven annual installments of $83,086 without interest." Id. The remaining
$233,397 was due the estate from the partnership. Id.
207. Id. at 549 n.7, 555. When the amount of the loans was deducted from the total settle-
ment amount, the actual value paid to the estate for the stock was $4,453.62. Id. at 555. Out
of the $815,000, the amount attributable to the corporation for working capital by Holmes and
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Meanwhile, however, Bronson and Bateson were engaged in merger nego-
tiations with Combustion Engineering, Inc.20 8 These negotiations indicated
that Maguire was much more valuable than disclosed to Holmes' estate in
the settlement negotiations.2°9 Furthermore, the corporation adopted the
accrual method of accounting, rather than the cash basis method which the
partnership employed, and thereby experienced a higher yearly profit than
that revealed to the estate.21° Consequently, the defendants never fully in-
formed the estate about the true value of its share in Maguire.21
When Holmes' estate discovered the merger and subsequently realized its
share in Maguire had been undervalued, the estate brought an action under
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 "to obtain compensatory damages for the sales
of securities allegedly induced by [Maguire]... in violation of the [Securities
Exchange] Act and the Rules promulgated pursuant to it."' 212 The estate
also brought a claim for fraud under Rhode Island common law.2 1 3
The district court found and the appellate court affirmed that the defend-
ants had made two material omissions: (1) failure to disclose the accrual of
profit to the corporation; and (2) failure to disclose the continuing negotia-
tions.214 These material omissions created a disparity between the value that
the estate received for its Maguire stock at settlement and the fair value of
that stock. Holmes' estate accepted the sum of $4,453.62 for its 41.6% share
of Maguire stock.215 The court of appeals determined the fair value of that
41.6% share to be $2,153,424.00. Therefore, the price-value disparity
amounted to $2,148,554.38.216
the estate totalled $577,150. Therefore, the amount paid for Holmes' share of stock in the
corporation could only be $4,453.62. Id.
208. Id. at 550. Maguire also entertained merger discussions with Science Management
Corporation, but ultimately settled on Combustion Engineering, Inc. Id. at 548, 550.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. Id. at 551.
212. Id. at 544-45; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
213. Holmes, 583 F.2d at 544-45.
214. Id. at 551.
215. Id. at 564. It is recognized that Holmes' share of the corporation was previously
described as 41.7%. See supra text accompanying note 205. The opinion of the court actually
states both figures as cited herein.
216. Id.
Contributions to capital [made by Holmes] must be deducted from the $6,000,000
value of the corporation before damages can properly be assessed. These contribu-
tions totaled $824,500, comprised of two advances of $412,250 made by each of the
two officers. The $6,000,000 figure is, therefore, reduced to $5,175,500. When this
figure is multiplied by the estate's share of the corporate stock (41.6%), the result is
$2,153,424. From this must be deducted the $4,453.62 already paid to the estate for
its stock, leaving a remainder of $2,148,554.38 instead of the district court's figure of
$2,465,746.38.
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In affirming in substantial part the district court's measure of the fair
value of the stock relinquished, the court of appeals sanctioned the lower
court's reliance on expert testimony, finding such reliance "exclusively
within [the] province" of the district court.21 7 Based upon that testimony,
the lower court found that Maguire Corporation had a fair value of $6 mil-
lion and not $1,489,000 as originally reported by the appellants. The expert,
Professor Hunt, based his valuation of Maguire primarily upon an analysis
of "the future funds flow which the company offers to its owners.
'
"
2 18
The $6 million fair value figure calculated by Professor Hunt and gener-
ally approved by the court was not based upon the market price of Maguire
stock on the date of the challenged trades. Although the First Circuit
agreed with the appellants' contention that the market price, defined as the
price at which the stock was sold on an open market in a contemporaneous
transaction, "is generally recognized as the best evidence [of fair value] when
it is available and reliable, 21 9 the court rejected that measure in this case.
The court asserted that: (1) the sale of Maguire did not take place on the
open market; (2) the stock involved in the transaction was unregistered, and
thus could not have been sold on the open market; and (3) the market value
of the acquiror's stock had no bearing on the value of Maguire stock.22 °
Accordingly, the First Circuit concluded that the "determination of the
value of Maguire's stock demanded a more sophisticated approach than the
simple application of a price index to the shares of [the acquiror's] stock."
2 2 1
Id. (footnote omitted).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 562. Professor Hunt, a member of the Harvard Business School specializing in
corporate finance, described the future funds flow as a figure:
obtained partially by using the history of the company to see the trends and partly by
studying other elements to predict [the] future course of it's [sic] funds flow and
earnings, and equal importance is given to the price earnings ratio as an indication of
* . .the investment world's evaluation of this type of risk.
Id. Hunt also testified that book value "is almost never one of the factors used in determining
the true value of a corporation, particularly with a service company such as Maguire." Id. at
562-63.
219. Id. at 563 (citing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239, 1247 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977); Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 516 F.2d 172, 185 (2d
Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 425 U.S. 910 (1977)).
220. Holmes, 583 F.2d at 563.
221. Id. at 563-64. That sophisticated approach adopted by the court involves a balance of
the following factors:
'[T]he companys [sic] history and management, its operating expenses and earnings,
the book value and adjusted book value of its shares, the selling price of its stock and
its profit trends.' . .
... [Other factors] to be considered in determining the value of... a going business
[are] what [the defendants] themselves thought it was worth [and expert testimony as
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These factors are designed to show the degree to which the defendants'
failure to disclose merger negotiations and the -accrual profits of the corpora-
tion affected the plaintiffs' decision to sell at a price lower than the stock's
fair value. The $6 million fair value figure was discussed during the nondis-
closed merger negotiations.2 22 Those aware of the potential merger valued
the stock at a minimum of $6 million. That information alone would have
substantially affected any decision by a reasonable investor to sell his
Maguire stock for less than the investor's proportionate share of $6 million.
Furthermore, that valuation reflected the acquiror's knowledge of material
facts not disclosed to the plaintiffs: the accrual profit of the company, mea-
sured primarily by the future flow of funds that the company offers its
owners.
Clearly, when informed of these material facts not disclosed to the plain-
tiffs, a reasonable investor would not have sold his stock for less than his
proportionate share. But the Holmes' estate administrators, acting on the
total mix of information available to them, reasonably evaluated their stock
at only $4,453.62.223 The difference between the value they received and the
fair value they exchanged in return precisely measured the effect of the non-
disclosures on the price at which they could have sold their stock. That
differential clearly measures the degree to which the nondisclosures affected
the reasonable investor, or, a quantification of the materiality of the defend-
ants' silence.
2. Janigan v. Taylor
In Janigan,224 the class plaintiffs, former stockholders of BESCO, simi-
larly claimed that the defendant, who served as BESCO's president, general
manager, and director, induced them to sell their BESCO stock by misrepre-
senting that no material events had occurred within the company that would
alter its present value. 225 Based on the defendant's representation that the
value of BESCO would remain the same, the plaintiffs immediately sold
their BESCO stock to the defendant for $40,000, or about $20 per share.
Two years later, the defendant resold the stock for $700,000 or about $300
to the predicted future flow of funds that the company offers to the owners of its
stock].
Id. (quoting Holmes v. Bateson, 434 F. Supp. 1365, 1388 (D.R.I. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 583 F.2d 542 (1st Cir. 1978).
222. Id. at 550.
223. Id.
224. 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
225. Id. at 783.
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per share.226 The First Circuit held that the plaintiffs were entitled to the
amount of the defendant's profits not attributable to his own labors. This
measure of recovery returns to the plaintiffs the amount lost as a "proximate
consequence of the fraud.g 227
The court, however, would not award to the plaintiffs all the defendant's
profits from the eventual sale of the BESCO stock because not all the profits
resulted directly from the fraud.228 The court made clear, by way of anal-
ogy, that limiting the profit recovery properly measures materiality: "If an
artist acquired paints by fraud and used them in producing a valuable por-
trait we would not suggest that the defrauded party would be entitled to the
portrait, or to the proceeds of its sale.", 229
In Janigan, the company's stock price rose to its $300 per share level after
the plaintiffs sold because of "price rises, increased efficiency, and an im-
provement in the business cycle."' 23  The plaintiffs claimed that the defend-
ant failed to disclose to them these very facts at the time of sale.231 The First
Circuit found that almost the entire measure of the defendant's profit ($300/
share minus $20/share) was attributable to these material omissions. The
court, however, reduced the district court's damage award slightly because it
found that the plaintiffs expected the defendant to continue to receive his
10% bonus on net pretax profits under an already established company
plan.23 2 The court suggested that had the plaintiffs remained unaware of
any information regarding this bonus, this ignorance would nonetheless not
have altered the total mix of information already reasonably available to the
plaintiffs and, thus, would not have been material. Accordingly, the First
226. Id.; see also Taylor v. Janigan, 212 F. Supp. 794, 798 (D. Mass. 1962), remanded, 344
F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
227. Janigan, 344 F.2d at 786.
228. Id. at 787. The court found that the defendant could still have expected to continue to
receive 10% of net pretax profits under the terms of the agreement, notwithstanding the mis-
representation and subsequent sale. The court did not disallow the defendant this bonus. Id.;
see also infra text accompanying notes 229, 232.
229. Janigan, 344 F.2d at 787. The artist, who buys paint for $10 (which has a fair value of
$20) by materially misrepresenting its quality, is liable under this theory for his profit attribu-
table only to his misrepresentation, or $10. If the artist paints a portrait worth $1,000, he has
profited, but that profit is unrelated to any material misrepresentation. Similarly, if the artist
had failed to disclose his intention to paint a $1,000 portrait, he still would not be liable for his
total profit because no reasonable paint seller would alter an investment decision because of
information that the paint would greatly increase in value, but only in someone else's hands.
The painter's recoverable profit, therefore, is still limited to the materiality of the challenged
nondisclosure.
230. Id.
231. See Taylor v. Janigan, 212 F. Supp. 794 (D. Mass. 1962), remanded, 344 F.2d 781 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
232. Janigan, 344 F.2d at 787.
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Circuit reduced the damage award by an amount designed to discount as
immaterial the nondisclosure of the defendant's bonus, thereby attempting
to find a precise measure of the materiality of the defendant's omission.
3. SEC v. MacDonald
The First Circuit further demonstrated that the unjust enrichment or dis-
gorgement remedy in Janigan serves as a surrogate for a quantification of
materiality in its en banc decision in SEC v. MacDonald. 2 33 In MacDonald,
the court held that in an insider trading case, if the defendant buys stock
without disclosing material information in breach of a duty to disclose, the
proper measure of the SEC's disgorgement remedy is limited to the amount
of the defendant's profits that resulted from the material omission.23 4
Although this holding pertained to SEC enforcement actions, the court's
reasoning involved analogies to private rule lOb-5 damages actions. The
case, therefore, indicated the proper amount of the defendant's profit which
a court can disgorge in such private actions.
MacDonald served as the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Realty
Income Trust (RIT) when RIT accepted title to a twenty-five story building
in Cincinnati, Ohio, in settlement of a lawsuit it had filed against the build-
ing's owners. 23' Although during this time RIT had publicly announced the
lawsuit and a decline in its earnings reflected in its quarterly financial report,
it did not announce its acquisition of the building until twelve days after it
occurred.23 6 Between the acquisition date and the announcement date, Mac-
Donald purchased 9,600 shares of the company at between 4 1/2 and 4 5/8
per share. 237 RIT subsequently announced its valuable acquisition, and the
price of its stock climbed to 5 3/4. Two years later, MacDonald sold his
9,600 shares for an average of $10 per share, reaping a profit of $53,013.238
The SEC alleged, and the trial court found, that MacDonald's purchase of
9,600 shares, without disclosing material information to his sellers, consti-
233. 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983).
234. See id. at 53-54.
235. Id. at 48.
236. Id. On December 12, 1975, "the case was settled by [the owner's] surrendering to
RIT ownership of the Kroger Building .... That day, however, RIT ... release[d] its quar-
terly financial report, which, basically, contained nothing but bad news." Id. On December
24, RIT announced "for the first time the acquisition of the Kroger Building," which substan-
tially brightened its financial picture. Id. at 48-49.
237. Id. at 48. MacDonald's wife, acting on his behalf, purchased 100 shares at 4 1/2, and
MacDonald, on December 23, purchased 9,500 shares at 4 5/8. Id.
238. Id. at 49.
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tuted a breach of his duty to disclose and violated rule lOb-5. The court
ordered MacDonald to disgorge his entire profit.2 39
The First Circuit affirmed the finding of liability, but remanded the issue
of damages to the lower court with instructions to limit the amount of the
profit recovered to that caused by the material omission. 2" The court thus
rejected a recovery based on the difference between the purchase price and
the resale price, and limited recovery to the difference between the purchase
price and the stock price at a "reasonable time after public dissemination" of
the material information.241' The First Circuit reasoned that an award of
damages for profits earned during the period of effective nondisclosure
would approximate the-materiality of the nondisclosure, rather than the de-
fendant's independent business acumen. This rationale takes into account
the degree of the materiality of the defendant's nondisclosure.
Moreover, the court reasoned, where the stock involved is publicly traded
and the seller has learned of the previously undisclosed facts, he "cannot
later claim that his failure to obtain subsequent stock appreciation was a
proximate consequence of his prior ignorance. '242 This rationale also relied
on the notion that the plaintiff's recovery should be an accurate measure of
the length, if not the degree, of the materiality of the nondisclosure. When
the nondisclosure ceases to be material, the link between the defendant's
conduct and plaintiff's losses has been broken. Recovery based upon the
difference between the purchase price and the market price a reasonable time
after the disclosure of material information reflects an accurate measure of
the materiality of the information concealed.
The First Circuit felt the need to reconcile its partial disgorgement remedy
with the so-called full disgorgement remedy awarded in Janigan.243 It did
so by arguing first that the profits awarded in Janigan were wholly attributa-
ble to the defendant's material omissions, and second, that the plaintiff sell-
ers in Janigan could not have reinvested in the stock after the disclosure of
the information because the stock was not publicly traded.244 The measure
of damages in Janigan, whether denominated partial or full disgorgement,
consisted of the defendant's profit which represented the materiality of his
nondisclosures. That amount, in the case of a closely held corporation
whose president grossly misrepresented the company's future prospects,
239. Id. at 52. The district court assessed MacDonald's profit at $53,012. Id.
240. Id. at 55.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 53.
243. Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965). See also
supra notes 224-32 and accompanying text.
244. MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 53.
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happened to be virtually all of the profit. In MacDonald, by contrast, the
amount of the windfall attributable to the defendant's nondisclosure hap-
pened to reflect less than the full extent of his profits. Both cases, however,
stand for the proposition that in private rule lOb-5 actions, the proper mea-
sure of damages is a quantification of the materiality of the nondisclosure.
B. The Second Circuit
Judge Friendly announced the general rule that the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit applies to measure damages under rule lOb-
5:
[A] defrauded buyer of securities is entitled to recover only the
excess of what he paid over the value of what he got, not, as some
other courts had held, the difference between the value of what he
got and what it was represented he would be getting . *.. 245
As the foregoing statement indicates, the Second Circuit follows the major-
ity of courts in generally embracing the out-of-pocket measure of damages
and rejecting the benefit-of-the-bargain measure of damages in rule lOb-5
actions.
However, the court has also created exceptions to its general rule. First,
in Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., the court held that a defrauded buyer
may, in some circumstances, recover the difference between the value of the
consideration paid and the resale value or the value of the security within a
reasonable time after the concealed material facts are disclosed.2 46 Unlike
the out-of-pocket rule, which measures the disparity between fair value paid
and received at the time of sale, the Chasins rule measures the disparity be-
tween value paid and resale value or value received at a reasonable time after
the disclosure of the material facts.24 7 Second, a defrauded buyer may occa-
sionally recover a measure of the defendant's profit resulting from the
fraud.2 48 Finally, the Second Circuit recognizes that a defrauded seller may
recover:
not only the difference between the actual value and what he re-
ceived at the time of sale, but added profits which the buyer has
realized through accretions in value subsequent thereto, or which
the seller would have realized had he retained the stock for a rea-
sonable period after the disclosure.249
245. Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328, 334 (2d Cir. 1971).
246. 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
247. Id. at 1173. See infra notes 272-89 and accompanying text.
248. Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908
(1973); see also infra text accompanying notes 290-99.
249. Levine, 439 F.2d at 334 (citations omitted).
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Defrauded sellers thus have available three alternative damages theories: (1)
out-of-pocket, or the difference between fair value paid and received at the
time of sale; (2) disgorgement, or the amount of the defendant's profit attrib-
utable to his material nondisclosures or misstatements; or (3) the cover mea-
sure of damages, which, by awarding the plaintiff the difference between the
fair value of the consideration paid to the seller on the date of sale and the
fair value of the stock measured at the highest value attained within a rea-
sonable time after the disclosure of the fraud,25° theoretically approximates
the cost to the plaintiff of replacing the securities. 25' However, the court has
not suggested any "decisive" legal distinction to identify the proper measure
of damages for defrauded sellers and defrauded buyers.252
1. The General Rule: Damages Rooted in Materiality
Although the general rule and its exceptions can be identified and sup-
ported with a variety of underlying theoretical foundations, the cases in
which the Second Circuit has applied them manifest a unity of purpose and
result: The court awards the plaintiff damages in an amount directly attribu-
table to the materiality of the defendant's misstatements or omissions.
In Judge Friendly's germinative decision in Levine v. Seilon, Inc.,253 the
measure of recovery clearly represented a quantification of the materiality of
the defendant's misrepresentation. In Levine, the plaintiff, a preferred stock-
holder of Seilon, Inc. (Seilon), alleged under rule lOb-5 that Seilon had
falsely represented that it would provide him an opportunity to exchange his
preferred shares of stock for common stock, thereby inducing him to consent
to its new credit arrangements. Seilon subsequently used these credit ar-
rangements to redeem rather than to exchange the preferred stock.254
250. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1306 n.27 (2d Cir. 1973).
251. See A. JACOBS, supra note 6, § 260.03[c][iii], at 11-39.
252. Zeller, 476 F.2d at 802 n. 10.
253. 439 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1971).
254. Id. at 329-32. Plaintiff alleged that Seilon developed a plan to acquire all its preferred
stock by redemption. Seilon allegedly wanted to redeem the stock to free itself from several
restrictions on its activities contained in its certificate of incorporation. Seilon allegedly needed
the fraudulent scheme as a consequence of not having enough cash on hand to redeem the
stock.
Seilon's preferred shareholders had previously refused to give the approval necessary to cre-
ate new funded debt. In order to induce such consent, Seilon promised to allow its preferred
shareholders to exchange their shares for common shares. It also represented that its board of
directors had authorized such an exchange program, that it would not redeem any of the
preferred shares until after the close of the exchange offer period, and that it would register the
necessary number of common shares for the exchange plan under the Securities Act of 1933.
Based upon these representations, the preferred shareholders consented to Seilon's desired
credit arrangements. Seilon entered into the new credit arrangements and then undertook the
sale or transfer of stock it owned as well as some of its own assets. Seilon then filed the S- 1
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Leaving aside the issue of whether the plaintiff's actions amounted to a
purchase or sale of securities, the court found two problems with the plain-
tiff's theory. First, the court found that no causal connection existed be-
tween the stockholders' consent to the new credit arrangement and the
challenged redemption, meaning that the alleged misrepresentation could
not have affected the plaintiff's investment decision.25 Second, because the
plaintiff failed to allege that his preferred shares had an investment value
greater than the price at which they were redeemed, he could not demon-
strate an adverse price-value disparity with respect to his stock.256 Levine
suffered no compensable loss precisely because the challenged misrepresenta-
tions, while they may have been false, did not affect any reasonable invest-
ment decision, and therefore were not material. Furthermore, the court
found that the alternate remedy of disgorgement was not available to the
plaintiff, purportedly a forced seller, for the same reason: Whatever profits
Seilon may have received were not the product of any material
misstatement.257
Even in a case where the Second Circuit seemed to adopt a benefit-of-the-
bargain measure of damages, in reality it attempted to calculate the material-
ity of the defendant's misrepresentations. In Osofsky v. Zipf 258 sharehold-
ers were induced to sell their controlling block of stock in a corporation by
misstatements concerning the value of consideration they would receive as a
result of a subsequent tender offer and merger.259 The court distinguished
Levine and held that such shareholders could recover nonspeculative, com-
pensatory damages measured by the benefit of their bargain.26° After ob-
serving that the Levine court rejected the benefit-of-the-bargain measure
only because it was too speculative, the Osofsky court concluded that where
the misrepresentation concerned the amount of consideration to be paid for
the stock, the plaintiffs were entitled to receive the difference between the
Registration Statement for the common stock offered in the exchange program, stating therein
that it did not intend to call any of the preferred stock before the close of the exchange period.
Seilon then substituted stock in one of its subsidiary companies for cash that had earlier been
pledged as collateral for another loan. It then had the cash it acquired in that transaction
available for the redemption it had allegedly planned all along. Seilon then issued a call for the
preferred stock and redeemed it with the cash obtained in the exchange of collateral.
255. Id. at 332, 333-34. By finding that the misrepresentations did not affect Levine's in-
vestment decision, the court simply held that the misstatement was not material.
256. Id. at 332-35. Essentially, the court found that Levine "suffered no compensable
loss." Id. at 335.
257. Id. at 334-35.
258. 645 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1981).
259. Id. at 109-10, 114.
260. Id at 111-12, 114.
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fair value of the securities they gave up and the fair value of the considera-
tion defendants represented that the plaintiffs would receive.26'
Unlike Levine, the facts of Osofsky indicate that the benefit-of-the-bargain
measure of recovery reliably gauged the materiality of the defendant's mis-
statement. In Osofsky, the defendants misstated the price that they would
pay for the plaintiffs' stock.262 The court found the misstatement material
because the amount of consideration promised, unlike the fruits of specula-
tion or puffing, had a substantial likelihood of assuming importance to the
reasonable investor. 263 The degree of materiality of the misstatement, as the
court recognized, was defined easily by the disparity between the considera-
tion agreed upon and the consideration received.
In fact, the court of appeals recognized that its measure of damages was
rooted in the materiality of the misstatement. The district court noted that
the value of consideration actually received by plaintiffs was "approxi-
mately" the same as the value represented. 26 In reversing and remanding,
the Second Circuit reasoned that the key question for purposes of measuring
damages in the case was whether that disparity was material.2 65 The court
concluded that the trier of fact, on remand, must be allowed to award dam-
ages in the amount of that disparity if it finds "a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable investor would consider it important" in making an investment
decision.266 "[W]hether the measure of those compensatory damages be
out-of-pocket loss, the benefit of the bargain, or some other appropriate stan-
dard," the plaintiff is entitled to recover the economic loss suffered as a re-
sult of a material misstatement or omission.267 If, as in Osofsky, the benefit-
of-the-bargain measure best approximates the materiality of the misstate-
ments, then that measure is appropriate. But the measure itself is not ipso
facto appropriate; rather its propriety lies in the fact that it approximates the
materiality of the misstatements. Consequently, the Second Circuit has re-
261. Id. at 114.
262. Id. at 110. The defendant, J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc. (McDermott), represented
that it would compensate the Babcock & Wilcox shareholders, in exchange for each of their
shares, a package of securities valued at $62.50. Id. This final price resulted from a takeover
battle for Babcock between McDermott and United Technologies Corporation. Id. at 109.
263. Id. at 114-15.
264. Id. at 114. The district court determined that the plaintiff received $59.88, " 'approxi-
mately' the same as the consideration allegedly represented." Id. The court of appeals dis-
agreed stating that "the difference between $59.88 and $62.50 is some 4%, which is not so
obviously unimportant that it can be viewed as immaterial as a matter of law." Id. (footnote
omitted).
265. Id. at 114-15.
266. Id. (quoting TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976)).
267. Id. at 111.
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jected the benefit-of-the-bargain measure when it does not quantify
materiality.
In Barrows v. Forest Laboratories, Inc.,2 68 the Second Circuit declared that
"[a] claim for benefit-of-the-bargain damages must be based on the bargain
that was actually struck, not on a bargain whose terms must be supplied by
hypotheses about what the parties would have done if the circumstances sur-
rounding their transaction would have been different."'2 69 The court rejected
benefit-of-the-bargain damages in Barrows as "speculative," not because they
were difficult to measure, but because the effect of the defendant's deflation
of the value of plaintiffs' stock upon plaintiffs' decision to enter the transac-
tion was difficult to gauge.27° In other words, the materiality of the defend-
ant's misrepresentations was too speculative to allow the plaintiffs to amend
their complaint to seek damages covered by those misrepresentations.27'
Judge Friendly's embrace of the out-of-pocket measure and rejection of the
benefit-of-the-bargain measure in Osofsky thus reflected a judgment that,
generally, the disparity between fair value obtained and fair value relin-
quished provided a better measure of the materiality of the defendant's con-
duct than the disparity between fair value obtained and fair value promised.
2. The Chasins Measure of Damages
Even the Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co. 2 72 measure of damages for de-
frauded buyers of securities demonstrates a judicial effort to approximate the
materiality of the nondisclosure. The Chasins method measures the differen-
tial between the fair value of the consideration paid and the lowest fair value
of the stock within a reasonable time after the concealed material facts are
disclosed. Chasins, a commentator on a radio program sponsored by Smith,
Barney & Co., opened an account with the brokerage firm.273 In a series of
268. 742 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1984).
269. Id. at 60. The Barrows' sold their pharmaceutical manufacturing business to Forest
Laboratories in 1969 in exchange for 22,000 shares of Forest common stock then valued at
$550,000, or $25 per share. Id. at 56. Eight years later, Forest officials publicly disclosed that
between 1963 and 1974 "Forest officers had engaged in a scheme to misstate Forest's financial
condition and earnings." Id. The Barrows sued, alleging violations of 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)
(1982) (section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) (section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), and rule 10b-5. They claimed that the stock, in 1969,
was worth no more than $1.50 per share. Therefore, they "sought rescission of the 1969
Agreement or ... $550,000 plus interest." Id. By 1980, however, the Barrows had sold their
22,000 shares of Forest common stock for a total of $748,229.30. Id.
270. Id. at 60.
271. Id.; see also Whitbread (US) Holdings, Inc. v. Baron Philippe de Rothschild, 630 F.
Supp. 972, 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
272. 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
273. Id. at 1169.
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four transactions, Smith, Barney sold securities to Chasins in the over-the-
counter (OTC) market without disclosing to him that by trading in those
stocks on its own account it was making a market in the securities.274 The
brokerage house also failed to disclose to Chasins the amount that it had
paid for the securities sold to him.275 The securities cost Chasins $34,950.276
On June 20, 1962, Chasins sold the securities for $16,333.36.277 The district
court awarded Chasins damages in the amount of $18,616.64, plus interest,
which represented the disparity between his purchase price and the price at
which he sold before discovering Smith, Barney's material nondisclosures.278
On appeal, Smith, Barney argued that the difference between the price
charged Chasins and the fair market value of the securities on the date of
purchase provided the sole proper measure of Chasins' damages. The firm
filed an affidavit stating that the price that Chasins paid for his stock was
"the same as that generally available from other dealers for the same securi-
ties at the time of sale.", 279 Smith, Barney contended that in the absence of
any price-value disparity, Chasins suffered no cognizable damages.28°
The Second Circuit disagreed. Affirming the lower court's award to Cha-
sins of the difference between his high purchase price and his low resale price
before discovery of the omission, the court of appeals reasoned that Chasins
was entitled to recover damages resulting from the precise violation alleged.
274. Id. The Chasins court stated in footnote 4:
Market maker has been defined by SEC Rule 17a-9(f)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-9(f)
as follows:
(1) The term 'market maker' shall mean a dealer who, with respect to a particular
security, holds himself out (by entering indications of interest in purchasing and
selling in an inter-dealer quotations system or otherwise) as being willing to buy
and sell for his own account on a continuous basis otherwise than on a national
securities exchange.
Id. at 1170 & n.4. The precise nondisclosure at issue in Chasins, therefore, was that Smith,
Barney had made a market which would give rise to conflicting financial and fiduciary duties.
275. Id. at 1170. Smith, Barney took positions in the securities while it sold them to Cha-
sins in the over-the-counter (OTC) market as follows:
Date Number of Shares Issuer
July 19, 1961 200 Welch Scientific Co.
July 19, 1961 200 Tex-Star Oil and Gas Corp.
July 19, 1961 200 Howard Johnson Co.
August 22, 1961 200 Welch Scientific Co.
Id. at 1169 n.3.
276. Id. at 1173.
277. Id.; see also Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 305 F. Supp. 489, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1969),
aff'd, 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
278. Chasins, 305 F. Supp. at 496; 438 F.2d at 1173.
279. Chasins, 438 F.2d at 1173.
280. Id.
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The price at which Chasins purchased stock did not result in any violation;
rather, the "evil" lay in Smith, Barney's inducement of Chasins to invest
without disclosing the conflict between its financial interest and its fiduciary
duty.21  The material omission was not the failure to disclose facts that
would have altered the price paid for the stock, but the failure to disclose the
fact that Smith, Barney's recommendation of those stocks, based on their
investment potential, was also colored by self interest, not the best interests
of Chasins.2
2
The Chasins measure of damages, then, reflected the material omission:
Smith, Barney's true motives for recommending the purchase of the securi-
ties that affected Chasins' decision to purchase them, not the price he was
willing to pay. If Chasins had known of Smith, Barney's conflict of interest,
the court concluded, he may not have purchased the stock at all.2" 3 Thus,
the measure of the materiality of the nondisclosure in this case represented
the difference between the purchase price of $34,950 and the price of non-
purchase, or zero. But, the court reduced that measure by any value that the
plaintiff received as a result of the fraudulent transaction. Accordingly, the
court deducted from his recovery the amount that Chasins received when he
sold his securities.
This so-called resale price measure of damages is rescissory. As one court
has noted, the Chasins measure sought "to return the parties to the status
quo ante the sale. In effect, the plaintiff is refunded his purchase price, re-
duced by any value received as a result of the fraudulent transaction."2 4 If,
as the lower court in Chasins observed, the plaintiff learns of the fraud before
reselling his securities, the recovery of his purchase price will decrease by the
price at which he could have resold the stock "as of the time [the] plaintiff
became aware that the material facts had not been disclosed to him."2 5 Re-
gardless of whether the plaintiff resells his stock before or after discovery of
fraud, the court based the Chasins measure of damages upon the assumption
that if the materiality of the nondisclosure is so great as to affect the decision
281. Id.
The issue is not whether Smith, Barney was actually manipulating the price on Cha-
sins or whether he paid a fair price, but rather the possible effect of disclosure of
Smith, Barney's market-making role on Chasins' decision to purchase at all on
Smith, Barney's recommendation. It is the latter inducement to purchase by Smith,
Barney without disclosure of its interest that is the basis of this violation ....
Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 1172.
284. Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1361 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 951 (1978).
285. Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 306 F. Supp. 177, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 438
F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
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to invest at all, rather than the decision to invest at a certain price, the mea-
sure of damages should quantify that degree of materiality by returning to
plaintiff the entire purchase price.
The reduction in damages for resale value obtained, or which could have
been obtained, is a separate issue. That reduction is based upon the duty of
the plaintiff to take reasonable steps after notice of the fraud to mitigate his
damages.2 86 The Chasins, or resale, measure of damages, therefore, meas-
ures the materiality of a nondisclosure which affects an investor's decision
whether or not to enter the market for stock, not the decision to purchase
stock at a certain price.
Not surprisingly, Judge Friendly dissented from the denial of reconsidera-
tion en bane in Chasins, arguing that the damage award was improper be-
cause Smith, Barney's nondisclosure would not have been as material to the
reasonable investor's decision to enter the market as the majority of the
court had supposed.28 7 Judge Friendly reasoned first that Smith, Barney
owed no duty to Chasins to disclose its market making function. Alterna-
tively, he stated his belief that disclosure by the broker of its "market
maker" status in the particular securities would neither have decreased the
price that a reasonable investor would be willing to pay for the stock, nor,
for that matter, would it discourage the investor from entering the market at
all. 288 Accordingly, given the lack of materiality of the nondisclosure, a
court should find the damages negligible.
Chasins was criticized not because it was inappropriate generally, but
rather because the measure it applied does not quantify the materiality of the
nondisclosure involved. 289 However, when the defendant's omission truly
affects the plaintiff's decision to invest, rather than the price of the invest-
ment, the purchase price quantifies the materiality of the nondisclosure and,
therefore, properly measures the damages under rule lOb-5.
3. Permitting Defrauded Buyers to Recover Damages
The Second Circuit has allowed defrauded buyers to recover a measure of
the defendant's profit only when it would approximate the materiality of the
defendant's conduct. In Zeller v. Bogue Electric Manufacturing Corp.,29 °
Judge Friendly concluded that despite the general rule limiting damages to
286. See, e.g., Garnatz, 559 F.2d at 1361. :'That decline in value is determined by the losses
... so long as all such losses were incurred prior to the date that plaintiff knew, or should have
known, of the fraud." Id. (emphasis added, footnote omitted).
287. Chasins, 438 F.2d at 1176 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
288. Id. at 1174-76.
289. Id.
290. 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973).
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out-of-pocket losses, a plaintiff could endeavor to establish that the defend-
ant's profit properly measured damages under rule lOb-5.291 In doing so,
however, the plaintiff would encounter formidable obstacles: he would have
to show that the defendant's profits resulted from his material misstatements
or omissions. 29
2
In Zeller, the plaintiff, a stockholder of Belco Pollution Control Board
Corp. (Belco) brought a derivative action against its parent, Bogue Corpora-
tion (Bogue), directors of both corporations, and their accountants. The
plaintiff alleged that the parent caused its subsidiary, Belco, to loan it money
at no interest which, when disclosed, scuttled a profitable public offering of
Belco shares. 293 The Belco shareholders sought damages under rule lOb-5,
including the amount by which the loans enabled Bogue to profit from its
subsequent sale of Belco stock at a higher price than it would have received
absent the loan.294
Noting that this theory of recovery sounded in disgorgement, the court
reasoned that the remedy might be available to a defrauded buyer of securi-
ties, but the defrauded buyer would encounter serious difficulties when try-
ing to establish that the defrauding seller profited from the sale.2 95 In this
case, the plaintiff would have difficulty not in showing that the defendants
profited, but in demonstrating that those profits resulted as a consequence of
the omission of the material fact that the interest free loans existed.
When analyzing the theoretical underpinnings of restitution, the court
made clear that any recoverable profits must be based on the materiality of
the nondisclosure:
Restitution seems to be based not only on a feeling that the party
who has acted wrongfully should not be permitted to benefit from
his conduct but also that the injured party should be given the ben-
efits of a transaction he would otherwise have been in a position to
enter into.296
Where the defrauded party is a seller and the defendant resells the securities
at a profit, the defrauded party would have been equally induced to sell at
the higher market price, rendering the plaintiff's losses equal to the measure
of the defendant's profit. The nondisclosure in such a case includes the exist-
ence of subsequent resale profits.
291. Id. at 802-03.
292. Id. at 803.
293. Id. at 797.
294. Id. at 801.
295. Id. at 801-02.
296. Id. at 802 n.10. See also RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 150, 202 (1936).
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However, the court concluded here that when the defendant seller de-
frauds a buyer and uses the proceeds from the sale to enter into a second
profitable transaction, it is "far more difficult to say as a general proposition
that, if the fraud had not occurred, the defrauded party would also have
done this.",
297
The distinction between profit recovery from buyers and sellers is not a
"decisive" legal one; rather, it is based on the difficulty of proving the affect
of the material omission on the transfer of benefits from one party to an-
other.29' Thus, the court concluded that "absent unusual circumstances,"
when a seller induces a buyer, consequent to a material misstatement or
omission, to transfer benefits to a seller of securities, the buyer may recover
the seller's benefits "if these can be traced with sufficient certainty" to the
material misstatement or omission.29 9
4. Measuring Damages in Tippee Trading
Similarly, in Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc.,3 the Second Circuit con-
cluded that the disgorgement remedy was proper if it approximated the ma-
teriality of a tippee's nondisclosure.3 ' In this pre-Dirks v. SEC30 2 tippee
trading case, class plaintiffs purchased Liggett stock from individuals to
whom the corporation had tipped nonpublic figures showing a substantial
downturn in its earnings.30 3 The lower court awarded the plaintiffs an out-
of-pocket measure of damages, the difference between the price that they
297. Zeller, 476 F.2d at 802 n.10.
298. Id. at 802.
299. Id. at 802 n.10.
300. 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
301. Tipping "has become a form of corporate brinkmanship-non-public disclosure of busi-
ness-related information to financial analysts." Id. at 158. For a more complete discussion of
tipping, and the role of tippee and tippor, see Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). In Elkind,
the court stated that "[t]he knowing use by corporate insiders of non-public information for
their own benefit or that of 'tippees' by trading in corporate securities amounts to a violation of
Rule 10b-5,. . . which may give rise to a suit for damages by uninformed outsiders who trade
during a period of tippee trading." 635 F.2d at 165 (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); In re Cady, Roberts &
Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228 (2d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977)); see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222
(1980) (trust relationship between tippee and tippor must exist before section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 violated).
302. 463 U.S. at 648 (officer of a broker-dealer firm who received inside information con-
cerning an insurance company, in which neither he nor his firm owned any stock, passed it on
to clients who then traded in that company's stock, held not to have violated section 10(b) or
rule 1Ob-5).
303. Elkind, 635 F.2d at 158.
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paid during the first material tip and subsequent public disclosure, and the
price of the stock at a reasonable time after the disclosure.3 ° 4
The Second Circuit reversed and remanded, reasoning that although most
courts accepted the out-of-pocket damages theory in cases involving a fiduci-
ary's failure to disclose material facts to his buyer of stock, that measure was
improper in this case. 305 The court enunciated several reasons for its reluc-
tance to employ the out-of-pocket theory. First, the measure would not be
linked to the corporation's act of tipping information to outsiders.30 6 Sec-
ond, the court found that measuring the price-value disparity of the
purchased stock was too difficult because of the speculative character of the
stock's hypothetical market value and price.30 7 Thus, the court of appeals
rejected the lower court's use of the post-public disclosure market price to
evaluate the materiality of the information. 3°" The court rejected the post-
public release market price as an inadequate indicator of the materiality of
the nondisclosure because it found the first alleged tip completely immaterial
and the second alleged tip less material than the information subsequently
disclosed to the market.309 In light of its finding that the price-value dispar-
ity would not approximate the materiality of the tip, the court concluded
that the out-of-pocket measure would permit recovery "out of all proportion
to the wrong committed.,
3 10
The court also rejected the direct market repercussion recovery based
upon the loss in the market value of the stock purchased by plaintiffs attribu-
table to the erosion of the market price resulting from tippees' trades.3 '
The court found this theory unacceptable because proving the affect on the
market price of each tippee's trades using material nonpublic information
304. See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 123, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd in
part, 635 F.2d 156, 168 (2d Cir. 1980).
305. Elkind, 635 F.2d at 168, 170.
306. Id. at 170.
307. Id.; see Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 227 (8th Cir. 1975) (applying this
theory), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976).
308. Elkind, 635 F.2d at 170. The court stated:
Whatever may be the reasonableness of the nunc pro tunc 'value' method of calculat-
ing damages in other contexts, it has serious vulnerabilities here. It rests on the
fundamental assumptions (1) that the tipped information is substantially the same as
that later disclosed publicly, and (2) that one can determine how the market would
have reacted to the public release of the tipped information at an earlier time by its
reaction to that information at a later, proximate time .... One could not reasonably
estimate how the public would have reacted to the news that the Titanic was near an
iceberg from how it reacted to news that the ship had struck an iceberg and sunk.
Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 171.
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exceeded the realm of possibility.31 2 Moreover, the court asserted that this
approach would not fully measure the materiality of the nondisclosure in
cases where the tippees have a fiduciary duty to disclose.3 1 3 The market
erosion theory would not approximate the materiality of the defendant's
nondisclosure.
The court did adopt the disgorgement measure 3 4 as the best indication of
the materiality of the defendants' conduct. Under this approach, a plaintiff
may recover any post-purchase decline in the value of his shares up to a
reasonable time after disclosure, limited by the profit of the tippee.3" 5 This
measure, however, presumes that the plaintiff has shown that a "reasonable
investor" would not have paid as high a price for the stock had the informa-
tion been disclosed.316 In calculating recovery, the court found that only
those plaintiffs, who purchased stock between the time that the defendant
traded based on material information and the time that the nonpublic infor-
mation became "effectively disseminated," had any claim to damages.
Those purchasers could recover the difference between their purchase price
and the price to which the market declined after disclosure.3 17 Because the
total loss from market decline exceeded the gain realized by the tippees, the
amount of the gain attributable to the fraud was the proper measure of re-
covery that should be distributed, pro rata, among the plaintiff class.31 '
The court's decision to limit damages to the amount of the tippees' profit
resulting from their nondisclosures reflected its view that those nondisclo-
sures did not directly affect the price at which plaintiffs purchased stock.
Indeed, the court rejected the out-of-pocket measure on those grounds.31 9
312. Id.
313. The court faced precisely this situation in Elkind.
314. Elkind, 635 F.2d at 173.
315. Id. at 172.
316. Id.
A plaintiff would simply be required to prove (1) the time, amount, and price per
share of his purchase, (2) that a reasonable investor would not have paid as high a
price or made the purchase at all if he had had the information in the tippee's posses-
sion, and (3) the price to which the security had declined by the time he learned the
tipped information or at a reasonable time after it became public, whichever event
first occurred.
Id.
317. Id. at 173. The stock traded and closed on July 17, 1972, the day the tippee acted on
the tipped information and sold 1,800 shares of Liggett stock at 55 1/4. The market price of
Liggett shares declined to 46 3/8 on July 19, 1972, after the tipped information was disclosed
publicly and disseminated. Therefore, the court determined that "[t]he total recovery . . .
would be limited to the gain realized by the tippee from the inside information . . . 1,800
shares multiplied by approximately $9.35 per share." Id. (footnote omitted).
318. Id.
319. Id. at 170.
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However, the basis for liability in Elkind, the tippees' breach of their duty to
"abstain or disclose," has been rendered suspect by the United States
Supreme Court's decisions holding that rule lOb-5 liability attaches only to
those who fail to disclose material information in breach of a duty to
disclose.3 2 °
In other words, the court's sense that damages could not be measured in
Elkind because of the tenuous link between the tippees' conduct and the
plaintiffs' losses is based on its sense that the nondisclosure was not material.
Therefore, as part of the measure of damages, the court insisted that the
plaintiffs prove that their investment decisions were "recoverable," that, in
some fashion, the nondisclosures were significant to the reasonable inves-
tor.311 Yet, despite other theories, 322 Elkind clearly supports the proposi-
tion that disgorgement properly represents the quantification of the
materiality of Liggett's nondisclosure.
5. The Cover Measure of Damages
The Second Circuit's approval of the "cover" measure of damages, under
which a defrauded seller receives the difference between the highest value
that the security achieves within a reasonable time after disclosure of the
concealed information and the value of the security at the time of the trans-
action, is likewise limited to those circumstances in which that measure re-
flects the materiality of the nondisclosure. In Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo,
Inc., 3 2 3 a class of minority shareholders of General Outdoor Advertising Co.
(GOA) claimed that they were induced by defendant Skogmo and its officers
to sell their stock for inadequate consideration.3 24 The sale of shares by mi-
nority shareholders resulted in a merger procured by the defendants' failure
to disclose, in their proxy statement, the material fact that after the merger
the defendants intended to pursue an aggressive policy of selling GOA's
320. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,
228 (1980).
321. Elkind, 635 F.2d at 172-73; see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 643.
Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel noted that the court, in Elkind, "doubted that there
was a causal connection between the withholding and the losses. People would have traded
(and some would have suffered loss) no matter whether some investors got tips, and the truth
would have led to loss anyway," Id. Moreover, they explain the profit measure result as "just
another way of stating the point that gains and losses net out when the revelation of the truth
is delayed." Id. Yet, this Article proposes that the Elkind result supports the thesis that
disgorgement properly measures damages when it represents a quantification of the materiality
of the defendants' nondisclosure.
322. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 646; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228.
323. 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
324. Id. at 1283-89.
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plants, which had already produced a substantial excess of receipts over
book value.32
5
The district court, after finding that the nondisclosures were material and
that restoring the parties to their premerger condition was impossible, held
that the plaintiffs were entitled to restitution, which amounted to the profits
that Skogmo received from the sale of GOA assets.326 The lower court mea-
sured those profits by taking the highest value attained by all of the assets
transferred from GOA to Skogmo after the date of the merger, including
postmerger appreciation of the assets.32 7 That total asset value was then
reduced by the amount of consideration the plaintiffs received and the pro-
portionate share of the assets owned by Skogmo. The lower court effectively
awarded plaintiffs the difference between the consideration they received and
the "highest intermediate value" of the stock between the sale date and the
judgment date.32 8 But the lower court reconsidered that measure, recalcu-
lating the difference between the value received and the value sold by plain-
tiffs at the time of the merger.329
The court of appeals addressed the issue of whether the plaintiffs' recovery
should reflect the defendants' profit from the postmerger appreciation of as-
sets, measured by their highest intermediate value. The court found two
possible bases for such an award. First, based upon Janigan v. Taylor, plain-
tiffs should be able to recover the defendants' profit from the nondisclo-
sures.330 Second, because a defrauded seller should be placed in the position
he would have occupied absent the fraud, he should be able to recover the
appreciation on the securities that he sold on the theory that he would have
otherwise been able to do SO. 3 3 ' The court paid little heed to the first argu-
ment, apparently seeing no connection between the defendants' nondisclo-
sures and the subsequent appreciation of assets.332 The court more subtly
rejected the second rationale.
325. Id. at 1284-85, 1302-03.
326. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66, 103-04 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), modified,
478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
327. Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1290.
328. Id.; see also Gerstle, 298 F. Supp. at 104. The "highest intermediate value" represents
the highest market price reached by the stock between the date on which the plaintiff resold
the stock and the date of the judgment.
329. Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1290; see also 332 F. Supp. 644, 649-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), modi-
fied, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
330. Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1304; Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786-87 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); see also supra text accompanying notes 224-32.
331. Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1304.
332. Id. at 1305; see also Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571, 575-76 (4th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970).
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According to the court, plaintiffs argued that but for the defendants' non-
disclosures, no merger would have occurred and the plaintiffs, still holders of
GOA stock, would have obtained the benefits of asset appreciation. After
acknowledging that a plaintiff could, in "a proper case," recover unrealized
appreciation of securities sold through fraud, the court concluded that this
was not such a case because, as observed in the court's discussion of "materi-
ality," the nondisclosures would not have led to the complete abandonment
of the merger. At most, the disclosure would have produced an adjustment
of its terms.3 33 The nondisclosures were not so material as to account for
the disparity between consideration received and the highest intermediate
value obtained. As the court stated, "[t]he crucial fact here is the misrepre-
sentations ... related only to the sales of plants, as to which Skogmo's liabil-
ity for profits is conceded. '334 The "nexus" between the material omission
and the appreciation of assets, however, was "too thin." 33 5 Accordingly, the
plaintiffs could recover the defendants' profits in a rule 10b-5 action only
when those profits accurately measured the materiality of the defendants'
misstatements or omissions. Similarly, the "cover" measure of damages is
available to a seller only when the difference between sale price and the high-
est intermediate value of the stock represents the materiality of the con-
cealed facts.
6. The Rolf Series: Linking Recovery to Materiality
Even when the Second Circuit applies the more traditional out-of-pocket
remedy, based on a plaintiff's loss rather than the defendant's gain, its meth-
ods of calculating that recovery are linked directly to the materiality of the
nondisclosure. In Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 3 36 David Rolf sued
Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co. (BEDCO) for mismanagement of his invest-
ment portfolio. 337  Rolf also sued Michael Stott for aiding and abetting
Akiyoshi Yamada, Rolf's investment advisor, in the perpetration of securi-
ties fraud. The United States District Court for the Southern District of
333. Gerstle, 478 F.2d at 1305.
334. Id. at 1306.
335. Id.
336. 637 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.) (Rolf V), aff'g remand from, 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1980).
337. Id. at 79. For a chronology of the litigation, see Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co.,
424 F. Supp. 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (RolfI), remanded, 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1039 (1978) (RolfII) (remanding for an assessment of damages with guidelines set forth
by court of appeals); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 1979 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,919 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (RoIfII) (establishing Stott's knowledge of Yamada's fraudulent
intuition at September 1969), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 637 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1980) (Rolf
V); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., No. 73 Civ. 2967 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (RoifIV).
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New York found Stott liable to Rolf. 33 8 The remaining issues focused upon
assessing damages in the aiding and abetting claims.3 39
Upon remand, the district court determined that liability in an aiding and
abetting case began on the date that the defendant-broker must have known
of the primary fraud, and ceased on the date the plaintiff's stock portfolio
shifted to another broker..3  At the onset of liability, the market value of
Rolf's portfolio, calculated based on closing bid prices for his stock owned,
was $597,140.99.341 On the date that liability ceased, the market value of
the portfolio had fallen to $211,129.98, experiencing a gross economic loss of
$386,011.01.342 The district court then reduced the plaintiff's gross eco-
nomic loss by the percentage decline in an appropriate index.34 3 Finding
from that index a general decline of 7.5%, the district court reduced the
gross economic loss by that amount.3" The court added to the net eco-
nomic loss figure of $199,788.58 the amount of the plaintiff's commissions
during the liability period, plus interest; but denied prejudgment interest on
the net loss award.345
The Second Circuit concluded, however, that liability began earlier, when
the broker's representations to the plaintiff about the trustworthiness of the
primary wrongdoer became material, not when the broker must have known
of the primary fraud.3 46 Moreover, the court corrected its own instructions
to the district court. Initially, the court of appeals had instructed the lower
338. Rof I, 424 F. Supp. at 1043. The Second Circuit remanded this case for the proper
assessment of aiding and abetting damages awards. RolfII, 570 F.2d at 48.
339. Rolf1, 570 F.2d at 49. In its remand opinion, the Second Circuit set forth guidelines
for damages:
First, the district court should determine as near as possible the time when Stott
began to aid and abet Yamada's fraud and compute the market value of Rolf's port-
folio on that date. Second, the district court should subtract the value of the portfo-
lio on the date when Stott's participation in and assistance to the fraudulent scheme
ceased from the value on the date when Stott became an aider and abettor. This
amount is Rolf's gross economic loss. The district court should then reduce Rolf's
gross economic loss by the average percentage decline in value of the Dow Jones
Industrial, the Standard & Poor's Index, or any other well recognized index of value,
or combination of indices, of the national securities markets during the period com-
mencing with Stott's aiding and abetting and terminating with its cessation.
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
340. Rotf V 637 F.2d at 81.
341. Id. at 81-82.
342. Id. at 82.
343. Rof IV No. 73 Civ. 2967 at 6-7. The district court chose the Standard & Poor's Low
Priced Common Stocks Index because "in only four instances did the price of the shares in the
portfolio on January 31, 1970 exceed $20." Roll V 637 F.2d at 82.
344. Rot( V 637 F.2d at 82 (citing RoifIV No. 73 Civ. 2967 at 6-7).
345. RoifIV No. 73 Civ. 2967 at 7-8.
346. Rot( V 637 F.2d at 83-84 (citing Rotf, 424 F. Supp. at 1029-31).
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court to reduce the plaintiff's gross economic loss by a market index to ac-
count for decline not caused by the defendants' conduct. The Second Circuit
realized, however, that the reduction should be made to the initial market
value of the portfolio on the date the liability began, not to the gross eco-
nomic loss figure.347 Further, the Second Circuit concluded that any gross
economic loss figure should be reduced by withdrawals, which the plaintiff
made, that were not attributable to the material misstatements or omissions,
and that his net economic loss should be reduced by any settlement value
received. 34" Finally, the court of appeals found that the district court had
abused its discretion in failing to award the plaintiff prejudgment interest on
the "principal sum" used by the defendants during the period of liability.349
The Second Circuit's various Rolfdecisions thus stand for the proposition
that the lower federal courts should calculate damages for securities fraud in
a manner that approximates the trading losses resulting precisely from the
defendant's material misstatements or omissions. Calculating the gross eco-
nomic loss to the plaintiff during the period of the material misstatements or
omissions and then finding what portion of that loss is attributable to the
misstatements or omissions produces this effect. By eliminating external
market forces through a market index, the court can define that portion of
the market decline which resulted from the defendant's conduct.
In the Rolf cases, that figure approximated the true materiality of the mis-
statements or omissions made by the defendants. The disparity between the
portfolio value before fraud and after fraud discounted by external market
forces appropriately measures the materiality of the defendants' omissions
and misstatements because the conduct that gave rise to the liability rested
upon the ongoing concealment of the fraudulent mismanagement of the
plaintiff's account. The concealment was material precisely because it per-
mitted the mismanagement to continue until discovery, affecting the value of
the plaintiff's portfolio during that period. Consequently, the court's dam-
age measure, including its reduction for market decline, quantifies the mate-
riality of the aider and abetter's conduct.
Indeed, the Second Circuit has rejected a market index reduction where
such a reduction would not approximate the materiality of the defendant's
conduct. In Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc.,350 for example, the Second Cir-
cuit refused to reduce the plaintiffs' damage award to account for a contem-
347. Id. at 84.
348. Id. at 83-84.
349. Id. at 86-87. The Second Circuit reasoned that prejudgment interest was proper (1) as
compensation for actual losses sustained by the plaintiff and (2) in the interests of justice and
fairness, given the defendant's conduct. Id. at 87.
350. 673 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1982).
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poraneous market decline because the misstatements that induced them to
purchase stock at inflated prices were unrelated to any subsequent market
decline."5' Where, as in Sirota, the materiality of the misstatements is calcu-
lated amply by the disparity between purchase price and fair value of stock
at the time of purchase, no need arises to track a market index. Where, as in
cases similar to Rolf however, the defendant's misstatements continue and
losses develop, a market index properly calculates the materiality of the
misstatements.
Whether the Second Circuit terms its damage calculation out-of-pocket,
benefit-of-the-bargain, disgorgement, resale price, or cover, the measure of
damages selected represents an effort to quantify the materiality of the de-
fendant's misstatement or omission. Moreover, even when the out-of-pocket
measure is chosen, the price-value disparity is calculated in a manner that
hinges on the precise materiality of that misstatement or omission.
C. The Third Circuit
1. Theories of Damages in Rule lOb-5 Actions
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit subscribes to the
traditional out-of-pocket measure of damages in rule lOb-5 cases.3 52 It fol-
lows the rationale of Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States3 53 that a de-
frauded seller may recover "the difference between what the seller received
for his stock and what he would have received had there been no fraudulent
conduct. ' 354 Furthermore, the Third Circuit applies this measure of dam-
ages to a defrauded buyer: "the measure of damages is the difference be-
tween what the [buyer paid] for his stock and what he would have [paid] had
there been no fraudulent conduct."'355 Both defrauded buyers and defrauded
sellers may elect to recover damages measured by the disparity in the fair
value of what they received and the fair value of what they transferred.
The court has also held that a defrauded seller may elect to recover the
amount of the defendant's profit rather than his own losses.356 If a defend-
ant, upon resale, receives more than the plaintiff loses, "then the award is the
351. Id. at 577-78. The Second Circuit rejected the application of Roif I, 570 F.2d 38 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978) and Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332
F. Supp. 544, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), reasoning that "[a]ny subsequent decline in the market
had no effect on that fraudulent sale." Sirota, 673 F.2d at 578.
352. See Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 190 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 938 (1982).
353. 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972); see also supra text accompanying notes 35-65.
354. Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577, 586 (3d Cir. 1975).
355. Sharp, 649 F.2d at 190 (citing Duralite, 524 F.2d at 586); see also Glick v. Campagna,
613 F.2d 31, 36 (3d Cir. 1979).
356. Glick, 613 F.2d at 36; Duralite, 524 F.2d at 586.
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amount of the defendant's profit over and above what he had paid to the
plaintiff.",311 When a defrauded seller elects to recover a defendant's profits
as damages, the seller is entitled only to those profits that are not a result of
the defendant's special efforts."' 8 Clearly, the defendant's profit must repre-
sent a "proximate consequence" of the material misstatements or
omissions.35 9
Finally, the Third Circuit allows the plaintiff to choose "to seek the equi-
table remedy of rescission rather than common law damages. ' ' 3 ' Thus, if a
defendant still owns the stock sold by a plaintiff, the plaintiff may have the
shares returned and seek an accounting of the amount of money the plaintiff
would have received during the period in which the defendant owned the
stock.36 1 If, on the other hand, the defendant no longer owns the stock or
the stock otherwise is unavailable because of a merger or other intervening
event, a court may award "rescissory damages to place the plaintiff in the
same financial position he would have been were it possible to return the
stock." '362 The rescissory award presumably is available to defrauded buyers
as well as to defrauded sellers of securities. The Third Circuit thus allows a
plaintiff to choose from out-of-pocket, disgorgement, and rescission, based
upon the measure that affords the greatest recovery.
2. Application of the Third Circuit's Theories of Damages
When applying these damages principles, the Third Circuit has effectively
limited the plaintiff's recovery to an approximation of the materiality of the
challenged conduct. For example, in Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades,363 the Third
Circuit permitted the plaintiff to elect to recover either its out-of-pocket
losses or the profits that the defendant buyers received, but the court circum-
scribed the measure of those profits.364 Defendant Rhoades purchased 50%
of the shares of MS&R Corporation held by plaintiff Rochez Brothers, Inc.
for $598,000. Within the year, Rhoades had consummated ongoing and un-
disclosed negotiations to sell 100% of MS&R stock to a third party for more
357. Duralite, 524 F.2d at 586.
358. Glick, 613 F.2d at 36; Duralite, 524 F.2d at 586.
359. Duralite, 524 F.2d at 586; see also Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 411-12 (3d
Cir. 1973).
360. Glick, 613 F.2d at 36.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 37 (citing Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 135 F. Supp. 176, 186-94 (D. Del.
1955), modified, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956)).
363. Rochez Bros., 491 F.2d at 402.
364. Id. at 416. Here again, plaintiffs brought suit against defendants alleging violations of
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Securities and
Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5. Id. at 402.
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than $4,250,000.365 The district court found that Rhoades had failed to
state the material fact that he had received higher offers for the plaintiff's
stock before the plaintiff sold the stock to him. The court therefore awarded
as damages the difference between the third-party offeror's valuation of the
stock and what the plaintiff received.366 The court refused to award the
plaintiff the full amount of the defendant's profit because some of the defend-
ant's profit primarily resulted from the defendant's special efforts: his ag-
gressive and enterprising management ability. 367
The Third Circuit, however, concluded that although Rhoades may have
engaged in special managerial efforts, those efforts took place before the date
of the plaintiff's sale.368 Those efforts were also not disclosed to the plaintiff.
Accordingly, defendant's omission was not simply that negotiations were
taking place with third-party purchasers, as the district court supposed;
rather, the material omission was the third-party purchaser's valuations of
MS&R.3 69 The proper measure of the materiality of the omissions, there-
fore, was "the difference between the value of 50% of MS&R stock on the
basis of the [resale price] and the amount Rochez received from
Rhoades. ' 370
The court further demonstrated that this measure of damages rested upon
the materiality of the defendant's nondisclosure. 371' The circuit court re-
jected the defendant's claim that the district court improperly based the
measure of damages on the plaintiff's knowledge of the nondisclosed facts 3 72
or their materiality. The circuit court reasoned that the value of what the
defendant gained should be measured by profit proximately caused by mate-
rial omissions and that the omission in these circumstances included the ma-
365. Id. at 405-06. Rhoades and Rochez Brothers each owned 50% of the shares of
MS&R Corporation as of May 1967. However, after fundamental business differences, both
parties agreed to try to procure a third party to purchase MS&R. Id. at 405. Unable to find
any interested buyers, Rochez Brothers agreed to sell to Rhoades their 50% share in MS&R.
Id. Meanwhile, however, Rhoades had generated, through the help of a solicitor, substantial
interest in a third party purchase of MS&R, yet failed to disclose this information to Rochez
Brothers. Id. at 406.
366. Id. at 412.
367. Id. The district court recognized that the Janigan v. Taylor measure of damages gov-
erned this case, but disregarded it here because of the seemingly unjust result it would have
produced. Id.; see Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965);
see also supra text accompanying notes 224-32.
368. Rochez, 491 F.2d at 412.
369. Id.
370. Id. The circuit court believed "that [they were] bound by the clear rule of damages
enunciated in [Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972)]." Id.
371. Rochez, 491 F.2d at 414 (opinion denying the petition for rehearing).
372. Id.
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terial fact that the defendant had negotiated for resale at the profit price.373
Hence, the measure of the defendant's "profit" (sometimes labeled disgorge-
ment, sometimes benefit-of-the-bargain)3 74 available to defrauded buyers or
sellers of stock is limited to the materiality of the omissions or
misstatements.3 75
Similarly, when the district court failed to limit plaintiff's recovery to the
materiality of the challenged conduct, the Third Circuit, in Sharp v. Coopers
& Lybrand, 376 rejected disgorgement or benefit-of-the-bargain damages. In
Sharp, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania adjudged an accounting firm in violation of rule 10b-5 for preparing
an opinion letter that misstated material facts about the tax consequences of
the plaintiffs' limited partnership interests in an oil and gas venture.377
Adopting the out-of-pocket measure of damages and rejecting contrary ex-
pert testimony, the trial court instructed the jury to find the difference be-
tween the price paid by the plaintiffs and the actual worth of the investment
at the time of purchase.378 The court then asked the jury to find the "actual
value, if any" of the plaintiffs' purchase on the date of sale. The jury, adopt-
373. Id. at 416-17.
374. Id. at 414.
375. Id. at 416-17.
376. 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982).
377. Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879, 887 (E.D. Pa. 1978), rev'd in part, 649
F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981) (reversed on the issue of damages), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982).
378. Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 83 F.R.D. 343, 347-48 (E.D. Pa. 1979), vacated, 649
F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981). The jury instruction read:
We are asking you to find what was the actual value of this investment in 1971. You
heard Mr. Wilson testify that he would have projected in 1971 400 million cubic feet
of gas and oil .... and that that would give a return of ... somewhere around...
$7900 over a nine-year period.
However, when he adopted the same method of Mr. Templeton, who took the
average production over... five years .... he came out with 250 million cubic feet of
gas and oil.
I am now instructing you to disregard Mr. Wilson's testimony as to the 400 mil-
lion cubic feet because the test is: Wat was the actual value in 1971, not its theoreti-
cal value in 1971.
So, you will disregard that, and you will make your choice on the actual value of
these investments between the testimony of Mr. Whitman who in effect said it had no
value because it was not saleable and that he would not advise anybody to touch it,
the testimony of Mr. Templeton who gave you a figure of $1240, and the testimony
of Mr. Wilson who gave you a figure of $4,080 for a 1/8 interest but who also said
that if he knew of fraud, if he knew that the General Partner was dishonest, that he
wouldn't touch it with a 10-foot pole.
Sharp, 649 F.2d at 189-90 (quoting Record at 2691a-92a) (emphasis added).
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ing a witness' testimony, concluded that the theoretical value of the invest-
ment equaled $1,240 in 1971.379
The Third Circuit reversed, finding that the proper "goal in formulating a
damage instruction must be to compensate appellees precisely for the dam-
age directly resulting from the appellant's wrongful acts," that is defendant's
material misstatements and omissions.38 Accordingly, damages must be
measured by the "actual value" of the investment at the time of the transac-
tion, assuming that all of the facts withheld by the defendant are known. By
allowing the jury to consider "subsequent production data unknown to any-
one at the time the investment was made," the lower court effectively per-
mitted a price-value disparity not based on the materiality of defendant's
nondisclosures.31 Any promise of future appreciation from the oil wells,
the court suggested, was not a material fact; rather, it was puffing that would
not have had a substantial likelihood of influencing the reasonable investor's
decision.382 However, a public accounting firm's promise of tax benefits in
the limited partnership represented a material misstatement. The court con-
cluded, "[i]f the opinion letter contained omissions and misrepresentations
impacting only on the validity of the tax opinion, the proper measure of
damages is the amount of money invested minus the value of the speculative
investment at the time of purchase, derived from all information available to
investors."3 ' 3 The remainder of the purchase price minus the value received
will equal the value that the court assigns to the materiality of the misrepre-
sentation at issue. Thus, damages reflected the amount by which the defend-
ant's false opinion letter affected the price that investors were willing to pay
for their investments. The Third Circuit, therefore, instructed the lower
court on remand to isolate and quantify each material misstatement. 384
The Third Circuit has also allowed a rescissory method of recovery when
doing so approximates the materiality of the nondisclosures or misstate-
ments. In Glick v. Campagna, 385 for example, the court held that rescission
and restitution secured through an accounting properly remedied the dam-
ages that were sustained by the plaintiff. The defendant made material mis-
statements about the existing and prospective financial condition of their
closely held corporation, and these misstatements induced the plaintiff to sell
379. Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 491 F. Supp. 55, 56 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (district court's
interpretation of the jury's response to the interrogatories), vacated, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir.
1981).
380. Sharp, 649 F.2d at 190.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 191.
385. 613 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1979).
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his stock at a deflated price.386 The district court awarded plaintiff damages
in the amount of his 50% share of all monies that the corporation had paid
to the defendant, excluding the defendant's salary, and reduced the damages
by the price plaintiff actually received for his stock.387 In justifying the
award, the lower court reasoned that a hybrid form of relief, which at-
tempted to place the plaintiff in his pretransaction condition, was proper.388
The Third Circuit held that the lower court should have granted rescis-
sion, requiring the defendant to return the stock to the plaintiff. Then, the
district court should have ordered restitution, based on an accounting from
the defendant of the profits they received as a result of the material misstate-
ments or omissions.389 In doing so, the Third Circuit suggested that when a
plaintiff elects rescission, he need not establish the value of the stock at the
time of the transaction, particularly the stock of a close corporation.3 90
Rather, the theory of rescission rests upon the assumption that the transac-
tion never took place; the defendant returns the stock and profits, which
absent the fraud, would have run to the plaintiff.391 The circuit court had
little difficulty awarding the return of the stock. The court reasoned that the
material omissions regarding the close corporation affected the plaintiff's de-
cision to get out of the market entirely, rather than to sell stock at a given
price. The court, however, remanded the case for an accounting of whether
any other "profits" received by the defendant would be recoverable as a mea-
sure of the materiality of his omissions, rather than as an impermissible
"punishment."'3 92
Hence, the Third Circuit has held that the district court has broad equita-
ble powers to fashion any remedy "tailored to fit the circumstances of the
386. Id. at 35. Glick and Campagna each owned 50% of the stock in Washington Market-
ing & Financial, Inc. (WMFI), a company that arranged and financed computer equipment
leases. Id. at 33. After some financial difficulties, Campagna informed Glick that the com-
pany faced an unprofitable future due to its inability to procure the proper insurance and its
inability to pay the proper withholding taxes. Id. at 34. Campagna then induced Glick to sell
his 50% share of WMFI to him for Glick's original $2,000 investment and repayment of a
$10,000 loan that Glick made to WMFI. In reality, however, Campagna did procure several
profitable equipment lease contracts through negotiations with another company, EFM Capi-
tol Corporation, and Campagna failed to disclose the procurement of these leases to Glick. Id.
387. Id. at 35. The opinion of the district court was unreported.
388. Id. at 36.
389. Id. at 37.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id. "The purpose of rescission and restitution is to restore the plaintiff to where he
would have been had the sale not taken place. To place him in a better position is beyond the
scope of the remedy and amounts to punishment of the defendant." Id.
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individual case' 3 93 and has held that "rescission is an appropriate remedy"
for a securities violation.3 94 Further, it has carefully ensured that, in re-
turning the parties to the status quo ante, the fraud is defined with such
precision that the remedy quantifies the materiality of the concealed
information.
D. The Fourth Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit gives a plaintiff
the right to choose, and lower courts the discretion to apply, the proper
measure of damages in rule lOb-5 cases. In the Fourth Circuit, a plaintiff
may elect to rescind the securities transaction.395 Moreover, a court may
grant rescission where the contract is illegal per se, or where the fraud is
collateral to the transaction, making the transaction voidable at the option of
the injured party.396
Alternatively, a plaintiff may choose to affirm the transaction and sue for
damages.397 Damages are measured as "the difference between the fair value
... received and the fair value of what... would have [been] received had
there been no fraudulent conduct. ' 39 ' However, "if the plaintiff's damages
... are not equal to or greater than the profit which accrued to defendants as
a result of their fraudulent conduct, [a] [c]ourt will measure [the damages]
by the restitution of the latter amount., 399 Moreover, the lower courts have
exercised their discretion to affix a measure of recovery that combines dam-
ages and rescission.' A lower court within the Fourth Circuit has based
this rescissional measure of recovery either on the plaintiff's out-of-pocket
losses or on the defendant's profit."'
393. See Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 586 F. Supp. 1297, 1302-05
(W.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd mem., 760 F.2d 257, 260 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 919 (1985).
394. Id. at 1305.
395. Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970).
Plaintiffs must make this election within a reasonable time after the fraud is disclosed. Ameri-
can Gen. Ins. Co. v. Equitable Gen. Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721, 756 (E.D. Va. 1980).
396. American Gen., 493 F. Supp. at 755. In exercising its discretion to grant rescission, a
court should consider: (1) whether the fraud is collateral to the contract; (2) the balance of
equities; (3) the public interest; (4) the length of time between fraud and judgment; (5) changes
in position since the fraud occurred; (6) degree of changes in position; (7) interests of third-
parties; (8) difficulty of rescinding transaction; (9) fairness of fraudulent transaction; and (10)
whether damages are adequate relief. Id. at 756 n.63.
397. Baumel, 412 F.2d at 575.
398. American Gen., 493 F. Supp. at 760 (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972)).
399. Id. at 760-61.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 760-61.
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This variety of approaches to damages by the Fourth Circuit has led one
commentator to observe that it has joined other circuits in cross-pollinating
the analytically distinct concepts of out-of-pocket damages and unjust en-
richment. 4° 2 Indeed, the courts have mixed tort concepts of causation with
contractual notions of rescission in an effort to approximate the materiality
of the concealed information in each case.
1. Baumel v. Rosen
The Fourth Circuit, in Baumel v. Rosen," 3 rejected rescission and em-
braced disgorgement as the proper remedy precisely because the latter more
accurately quantified the materiality of the defendants' concealments. Plain-
tiffs Milton Baumel and Earl Weiner alleged that the defendants induced
them to sell their "units" in a corporation engaged in the sale of real es-
tate.' ° Specifically, the jalaintiffs alleged that the defendants misrepresented
the desperate financial state of the corporation, by omitting the material
facts that the corporation had a ready source of funds, that its property sales
exceeded its expectations, and that potential profits were excluded from an
exhibited stockholders' report. 4 5 Although Baumel and Weiner sold their
stock to the defendants at a 900% profit, the district court found that their
profit could have been "far handsomer" and ordered the defendants to re-
scind the transaction, returning to plaintiffs the current equivalent of the
shares they had purchased. 406
The Fourth Circuit, however, held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to
rescission because they had waited eighteen months after the discovery of
the concealed information to renounce their sales." 7 The court did, how-
ever, award the plaintiffs damages in the amount of the defendants' profit
resulting from the fraud." 8 In rejecting rescission, the court reasoned: "Re-
scission is a radical move, and the law exacts the election of that course to be
asserted without wait. The demand is that advice of the determination be
given within a reasonable time after discovery of the ground for rescis-
402. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 373-78.
403. 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970).
404. Id. at 573.
405. Id. For a comprehensive and clear account of the facts, see Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F.
Supp. 128, 132-39 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970).
406. Baumel, 412 F.2d at 573-74.
407. Id. at 574-75; see also Friedman, Delay as a Bar to Rescission, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 426,
432 (1941) (discussion of time limitations on plaintiff's election for the remedy of rescission).
408. Baumel, 412 F.2d at 575-76 (the court relied upon the decision in Janigan v. Taylor,
344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965)); see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 224-32.
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sion. ' ° The court asserted that the election must be made within a reason-
able time because: (1) in an equitable action, generally the plaintiff must have
clean hands; (2) in a securities action, particularly, a court should not permit
the plaintiff to wait to see whether the price of the stock sold increases in
value before electing to have it returned rather than sue for damages, thus
placing all market risk on the defendant for a long period of time; and (3) the
aim of rescission, to return the parties to their pretransaction condition, is
frustrated by the lapse of time.41°
While these considerations justified the court's rejection of rescission, the
rescission remedy would also fail to reflect the materiality of the conceal-
ment in this case. The plaintiffs sought to recover the full increase in the
value of their shares resulting from two independent stock splits.411 The
court determined that the plaintiffs knew or should have known of material
facts concealed by the defendants after the first stock split, but well before
the second.4 12 Accordingly, the court rejected rescission because the value
of the stock eighteen months after the disclosure of the material facts clearly
would not have reflected the materiality of the nondisclosures.
The court also embraced a qualified "profit" measure of damages because
that measure would reflect the materiality of the concealed information.
Although the court began with the general proposition that the plaintiffs are
entitled to damages as an alternative to rescission, in the amount of the de-
fendants' profit, it calculated that profit by taking the sale of the stock one
day after the concealed facts were disclosed.4 13 By limiting the damages to
defendants' profit resulting from their misstatements, the court's approach
more accurately reflected the materiality of those misstatements. Baumel
stands for the proposition that no matter what the lower courts within the
Fourth Circuit label their damage measure, they should endeavor to quan-
tify the materiality of the concealed information at issue.
2. Nondisclosure of Merger Negotiations
In American General Insurance Co. v. Equitable General Corp.,414 the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, followed
the Fourth Circuit's direction in Baumel. In American General, the defend-
409. Baumel, 412 F.2d at 574.
410. Id. at 574-75.
411. Id. at 574. A stock split is the division of the outstanding shares, or class of shares, of
a corporation into more units without altering each shareholder's original proportional inter-
est. See 11 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5362.1
(rev. perm. ed. 1986).
412. Baumel, 412 F.2d at 576.
413. Id.
414. 493 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Va. 1980).
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ants induced the plaintiffs to sell their stock back to the corporation by fail-
ing to disclose the existence of merger negotiations. The defendants
eventually sold the stock at a substantially higher price to a third party.4" 5
As a result of the omission of the merger negotiations, American General
brought suit against Equitable alleging violations of rule lOb-5. The court
first analyzed the availability of rescission. Unlike Baumel, after finding that
the plaintiffs had sought rescission in a timely fashion after full disclosure of
the concealed facts, the court determined that the equitable factors favored
that remedy. The court found that: (1) the defendants suffered no hardship
because the merger proceeded despite the lawsuit; (2) the public interest in
enforcing rule lOb-5 supported the election of remedies; (3) the defendants
did not change their position prior to learning of the action for rescission; (4)
the parties considered the rescission action in determining the merger price,
thus avoiding undue harm to third parties; and (5) although specific restitu-
tion of the shares of stock was not possible, the court was capable of finding
a "money substitute. ' 4
16
The money substitute, which the court ordered, measured the materiality
of the nondisclosure of the ongoing merger negotiations. The court then set
out to determine "what precise action the plaintiff would have taken" if the
existence of merger negotiations had been disclosed.41 The court decided
that the plaintiff would not have realized the full $51 per share price, even if
the fraud had not occurred. Rather, it found that the plaintiff would have
held onto the shares until presented with an opportunity to sell them at their
fair value.41 8
Under the label of rescission, therefore, the court determined the price-
value disparity. The fair value of the stock could not be measured by the
market price on the date of the transaction because the nondisclosures
tainted that price.4" 9 Following the Restatement of Restitution,4 20 the court
valued the shares sold at their highest value attained within a reasonable
415. Id. at 727-28 (plaintiffs sold their stock to Equitable General Corporation for $32.50
per share, and Equitable eventually resold the shares to Gulf United for $51 per share).
416. Id. at 756-59.
417. Id. at 759.
418. Id.; see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 757-58 (1975)
(Powell, J., concurring) (offeree who waited two years after shares were issued and until after
market price soared could not maintain suit); but see Capital Invs., Inc. v. Bank of Sturgeon
Bay, 430 F. Supp. 534, 537-38 (E.D. Wis. 1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1978) (plaintiffs
collaterally estopped from maintaining suit where they did not rely on any misrepresentations
and suffered no damages).
419. American Gen., 493 F. Supp. at 761.
420. Id. at 763; see RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 151 comment c (1936).
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time after disclosure of the merger negotiations.42' The court accepted the
asking price, determined two weeks after disclosure, rather than the bid
price to reflect roughly the premium to the plaintiffs of selling their block of
shares.422
The court's rescissional damage award therefore reflected the materiality
of the nondisclosure of merger negotiations. First, the plaintiffs' purchase
price represented their reasonable appraisal of the stock's worth without the
concealed information. Second, the fair value settled upon by the court rep-
resented a reasonable investor's appraisal of the stock when the concealed
information became known. In fact, the court considered the fair value of
the stock on the date and at a price that reflected the significance that a
reasonable investor would attach to the announcement of an agreement in
principle. 423 Finally, the disparity between the uninformed price and the
materially informed price, labeled the rescissional measure of damages in
this case, was the measure of the materiality of the nondisclosure.
E. The Fifth Circuit
1. Damage Theories
A defrauded rule lOb-5 plaintiff may recover both general and special
damages in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
424
General damages necessarily and usually reward a plaintiff as a result of the
421. American Gen., 493 F. Supp. at 765 n.79. The court determined that two weeks after
the sale constituted a reasonable time. "[T]he [c]ourt... considered the sophistication of the
plaintiff, the nature of the fraud in this case as being particularly resistant to discovery by the
market, [and] the time necessary for the market to react to the disclosure of Equitable's agree-
ment in principle .... Id. See also A. JACOBS, supra note 6, § 260.03[c](iii), at 11-43 to 11-
46.
422. American Gen., 493 F. Supp. at 766 n.81. The asking price was $44 per share as
opposed to the $42 per share bid price. Id. Consequently, the court calculated the rescissory
measure of damages as follows:
$44.00 (fair value per share of stock two weeks after
disclosure)
$32.50 (price per share received by plaintiffs)
$11.50 (rescissional damages per share)
X
315,000 (plaintiffs' total shares)
$3,622,500 in rescissional damages
Id.
423. Id. at 765.
424. Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196, 1212-14 (5th Cir. 1982) (discussing the congruence
between damages under rule lob-5 and Texas state law). See also A. JACOBS, supra note 6, at
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challenged wrong.4 25 Special damages or consequential damages do not rep-
resent necessary compensation for the wrong, but do flow from the allegedly
wrongful conduct.426 Special damages cannot be awarded if their relation-
ship to the defendant is too remote, if they redress the same injury compen-
sated by general damages or prejudgment interest, or if they are not plead
with "specificity. '4 27 Special damages are obtainable, however, even if the
plaintiff can show no general damages.
4 28
In awarding general and special damages under rule lOb-5, the Fifth Cir-
cuit does not insist that the plaintiff prove the amount of damages with
mathematical certainty."' Rather, the defendant bears the risk of imprecise
calculations of damages.43°
Within these broad guidelines, the Fifth Circuit has followed the weight of
authority and has applied the traditional measure of damages, based upon
the out-of-pocket rule, to rule lOb-5 violations.43 Under the out-of-pocket
rule, a defrauded buyer of securities may recover the "difference between the
price paid and the real value of the security at the time of the initial
purchase., 4 32 The court has defined the real value of the securities as "the
fair market value absent the misrepresentations, at the time of the initial
purchase." '433 The court has repeatedly applied this measure of damages in
rule lOb-5 actions.434 When plaintiffs bring a class action under rule lOb-5,
§ 260.03[b], at 11-28. See D. DOBBS, supra note 8, at § 3.2. See also infra notes 425-30 and
accompanying text.
425. Meyers, 693 F.2d at 1214.
426. Id.
427. See A. JACOBS, supra note 6, § 260.03[d], at 11-135; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 9(g)
(claims for special damages must be specifically stated).
428. A. JACOBS, supra note 6, § 260.03[d], at 11-134.
429. Meyers, 693 F.2d at 1215.
430. Id. (citing A. JACOBS, supra note 6, § 260.02).
Although the plaintiff must present as much proof as he can, the defendant has no
ground to complain if the plaintiff cannot prove the extent of his injury (as distin-
guished from the fact that he was harmed) with mathematical certainty. In effect,
the defendant bears the uncertainty as to the amount of damages.
Id.
431. Smoky Greenhaw Cotton Co. v. Merrill Lynch, 785 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1986); Hud-
dleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 554-56 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 459 U.S. 375 (1983). See also supra notes 35-65 and accompanying text.
432. In re Letterman Bros. Energy Secs. Litig., 799 F.2d 967, 972 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing
Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 556).
433. Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 556.
434. See Alley v. Miramon, 614 F.2d 1372, 1387 (5th Cir. 1980) (dicta); Nor-Tex Agencies,
Inc. v. Jones, 482 F.2d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974); Wolf v.
Frank, 477 F.2d 467, 478 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 975 (1973); see also Dupuy v.
Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1024-25 (5th Cir.) (damages measured by difference between amount
for which defrauded buyer bought stock and amount he would have received absent misrepre-
sentation), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977). Compare John R. Lewis, Inc. v. Newman, 446
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the Fifth Circuit has required district courts to calculate the real value of the
stock on the date each member of the class entered into the fraudulent trans-
action.435 Once that value is determined, damages in the typical case be-
come a "simple matter of subtraction of the 'true' value of the security on
the date of the plaintiff's purchase from the purchase price paid by the plain-
tiff on that date.",436
The Fifth Circuit, however, has recognized the inappropriateness of the
out-of-pocket rule in certain circumstances: "The cases are uniform in stat-
ing that one remedy which may be available to a defrauded plaintiff under
Rule lOb-5 is to seek rescission of the transaction . . . ."3' Rescission at-
tempts to avoid or undo the transaction and return the defrauded party to
the party's position before the wrongful inducement to enter the transac-
tion.43 8 Although the Fifth Circuit has recognized the legitimacy of rescis-
sion and "rescissional damages" for rule lOb-5 violations, it has placed limits
on their availability. The court has declared that such recovery is usually
available in cases where privity runs between the plaintiff and the defendant
or where the recovery reflects losses proximately caused by the defendant's
conduct.
4 39
The Fifth Circuit requires privity in rule lOb-5 cases that involve de-
frauded buyers because the rescissory remedy for those buyers under section
12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 requires privity. According to the court,
allowing buyers to seek implied rule lOb-5 remedies in the same action cir-
cumvents the express requirements of section 12(2) and produces inequitable
results."' In addition, in an open market transaction, the fiction of re-
turning the consideration is strained. 1 In light of some recent United
States Supreme Court decisions, however, the Fifth Circuit's continued ad-
herence to the privity requirement for rescission under rule lOb-5 is dubious.
F.2d 800, 805 (5th Cir. 1971) (court notes in dicta that although usual remedy is rescission or
restitution, the out-of-pocket rule is appropriate where factual misrepresentation was coupled
with seller's default on express agreement) with Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591, 605
(5th Cir. 1975) (plaintiff's right to seek damages compatible with rescission including fair mar-
ket value absent misrepresentation), vacated and remanded, 426 U.S. 944 (1976).
435. Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 556. Determination of the real value of the securities may be
performed with the help of an expert or a special master. The court has suggested that in a
class action, an expert or master should create a "value line," indicating the true value of the
stock on each date during the class period. Id. at 556 n.36.
436. Id. at 556.
437. Id. at 554 (quoting R. JENNINGS AND H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 1085
(4th ed. 1977)).
438. Id. at 554.
439. Id. at 555; see also Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases Involving
Actively Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. REV. 371, 376-77 (1974).
440. Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 555.
441. Id.
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First, the Supreme Court rejected both the strict privity and proximate cause
tests of a "seller" under section 12(2), declaring that "privity is not essen-
tial" in a fraud action." 2 If privity is not required under section 12(2), no
inequities result from relaxing the requirement under rule lOb-5. Second,
the Supreme Court embraces the fraud-on-the-market concept in the class
action context, suggesting that fraudulent transactions can be rescinded de-
spite the impossibility of matching buy and sell orders."13  Hence, the
Supreme Court has cast a suspicious light on the Fifth Circuit's privity re-
quirement for rescission under rule lOb-5.
The court's additional requirement, however, prohibiting the awarding of
rescissional relief beyond the measure of the plaintiffs' losses caused by the
defendant's conduct, remains viable. Because the rescissional measure of
damages permits the defrauded plaintiff to place upon the defendant the bur-
den of any adverse change in the value of the securities between the date of
purchase and the date of rescission, the court reasons that only a portion of
the recovery may be proximately caused by the defendant's wrong.' 44 A
court could appropriately permit rescissional damages only if it "adopt[ed] a
theory of damages that views the entire loss as resulting from the fraud be-
cause, 'but for' the deceit, the buyer would not have purchased, and hence
would have suffered no loss."" 5 Consistent with its view that a plaintiff
must show both transaction causation and loss causation, the court discards
that rescissory theory of damages in favor of the tort law's out-of-pocket
rule, which usually reflects "the loss proximately caused by the defendants'
deceit.""' 6
The court's precise rejection of rescission rests upon the view that usually
the materiality of the nondisclosure does not amount to a complete reflection
of the full disparity between the purchase price and the subsequent rescis-
sory value of the stock. But the court leaves open the possibility that in
some cases rescission will approximate the materiality of the information
concealed by the defendant. In those cases, rescission is proper. Yet, the
propriety of rescission is not the result of a worthy goal with sound theoreti-
cal underpinnings; rather, the measure of damages is proper only to the ex-
442. Pinter v. Dahl, 108 S. Ct. 2063, 2079 n.23 (1988).
443. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 992 (1988); see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 153-93; Merritt, A Consistent Model of Loss Causation in Securities Fraud.Litigation:
Suiting the Remedy to the Wrong, 66 TEX. L. REv. 469, 510-15 (1988) (advocating that the
broker-dealer and privity distinctions be abandoned).
444. Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 555.
445. Id.; see also Moody v. Bache & Co., 570 F.2d 523, 527 (5th Cir. 1978) (court rejected
plaintiff's contention that where reliance and materiality are found, causation follows as a
matter of law).
446. Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 555.
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tent that it usefully approximates the materiality of the challenged
misstatement or omission.
2. Application of the Fifth Circuit's Standards
The actual application of the Fifth Circuit's standards demonstrates the
prominence of materiality in its measurement of general damages. In In re
Letterman Bros. Energy Securities Litigation, 447 the court affirmed the trial
court's grant of a directed verdict against the plaintiffs who had sought dam-
ages under rule lOb-5 against a bank (BancTexas) that had financed an un-
successful oil and gas venture."" On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the
district court should have adopted a rescissional measure of damages rather
than an out-of-pocket measure because the bank did not misstate the fair
value of the stock, but rather it induced the plaintiffs to purchase in the first
place.449
The Fifth Circuit rejected a rescissional measure of damages on the
ground that the bank was not in privity with plaintiffs nor did it owe them a
fiduciary duty.4 50 The bank, in other words, by its silence or even its mis-
statements was not in a position to induce a reasonable investor to purchase
in the first place. Unlike the broker in Chasins,411 whose advice was mate-
rial to the investor's very decision to enter the market, the bank here had no
substantial likelihood of altering a reasonable investor's decision.
The Fifth Circuit made clear that its rejection of rescission focused on the
limited materiality of the bank's misstatements when it also found that the
plaintiffs had failed to establish any out-of-pocket damages. Furthermore,
the court found that the fair value of the oil and gas interests purchased by
the plaintiffs was not zero because the investment included tangible assets in
oil and gas leases and drilling equipment. The misstatements that the bank
made were unrelated to the value of those assets; instead, the misstatements
related only to the competence of the lease operators, whom the plaintiffs
could remove at their option.4 52 The plaintiffs, therefore, were unable to
447. 799 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987).
448. Id. at 970-71. Letterman Brothers Energy Programs (Letterman) "suffered substan-
tial financial losses as a result of investments in oil and gas leases that they entered into with
Wells-Battelstein Oil & Gas, Inc." Id. at 969. Letterman sued BancTexas under section 10(b)
and rule lob-5 alleging that BancTexas wrongly induced Letterman to invest in Wells-Battel-
stein's drilling ventures. Id. at 970.
449. Id. at 972.
450. Id. (citing Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 554). Cf Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438
F.2d 1167, 1173 (2d Cir. 1970) (plaintiff purchased securities based on broker's misrepresenta-
tions, and thus broker breached fiduciary duty).
451. See supra notes 272-89 and accompanying text.
452. Letterman Bros., 799 F.2d at 973.
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show that the disclosure of the bank's misstatements would have signifi-
cantly altered the total mix of information available to the reasonable inves-
tor. Thus, they could not show that the bank's misstatements were material,
and, therefore, the plaintiffs could not show any price-value disparity of the
interests at the time of the transaction. Their measure of damages depended
upon a showing of the materiality of the bank's misrepresentations.
In Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean,453 by contrast, the court suggested
that out-of-pocket damages were recoverable because the accountants who
had participated in the preparation of a prospectus had misrepresented and
omitted material facts about the value of the underlying assets, thereby af-
fecting the price a reasonable investor would have been willing to pay for the
stock.454 The court appointed a special master in Huddleston and charged
him with the task of computing the degree of the materiality of the defend-
ants' conduct. At the same time, however, the Fifth Circuit was unwilling to
find that the misstatements and omissions made by these defendants, who
were neither in privity with nor fiduciaries of the plaintiffs, were so material
as to affect the fundamental decision to invest.455 Accordingly, the court
remanded the case for a determination of the price-value disparity created by
the defendants' misstatements and omissions, or, in other words, for a quan-
tification of materiality. 456 In a rule lOb-5 case, then, the Fifth Circuit meas-
ures general damages based on such a quantification.
This quantification is also used to measure special or consequential dam-
ages. While the Fifth Circuit generally allows consequential damages, it lim-
its the amount of those damages to injuries caused by the material
misrepresentations. Thus, in Letterman, the Fifth Circuit suggested that
consequential damages were the preferred remedy because the misrepresen-
tation charged went not to the value of the assets, but to the decision to
453. 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
454. Id. at 555-56. The defendants filed a registration statement and prospectus with the
SEC for the offering of securities "the proceeds of which were to be used to construct ... the
Texas International Speedway." Id. at 539. The company, Texas International Speedway,
Inc. (TIS), however, went bankrupt soon thereafter. Huddleston was one of several investors
in TIS who brought a section 10(b) and rule lob-5 action against TIS and the accountants who
prepared the prospectus. Id. The court considered on appeal the issue whether the preparers
of the prospectus materially mislead the investors regarding the cost of construction of the
speedway, and how much damage the misstatements caused. Id. at 553-54. See also Securities
Act of 1933, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
455. Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 555.
456. See also Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196, 1215 n.16 (5th Cir. 1982) (rejecting out-of-
pocket measure in complex, multi-count action because it was inadequate to account fully for
the materiality of defendants-fiduciaries' misstatements and omissions), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
920 (1983).
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choose an incompetent operator.457 The plaintiffs in Letterman could have
recovered the additional expenses that resulted from the defendant's mis-
statements that led to the hiring of an incompetent operator.45 8 Even in
computing consequential damages, therefore, the court uses as its guide the
materiality of the challenged concealments.
F The Sixth Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit accepts the
Supreme Court's Affiliated Ute459 damages rule for both defrauded sellers
and defrauded buyers. The court agrees that the correct measure of dam-
ages is the difference between the fair value of all that the plaintiff received
and the fair value of what the plaintiff would have received absent the de-
fendant's material misstatement or omission.
4 6 °
But the Sixth Circuit also allows a plaintiff to recover the defendant's
profit attributable to the fraud where that amount exceeds the plaintiff's ac-
tual losses.4 6' In one case, the Sixth Circuit stated the extreme position that
"[tlhe proper standard of damages for either a defrauded seller or a de-
frauded buyer under [rule lO(b)(5)] is 'disgorgement of profits.' ,462 The
court believed that disgorgement of the defendant's profits is proper because
it represents the "simple equity that a wrongdoer should disgorge his fraudu-
lent enrichment. '4 63 That principle extends without a "decisive legal differ-
ence" to defrauded buyers of securities, provided they can show that the
sellers reaped profits from their fraud.4 4
Simultaneously, however, the Sixth Circuit has insisted on limiting a
plaintiff's recovery to losses caused by the defendant's misstatements or
omissions. Thus, in Fridrich v. Bradford, 65 the court found no cognizable
damages because the plaintiffs could not establish that the defendants' failure
457. 799 F.2d at 973 n.5.
458. Id. at 974.
459. 406 U.S. 128 (1972). See also supra notes 35-65 and accompanying text.
460. See, e.g., Nickels v. Koehler Management Corp., 541 F.2d 611, 617 (6th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977); Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnson, 498 F.2d 186, 190-91
(6th Cir. 1974), modified in part on other grounds, 625 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1980).
461. Nickels, 541 F.2d at 617.
462. Ohio Drill, 498 F.2d at 190.
463. Id. (citing Janigan v. Taylor, 344 1.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879
(1965)).
464. Id. at 191 (citing Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973)). Defrauded buyers experience much difficulty when attempting
to meet this burden. See supra text accompanying notes 290-99.
465. 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
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to disclose material, nonpublic information affected the price at which plain-
tiffs sold their stock.4 66
In April 1972, J.C. Bradford, Jr. purchased 1,225 shares of Old Line Life
Insurance Company (Old Line) stock based on material, nonpublic informa-
tion about a possible acquisition.46 7 He sold the stock two months later,
reaping a $13,000 profit on the transaction.4 68 After an SEC investigation,
Bradford was forced to disgorge the $13,000. Furthermore, the sellers of
Old Line stock during the period of nondisclosure sought damages under
rule lOb-5.
4 6 9
The district court, after finding all the defendants liable under rule lOb-5
for trading while possessing material inside information, awarded the plain-
tiff sellers $361,186.75 in damages.47' The district court did not base its
damage formula on the profits that the defendants received from their trans-
actions nor on an effort to capture the plaintiffs' losses by finding the price-
value disparity on the date of the transaction. Rather, the district court, by
ordering the defendants to return to the plaintiffs the difference between the
sale price and the highest resale price after disclosure, adopted a version of
the Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co.47' rescissory measure, whereby plaintiffs
obtained a return of the highest value of the shares they sold less considera-
tion received.
The Sixth Circuit rejected this theory of damages, and held that because
defendants' act of trading with third parties in an open and impersonal mar-
keto"in no way affected plaintiffs' decision to sell," the trading was not caus-
ally connected to plaintiffs' losses.4 72 Unlike Chasins, the plaintiffs could not
show that their decision to invest or the price at which they invested was
altered by the defendants' trades based on inside information. Accordingly,
any recovery based on the highest resale value of the stock after disclosure to
466. Id. at 322.
467. Id. at 308.
468. Id.
469. Id.
470. Id. at 312. The court noted that the district court had made the following finding:
Each plaintiff sold Old Line stock during the period of nondisclosure and is therefore
entitled to damages as a result of defendants' nondisclosure . . . . The measure of
damages is the difference between the price each plaintiff received for his shares sold
during the period of nondisclosure . . . and the highest value reached by Old Line
stock within a reasonable time after the tortious conduct was discovered and the
disclosure made of the information wrongfully withheld.
Id. at 312-13. The opinion of the district court was unreported.
471. 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970). See also supra text accompanying notes 272-89.
472. Fridrich, 542 F.2d at 318.
[Vol. 39:29
Damages Under Rule Job-5
a plaintiff class would be so unlimited in scope as to be punitive.473 The
court also felt powerless to limit the scope of such recovery by calculating
only the disparity between fraud price and resale price for defendants'
trades.
The court suggested, however, that the Chasins measure of damages might
be appropriate if the defendants had a fiduciary duty to disclose to the plain-
tiffs the material nonpublic information. The court suggested that the si-
lence of such a fiduciary would materially affect either the decision to invest
or the price of the investment.474 Moreover, the court left unanswered the
question of whether a plaintiff could recover his out-of-pocket losses if he
could show that defendant's trading activity impacted the market price that
the plaintiff received for the defendant's stock.475
The premises that led the Sixth Circuit to limit damages in the open mar-
ket insider trading situation were subsequently undermined by the Supreme
Court. In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,476 the Supreme Court indeed agreed with
a Sixth Circuit panel that the plaintiffs could recover damages under rule
lOb-5 by showing that the market price of stock, even when sold in an open
and impersonal market, was affected by material misstatements. However,
by approving the fraud-on-the-market theory, the Supreme Court suggested
that the causal link between plaintiffs' losses and defendants' conduct need
not be established on an individualized, face-to-face basis; rather, by market
price communications of all material nondisclosures.477 A plaintiff can show
that the defendant's conduct was material by establishing that: (1) the de-
fendant failed to disclose price altering information in breach of a fiduciary
duty to disclose; or (2) the defendant's affirmative misstatements altered the
price at which plaintiff bought or sold. In either case, the proper measure of
damages in the Sixth Circuit for rule lOb-5 violations in either a personal or
an impersonal market rests upon the disparity that the defendant's misstate-
473. Id. at 321. See also Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d
228, 242 (2d Cir. 1974); Bangor Punta Operations v. Bangor & Aroostock R.R., 417 U.S. 703,
715-16 (1974); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, reh'g denied, 423 U.S.
884 (1975).
474, Fridrich, 542 F.2d at 320.
475. Id. at 320 n.27.
We specifically do not reach the question of availability of the remedy to open market
situations where the insider trading with resultant price changes has in fact induced
the plaintiffs to buy or sell to their injury. Here there was no proof that defendants'
insider trading had any impact whatever upon the value of Old Line stock.
Id. (citation omitted).
476. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988).
477. For a more thorough discussion of Basic, see supra notes 153-93 and accompanying
text.
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ments or omissions created between the price and value of stock. Thus,
damages are clearly rooted in materiality.
G. The Seventh Circuit
1. Reluctance to Labelling
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has stated
generally that the "usual measure of damages in a case under Rule lOb-5 is
the difference between what the stock fetched and what it would have been
worth had all the information been disclosed."4 7 A plaintiff must prove
damages by establishing a disparity between the price paid and the price that
would have been paid but for the fraud.47 9
The circuit court, however, has also declared that "[r]ecovery sometimes
depends on the defendant's profit" '4 ° rather than the plaintiff's losses and
that the plaintiff may elect either. 48 ' Hence, the court has observed:
There are two standard measures of damages in securities law.
One, the 'rescissionary' measure of damages, is based on defend-
ants' gain. The court reverses the transaction and compels defend-
ants to return the purchase price or disgorge any gains they
received. Damages based on defendants' gain make the fraud un-
profitable and therefore deter wrongdoing. The other, the 'market'
measure of damages, is based on the plaintiffs' loss. If the investor
sells for $200 a security that on the day of the sale would fetch
$1,000 in an arms' length transaction between fully informed par-
ties, he recovers his loss of $800.4"2
The Seventh Circuit has not expressly decided when either the market mea-
sure or the rescissory measure should be used, and has suggested only that
the issue is of "great subtlety and substantial moment, 48  and that both
measures are sometimes used.48 4
Despite its professed reluctance to select a proper measure of damages, the
Seventh Circuit has suggested that in every rule lOb-5 action, the proper
measure of damages is a quantification of the materiality of the defendant's
misstatements or omissions. The Seventh Circuit has indicated that a plain-
tiff establishes liability under rule lOb-5 by showing that the defendant's
478. Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1179 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 157
(1987).
479. Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Ellis, 810 F.2d 700, 706 (7th Cir. 1987).
480. Flamm, 814 F.2d at 1179.
481. Harris, 810 F.2d at 706.
482. Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 441-42 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed,
108 S. Ct. 1067 (1988).
483. Harris, 810 F.2d at 707.
484. Jordan, 815 F.2d at 442.
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nondisclosure was material in that it had a substantial likelihood of affecting
the price at which a reasonable shareholder was willing to buy or sell securi-
ties. The court has declared that, "[c]ausation is an essential ingredient of
any securities case" because the plaintiff must show that the price of securi-
ties has moved in response to the defendant's omission.485 Yet an omission
that does not alter the price of stock is not material. Therefore, a nondisclo-
sure must cause a price-value disparity before a court in this circuit will
consider it material. Then, materiality, as such, demonstrates the fact of
damage.486
But the Seventh Circuit has gone further. Not only does the materiality of
the defendant's nondisclosure establish the fact of damage, it also establishes
the amount of damages. The fairness of the price at which a plaintiff trades
stock, the court has recognized, is not an either-or proposition; " 'fairness' is
a range, not a point., 487 Information is necessary so that the stock will
reach a price within that range that is closer to its fair value.4 8 If all mate-
rial information about the stock is disclosed, presumably the price and value
of the stock will be the same. However, if some material facts are concealed,
the range between price and value will widen. That range represents the
materiality of the nondisclosures. When a defendant's concealment creates
that range, a plaintiff may then scale damages under rule lOb-5. The range
between price and fair value created by the defendant's material nondisclo-
sures constitutes the amount of damages.489
2. Application of the Price- Value Range
Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc.490 clearly supports the proposition that the
measure of rule lOb-5 damages quantifies the materiality of the defendants'
nondisclosures. In this case, Jordan, an employee of Duff & Phelps, Inc., a
closely-held corporation, purchased his employer's stock under a purchase
agreement. The agreement provided that upon his termination from em-
ployment with the corporation for any reason, the corporation would buy
back his shares at the adjusted book value of the shares on December 31 of
the year preceding his termination.49' While Jordan had accumulated stock,
the chairman of Duff & Phelps negotiated the sale of the corporation for
about $50 million to Security Pacific Corporation. The sale, however, was
485. Harris, 810 F.2d at 706.
486. Id.
487. Id.
488. Id.
489. See id.
490. 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1067 (1988).
491. Id. at 432.
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not consummated.492 Jordan, meanwhile, sought and accepted a new job in
Houston at a salary sufficiently higher than that which he had received at
Duff & Phelps.4 93 Jordan resigned from Duff & Phelps on December 31,
1983, and received as consideration for his shares a book value on that date
of $123.54 per share.494 Jordan later learned that Duff & Phelps had con-
summated a merger with a subsidiary of Security Pacific, which would con-
sequently value Duff & Phelps at $50 million.495 If Jordan had been an
employee on that date, he would have received at least $452,000 for his
shares.496 He sought damages .9easured by the disparity between the price
he received and the price he would have received under the terms of the
merger. However, when the merger ultimately fell apart, Jordan amended
his prayer for relief, seeking rescission rather than damages.
In reversing and remanding the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment for the corporation, the Seventh Circuit held that the question of the
materiality of the nondisclosures and the related issues of causation and
damages should have been sent to the jury. First, however, the court re-
jected Jordan's claim for rescission. It did so not because Jordan's delay in
electing rescission evidenced his unclean hands and made that relief inequi-
table.497 Rather, the court found that rescission was impossible under the
circumstances because Jordan's employment status at Duff & Phelps could
not be recreated or restored.498
The court suggested that the remedy of rescission should be permitted
only at a time and under circumstances that will approximate market dam-
492. Id.
493. Id. Jordan was offered about $43,000 more per annum for the new position in
Houston.
494. Id.
495. Id. at 433.
496. Id.
497. See supra text accompanying notes 407-10. Prompt election of rescission under the
securities laws has the effect of preventing the defrauded party from speculating at the defend-
ant's expense about the value of the stock after learning of the breach. Jordan, 815 F.2d at
440.
498. Jordan, 815 F.2d at 440. In the course of rejecting rescission and then reaching the
issues of causation and damages, however, the court philosophizes about the nature of that
relief:
A prompt demand for rescission is important in allocating risks among parties, ....
[O]nce the investor discovers the fraud, he has an ordinary investment decision to
make with respect to the future - to keep (or recover) the stock in hope of gain or to
disinvest. Allowing a belated election between market damages and rescission effec-
tively allows him to do both, and therefore visits defendants with expected damages
greater than the loss the investor actually suffered.
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ages.4 99 Thus, if a seller is induced by a material misstatement to sell stock
worth $20 per share at $10 per share, the rescissory damages received should
be limited to the price-value disparity ($10), less the market price at the time
of rescission. Otherwise, the seller would be able to wait to see whether the
sold stock declined in price before electing to sue for damages measured at
the time of sale, thereby shifting all of the postdiscovery risk to the defend-
ant. The seller's damages are the difference between the contract price ($10)
and the resale price a reasonable time after discovery of the fraud.5° °
Similarly, the defrauded buyer, who purchases worthless stock for $10 per
share, should be able to recover rescissory damages in the amount of the
difference between market price at a reasonable time after the fraud is dis-
covered and the purchase price. The buyer is encouraged to "cover" his
losses by selling at the postdiscovery market price. If the buyer chooses not
to resell the stock at that price and the market price continues to decline, he
cannot recover from the defendant the measure of the subsequent decline.
For both defrauded sellers and buyers, the court suggested that the postdis-
covery decision to reinvest or divest in the stock is an independent invest-
ment decision, the risks of which cannot be passed on to the defendant.5"'
The Seventh Circuit, however, imperfectly analogizes the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (U.C.C.) remedy to the remedy of rescission.5" 2 First, the
seller's remedies relied upon by the court under sections 2-706 and 2-708 are
conditioned upon circumstances provided in section 2-703, not cited by the
court.5 ° a Those conditions all proceed from the assumption that the seller
still has the goods and most assume that a breach has not yet occurred.
Indeed, the resale price measure of damages in this context encourages sell-
ers to get the best price for goods they still possess. In the securities context,
however, the seller has already parted with the securities, and resale only
becomes possible after discovery of the fraud or breach. Prompt election of
rescission occurs prior to and differs from the decision to resell stock in a
commercially reasonable manner.
499. Id. Comparing rescission to remedies provided under the Uniform Commercial Code,
the court declares that prompt election should have the following effects:
(1) The defrauded seller's damages will be limited to the unpaid contract price less
the market price of the stock at the time of delivery; and
(2) The defrauded buyer's damages will be limited "to the market price at the time
the breach is discovered less the contract price." Id.
500. See U.C.C. § 2-706 (official comment 5 to section 2-706 states: "[s]ubsection (2)
merely clarifies the common law rule that the time for resale is a reasonable time after the
buyer's breach, by using the language 'commercially reasonable.' ").
501. Jordan, 815 F.2d at 440.
502. See supra notes 497-99 and accompanying text.
503. U.C.C. § 2-703(c).
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Second, and similarly, the buyer's damages under the U.C.C., which en-
courage him to cover by limiting his damages to the difference between the
contract price and the market price at the time of discovery of the breach,
presume that the buyer does not yet have some or all of the goods. Rescis-
sion, by contrast, requires the buyer first to elect to rescind the deal and then
to attempt to cover. Indeed, the U.C.C. allows the buyer to recover both the
"price," 5" which the buyer has already paid, if any, and the difference be-
tween the contract price and the cover price, suggesting that the cover mea-
sure remains separate and apart from a rescissory measure.
Third, the consequences of failing to act in a prompt manner under the
U.C.C. differ from those under the doctrine of rescission. The defrauded
sellers or buyers who fail to act in a commercially reasonable manner to
cover or resell simply pay for their delay in an incremental reduction in their
damages. By contrast, under the Seventh Circuit's view of rescission, the
failure of the defrauded buyer or seller to act in a prompt fashion results not
in an incremental reduction in their damages, but in a complete forfeiture of
the remedy of rescission.
Finally, the U.C.C.'s measures of damages are simply not rescissory.
Rather, as the Code suggests, the measures are formulas for determining
damages that essentially require a plaintiff to take reasonable steps to miti-
gate damages. A plaintiff seller must attempt to mitigate damages by resel-
ling goods; a plaintiff buyer must attempt to mitigate damages by covering.
The failure to mitigate damages does not forfeit the remedy, but rather sim-
ply results in a reduction of the actual losses that are recoverable. Rescis-
sion, by contrast, has no inherent mitigation checks. It aims to unwind a
transaction, which, because of fraud or mistake, never really took place. If,
as the Seventh Circuit stated in Jordan, equitable requirements for the use of
rescission became obsolete when law and equity merged, then nothing about
rescission itself requires prompt action or mitigation. 5
The lack of a precise fit between the U.C.C.'s measures of damages and
rescission under the securities laws belies the Seventh Circuit's effort to limit
rescissory relief to the market measure of damages. The market measure of
damages measures the price-value disparity at the time of the transaction.5 "6
Rescissory damages reflect the price-value disparity at some time after the
504. U.C.C. section 2-71 l(l) states: "(1) Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudi-
ates or the buyer rightfully rejects... any goods involved .... the buyer may cancel and ...
may in addition to recovering so much of the price as has been paid . . . 'cover'...."
505. See Jordan, 815 F.2d at 440. Examples of equitable requirements include clean hands
and laches. See id.
506. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
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plaintiff discovers the fraud.5"7 Hypothetically, the rescissory measure
would equal the market measure if the defrauded party elected to rescind the
instant that the parties consummated the transaction. However, the greater
the interval between the transaction date and the rescission date, the greater
the chance that the rescissory measure will differ from the market measure.
By requiring a prompt rescission, the Seventh Circuit seeks as much congru-
ence between the rescissory measure and the market measure of damages as
possible.50 8
More subtly, the court recognized that the task of calculating the fair
value of stock on the transaction date before the fraud was revealed presents
more problems than computing the fair value of stock on the rescission date
after the fraud has been revealed to the market.50 9 Presumably, the market
price will reflect the true value of the stock once the market is fully in-
formed. Thus, a possible indication of the fair value of the stock on the date
of the transaction is the market price of that stock once the previously con-
cealed information has been disclosed. If the measure of rescissory damages
is limited to the difference between the purchase price and the informed mar-
ket price (measured a reasonable time after the market discovers the fraud),
then that measure will generally be the same as the market measure, which is
the difference between the purchase price and the fair value of the stock
(measured by the informed market price). Requiring prompt election of re-
scission, therefore, ensures that rescissory and market damages will be ap-
proximately the same.
If, however, intervening external market forces make the revelation of the
concealed information on the discovery date insignificant, the rescissory
measure may greatly exceed the market measure. 51° The Seventh Circuit
responded to this possibility by redefining rescission itself. Rescission, the
court declared, is an order compelling a defendant to disgorge his gains,51
but in the securities arena, gains and losses often match each other; the de-
507. See supra text accompanying notes 420-22.
508. Jordan, 815 F.2d at 440-42.
509. Id. at 442-43.
510. For example, assume a buyer purchases stock in 1985 at $10 per share in a corpora-
tion connected to the space program. The buyer watches the stock become worthless after the
shuttle disaster and then discovers an unrelated material omission which, if disclosed at the
time of the purchase, would have decreased the market price for the stock in 1985 to $7 per
share. The buyer may recover, after a prompt election of rescission, the full purchase price of
$10 per share instead of the $3 per share disparity between market price and true value at the
time of the transaction. Not even a prompt rescission requirement would seem to limit rescis-
sory damages to those market damages.
511. Jordan, 815 F.2d at 441.
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fendant's gain is the plaintiff's lOSS.5 12 Rescission thus aims at disgorging
net gains to all investors resulting from fraud, not merit.
This was the scenario in Jordan. When Jordan sold his stock to Duff &
Phelps, Inc., all of the other investors gained because they obtained a larger
share of the ultimate pot. The court concluded that the defendant (defined
broadly to include its shareholders) "gained exactly what Jordan lost - the
value of his 1.244% stake in the firm.",5 13 Moreover, the court found that
Jordan's losses, which resulted from not taking part in the merger opportu-
nity and from forfeiting his salary at Duff & Phelps, were matched by the
defendant's gains. First, measured at the time of sale, Jordan lost the value
of the merger, discounted by the probability that it would take place. He
lost the value of the merger multiplied by its percentage chance of occurring,
less his actual sale price. Conversely, the other investors in the firm gained
the merger value, which they would otherwise have had to pay to Jordan,
multiplied by that probability, and discounted by the price they actually paid
for Jordan's stock. Second, Jordan's gain from the increase in his salary
upon leaving Duff & Phelps is equal to Duff & Phelps' loss because the firm
gave up the bargain element in his salary measured by its increase.51 4
Hence, the firm's net profits must be discounted by Jordan's new salary and
Jordan's exact same net losses must be reduced by that salary.
Even viewing rescission and out-of-pocket damages as matching net prof-
its and losses, however, the court recognized that rescission values only
those gains commencing upon the certainty of the outcome of events. Here,
the merger possibility was such an event. On the contrary, the market mea-
sure values losses before the outcome becomes certain.5 1 5 The court circum-
vented the timing disparity between the market measure and rescission by
introducing into each theory a probability or a materiality factor. The likeli-
hood that Jordan would have remained at Duff & Phelps "may be closely
related to the probability that [the] deal" would have been made on benefi-
cial terms.5 16 The likelihood that a beneficial deal would be made, the court
reasoned, would be reflected in the price that reasonable investors would be
willing to pay for the stock. That price, in turn, would be reflected in any
market measure of damages.
Accordingly, the probability that Jordan would have stayed at Duff &
Phelps, but for the fraud, which is dependent upon the likelihood of the deal
being made on beneficial terms, is a factor in the market measure of dam-
512. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 634.
513. Jordan, 815 F.2d at 442.
514. Id.
515. Id.
516. Id.
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ages. Moreover, because "Jordan must prove that he would have stayed" '17
to obtain rescissory damages, the effect of the merger disclosure on that deci-
sion also factors into the measure of that relief."' 8 The court's analysis,
therefore, simply stated in the alternative, that for both market and rescis-
sory damages, the effect of the nondisclosure on a reasonable investment
decision must factor into measuring the damages. The materiality of the
nondisclosure, in other words, is the proper measure of market and rescis-
sory damages.
The Seventh Circuit, in fact, offered some guidance on how to quantify the
materiality of the nondisclosure for damages purposes. First, the court de-
cided that the plaintiff may recover the price-value disparity because infor-
mation that the firm had lucrative offers may have had a substantial
likelihood of inducing the "reasonable investor" to stay at the firm.51 9 A
jury could have found the nondisclosure material, thus establishing causa-
tion. But then the court indicated that the measure of damages is related to
the problem of causation. 2° The question of causation centers on probabili-
ties; that is, the likelihood that the concealed information affected the rea-
sonable investor by a certain amount. The court recognized that Jordan
would claim that the information was material, while Duff & Phelps would
adduce evidence that it would have had no effect on his investment decision
given the total mix of factors weighing on it. 52 ' Because the truth lies some-
where in the middle, a jury verdict for one or the other based on liability
would be inaccurate, introducing a "rounding error., 522
The cure to this ill, according to the court, is to collapse the issues of
materiality and damages so that the jury is able to quantify more precisely
the effect of the nondisclosure on the investor. 523 The court suggested that
an informed reasonable investor would have valued each share of stock on
517. Id.
518. Id. at 440.
519. Id. at 441.
520. Id.
521. Id.
522. Id.
523. Measuring the materiality of the nondisclosure requires quantifying: (1) the
probability that the beneficial deal will occur; and (2) the probability that it would alter the
investor's decision. The former is a function of the market measure of damages because the
likelihood of a good deal is reflected in a fully informed price. That likeliho6d can be calcu-
lated as follows:
Suppose there is one chance in three of each of the following outcomes: merger at
$50 million, LBO at $40 million, and no deal (book value = $2.5 million). The
expected value of Duff & Phelps then is the sum of these outcomes, divided by three,
or $92,500,000/3 = $30,833,333 .... There were 20,100 outstanding shares, making
each worth $1,534.00 in an arms' length transaction on these assumptions.
Id. at 442-43.
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the sale date at $1,534.524 The fair value of the stock on the sale date is the
expected value of each share because the information is so material as to
affect the expectations of the reasonable investor. Furthermore, the court
assumed that the likelihood that Jordan would have left the firm equals the
likelihood that a good deal would be made. Without inquiring into Jordan's
individual motives, the court objectively quantified the materiality of the
concealed information to the reasonable investor as the difference between
the price accepted and the expected value of the stock on the date of the
transaction. Whether they are termed market or rescissory, damages are a
quantification of the materiality of the challenged nondisclosures.
The Seventh Circuit also suggested how that quantification can be made in
subsequent rule lOb-5 actions. For example, an expert, such as an invest-
ment banker, should compute the probability that the firm in question would
be sold.5 25 That price should then be reduced by the amount that the plain-
tiff received for his shares and any other benefits resulting from the invest-
ment decision. Ultimately, the court preferred this expert analysis to the
jury's assessment of the plaintiff's subjective motivations.5 2 6 The court fur-
ther suggested that the parties may also prefer the expert method, which
attempts to quantify materiality, to the all-or-nothing character of a jury's
finding.
27
Judge Posner dissented, and particularly questioned the majority's equa-
tion of damages and materiality.5 28 After disagreeing with the majority's
finding of a duty to disclose, Judge Posner argued that the question of the
affect on Jordan of the concealed information, or its materiality, could not be
calculated simply by an investment banker's valuation of the firm. Rather,
Judge Posner believed materiality is more subjective, requiring the jury to
consider numerous factors.5 29 While the dissent applauded the majority's
524. Id.
525. Id. at 443.
526. Id. "The computation of the expected value as of [the date of sale], rough as it is, may
be more reliable than a jury's guess about whether Jordan's wife would prevail on him to quit."
Id.
527. Id.
528. Id. at 444 (Posner, J., dissenting).
529. Id. at 451-52. These factors include: (1) the value that Jordan would have placed on
the shares if he had known what the defendant knew; (2) Jordan's attitude toward taking risks;
(3) the method Jordan would have employed when trading off his estimate of the value of his
shares, a value he could not have realized immediately even if he had remained with Duff &
Phelps, against the higher salary he was to receive in Houston and against freedom from do-
mestic conflict; (4) the ability of Jordan to rescind his resignation; (5) the speculation concern-
ing whether Jordan would still have been working for Duff & Phelps two years later when the
firm was reorganized; and (6) how Jordan would have reacted to the collapse of the Security
Pacific deal and whether this would have precipitated his departure. Id.
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"boldness" in "breaking with the tradition of expressing causation in either-
or terms, '5 30 Judge Posner believed that the proper quantification of the
materiality of the nondisclosed information was "not the probability that an
investment bank would assign to Duff and Phelp's [sic] being sold or reorga-
nized; it is a function of the six factors that I have listed."'53
3. The Great Debate: Judge Easterbrook v. Judge Posner
Thus, Judge Posner agrees with Judge Easterbrook that the proper mea-
sure of damages is a quantification of the materiality of the nondisclosure.532
The judges disagree, however, on how to make that quantification. Judge
Posner believes that materiality has a subjective component that requires a
jury's analysis of the total mix of information confronting the plaintiff.
Judge Easterbrook, on the other hand, believes that materiality is purely
objective, suggesting that the determination can be made by the court or by
experts based upon the reasonable investor standard.
Because Judge Easterbrook penned the principal securities law damages
decisions in the Seventh Circuit, it may be possible to predict the direction of
that circuit's law from his scholarship. In Optimal Damages in Securities
Cases,533 Judge Easterbrook co-authored an argument for a measure of
damages that approximates the "net loss" that securities fraud (a form of
breach of contract) imposes on investors, divided by the probability that the
activity will be detected and prosecuted with success. 534 Net loss or net
harm from securities fraud has four components: (1) the net transfer of
wealth from victim to offender; (2) the total cost of accomplishing the of-
fense, guarding against it, and litigating it; (3) the investor's choice of the
wrong investments; and (4) the choice of investment generally due consump-
tion.535 When promulgating the securities laws, Congress intended to pro-
tect investors, to provide for efficient markets, and to provide for damages to
deter conduct that frustrates these intentions without deterring beneficial
conduct. The balance requires a measure of damages based on net harm,
but, as Judge Easterbrook made clear in Jordan, losses and gains match each
other in the securities field.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the courts, in measuring damages
under rule lOb-5, have used both the out-of-pocket measure based on losses
530. Id.
531. Id.; see supra note 529 (factors listed).
532. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 613.
533. Id. at 611.
534. Id. at 613-14, 618.
535. Id. at 622-25.
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and the rescissory measure based on gains.5 36 Yet, because other net harms
from securities fraud exist, such as the costs of guarding against and litigat-
ing material nondisclosures, the optimal damages in rule lOb-5 cases are not
zero.5 37 Nor are optimal damages the gross transfer of wealth from inves-
tors to nondisclosers. Instead, the proper measure of damages should: (1)
presume that investors' losses match other investors' net out; (2) begin with
the wrongdoer's profits; (3) add damages for the cost of carrying out and
thwarting the fraud; and (4) add a reserve of recovery for the costs of risk
created by wrongdoing. 538 The measure would be mechanical, fixing a per-
centage of the total movement of the price attributable to the omissions or
misstatement. 539 Recognizing that such a rule would only be an estimation
of an "utterly unquantifiable" figure of net loss, Judge Easterbrook suggests
that a statute would have to set the measure, or at least, in the meantime,
expert testimony would set the measure. 54°
In Jordan, however, Judge Easterbrook stretched these theories to imple-
ment them. The court rejected any useful distinction between loss and gain
in measuring damages.5 4 ' The court presumed and then found that losses
and gains offset each other.5 42 The court then began with the defendants'
profits,54 3 but did not recognize that profits should be limited to those re-
sulting from the fraud created by the materiality of the nondisclosure.
Moreover, while Judge Easterbrook stopped short of setting a mechanical
rule for finding the percentage of the price causation attributable to the
wrong that would precisely date net harms, he did erect and encourage
probability factors for the jury's use with the help of experts in calculating
the degree of the materiality of the defendants' mistatements or omissions.
In Judge Posner's view, by breaking with the tradition of expressing materi-
ality/causation in "either-or terms," 5" Judge Easterbrook set the stage for a
reduction in damages to account more precisely for the net harm of the
fraud. The proper increase of damages will continue to represent a precise
quantification of the materiality of the defendant's concealments. Yet, their
materiality may be measured not by their effect on the "gross movement in
536. Id. at 634.
537. Id.
538. Id. at 642.
539. Id. at 642 n.44.
540. Id.
541. Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 441-42 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed,
108 S. Ct. 1067 (1988).
542. Id. at 442.
543. Id.
544. See id. at 452 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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the price of the firm's stock," '545 but by their effect on the net harm to inves-
tors and market efficiency.
H. The Eighth Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit expressly
traces the general out-of-pocket measure of damages in rule lOb-5 cases to
the tort roots of the implied right of action.54 6 A defendant, under that tort
model, is "liable to respond in such damages as naturally and proximately
result from the fraud. 547 The Eighth Circuit recognizes that the federal
courts measure those damages according to the out-of-pocket rule.54' That
rule allows "recovery of the difference between the actual value of the securi-
ties and their purchase price." '549 The tighth Circuit also permits recovery
for consequential damages proximately resulting from the fraud. 550
Calculating the disparity between the price of stock and its true value re-
quires a determination of that value. The Eighth Circuit recognizes two
dates at which the value of the stock may be determined. First, where the
misstatement or omission is directed toward the plaintiff only, and not the
public at large, the actual value of the securities at the time of purchase is
readily ascertainable and should be used. 55' Alternatively, where defend-
ant's conduct causes an artificial market price of long duration, damages are
fixed not at the date of purchase, but at the date of discovery of the fraud.552
Presumably, the market price on that date will reflect the impact of the de-
fendant's fraud. The Eighth Circuit allows the plaintiff to establish damages
on either date.
Whether value is measured on the transaction date or the postdiscovery
date, however, the court determines the price-value disparity that the de-
fendant's conduct created on the transaction date. In Harris v. Union Elec-
tric Co., 553 the court stated generally that, in a bond fraud case, the price-
value disparity on the date that the bonds were issued properly measures the
545. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 642 n.44.
546. Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1360 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 951 (1978).
547. Id. (quoting Estate Counseling Serv. Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962)).
548. Id. (citing Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 224-26 (8th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976)).
549. Id.
550. Id. (citing D. DOBBS, supra note 8, at 601-06, 615).
551. Harris, 523 F.2d at 226.
552. Id.
553. 787 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1986).
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damages.5 54 That disparity represented the bonds' reduction in the value
that was caused by the defendant's failure to disclose that the bonds lacked
call protection. 515 Yet, the court looked to the fact that the market price of
the bonds had dropped when the fraud was disclosed as probative of the
impact that the defendant's omission had on the initial price-value dispar-
ity. The value of the call protection, which the plaintiffs paid for but
never received, precisely measured the damages. Accordingly, the fact that
the bonds recovered and their market value eventually exceeded the plain-
tiffs' purchase price had no bearing on the disparity between price and value
created by the defendant's conduct. 557
Similarly, in those -cases in which the Eighth Circuit has applied a rescis-
sory measure of damages, it has done so in an effort to quantify the impact of
the defendant's misstatement or omission on the stock's transaction price.
In Myzel v. Fields, 558 plaintiffs who were induced to sell their stock at artifi-
cially deflated prices because of defendant's failure to disclose optimistic
sales figures, sought a rescissory measure of recovery. 559 The Eighth Circuit
approved an instruction that allowed the jury to award the plaintiffs the dif-
ference between the selling price and the "highest intermediate value"
reached by the stock within a reasonable period of time after the sale.5l 6
The instruction effectively allowed the jury to quantify the materiality of
the defendant's conduct. If the omissions merely induced the plaintiffs to
sell their stock at a low price, "the measure of the damages [is] the difference
between what they actually received and the higher price." 5 6 1 If, however,
the omissions were so material that their disclosure would have caused
plaintiffs to retain their stock and share in the growth of the company, then
554. Id. at 367. The Union Electric Company issued $70 million worth of First Mortgage
Bonds in 1975. In 1978, Union Electric decided to call $50 million of the bonds, which re-
sulted in the bond value dropping from $113 to $101. The trustees refused to call the bonds
without judicial approval. The litigation that ensued involved the prospectus for the bonds
and an alleged violation of section 10(b). The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff bond-pur-
chasers, finding that Union Electric had "misrepresented and omitted material facts regarding
the call-protection provisions of the bond contract, and that the attempted plan to call the
bonds constituted a scheme to defraud the bondholders because Union Electric knew the plan
was 'contrary to and prohibited by the terms of the prospectus.' " Id. at 360.
555. Id. at 367-68.
556. Id. at 368.
557. Id. at 368 n.10, 372.
558. 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
559. Id. at 740.
560. Id. at 746. For an explanation of "higher intermediate value," see supra note 328 and
accompanying text.
561. Myzel, 386 F.2d at 745.
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damages are properly based on "the subsequent increases in the value of the
stock over [what the jury considered] a reasonable period." '562
In Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 563 the Eighth Circuit also recognized
that the proper measure of damages in securities fraud actions is the measure
that most effectively determines the materiality of the challenged conduct in
each particular case. In Garnatz, the defendant's material misstatements
and omissions induced an unsophisticated investor to enter into a bond mar-
gin account.5 Finding that the out-of-pocket rule is not a "talisman," the
court concluded that this damage measure is not proper where the "grava-
men" of the plaintiff's complaint is not that he bought stock at an unfair
price, "but that he bought at all."'5 65 Under those circumstances, a rescis-
sory measure returns to the plaintiff the full purchase price less any value
resulting from the fraudulent transaction.566 Accordingly, if the defendant's
misstatements or omissions are so material as to induce the plaintiff to enter
the market where he would not have otherwise, the measure of damages may
be the full purchase price. In these cases, the full purchase price represents
the materiality of the defendant's conduct.
. The Ninth Circuit
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ordi-
narily measures damages based upon the out-of-pocket rule, the court has
deferred to the discretion of the lower courts' application of a rescissory
measure of damages in "appropriate circumstances." '67 The out-of-pocket
rule measures "damages as 'the difference between the purchase price and
the value of the stock at the date of purchase.' ,56 The Ninth Circuit has
562. Id.; see also Nye v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 588 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1978) (per-
mitting plaintiff investors who could not make informed investment decision because of mis-
representations to recover realized loss plus difference between market value on date of
unauthorized transactions and highest market value of stock reached between the date of those
sales at a reasonable period after defendants left their firm).
563. 559 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978).
564. Id. at 1359. The bond margin account in Garnatz allowed the investor to purchase
bonds through a broker on margin, or with money effectively borrowed from the broker. Be-
cause the investor's bond purchases were highly leveraged, small fluctuations in the market
price of the bonds resulted in disproportionately large fluctuations in the investor's account
equity. Accordingly, such accounts carry tremendous risk.
565. Id. at 1360 (citing Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970)).
See also supra text accompanying notes 272-$9.
566. Garnatz, 559 F.2d. at 1361.
567. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 908-09 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816
(1976). See also Wool v. Tandem Computers Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987); Green
v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1341-46 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring
in part).
568. Wool, 818 F.2d at 1437 (citing Green, 541 F.2d at 1344 (Sneed, J., concurring)).
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concluded that the out-of-pocket measure is the only measure available to a
plaintiff injured by market transactions in an actively traded stock. 569 In
Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,"57 Judge Sneed reasoned that because
plaintiffs who do not deal face to face with the defendants in open market
transactions provide no direct pecuniary benefit to the defendants, those
plaintiffs may recover only what they lost and not what the defendants
gained. 7 Accordingly, Judge Sneed concluded that, in the open market
context, the rescissory measure of damages is generally improper. 572
Rescission is proper, however, when it approximates the materiality of the
alleged misstatements or omissions. 57 Rescission contemplates placing the
injured party in the position that party occupied before being induced by the
wrongful conduct to enter the transaction. Pure rescission requires an ex-
change between the parties of the entire purchase price and the stock
purchased. When the purchaser no longer possesses the stock, however, the
defendant must return its monetary equivalent. Under the rescission model,
the monetary equivalent of the stock must be determined on the date that
the purchaser was under a duty to return the stock. 74 That duty arises on
the date of discovery of the fraud and extends to a reasonable time after
discovery. The rescissory measure of damages, therefore, is the difference
between the transaction price and the stock's value within a reasonable time
after discovery of the fraud. That measure does not work in the open market
setting, however, because the defendant never received any consideration.
More significantly, the Ninth Circuit rejects the rescissory measure of relief
in typical open market cases because the disparity between the transaction
price and the post-discovery value of the stock does not reflect the losses
precisely caused by the defendant's misstatements or omissions.
Rescissory damages, however, work "justly" when a material misstate-
ment or omission induces the plaintiff to sell his stock to the defendant. The
plaintiff may recover the spread between transaction price and postdiscovery
value only where that spread has a "necessary relationship to the amount
needed" to return the plaintiff to the position he would have occupied absent
the misstatement or omission. 75 Rescission is also available where the
plaintiff-buyer retains his stock until the date of disclosure. In that instance,
the plaintiff is entitled to the return of his purchase price reduced by the
569. Id.
570. 541 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1976).
571. Id. at 1341-42 (Sneed, J., concurring).
572. Id. at 1342.
573. See, e.g., Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1338-40 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
970 (1978).
574. Green, 541 F.2d at 1342.
575. Id.
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value of the stock, if any, on the date of disclosure. This measure is proper
because it quantifies the shift in market risks directly caused by the defend-
ant's fraud.57 6 Even in the open market setting, rescissory damages are
available where the corporate defendant makes material misstatements or
omissions when repurchasing its own shares or making a public offering.577
In those situations, the corporation receives a benefit from the plaintiff
caused by its material misstatements or omissions."' Finally, a plaintiff
may recover her entire purchase price in cases such as bond fraud where the
defendant's misstatement or omission does not alter the price of the stock,
but the misstatement or omission alters the decision to invest. 79
Whether the district court in its discretion applies a rescissory or a tort
measure, it must calculate the disparity between transaction price and the
stock's value. The increase or decrease in the market price of stock after
disclosure of the material misstatement or omission is "circumstantial evi-
dence" of the true value of the stock on the date of the transaction. 80 But
the market price after a corrective disclosure is not conclusive evidence of
the value of the stock on the transaction date. The corrective disclosure may
not be complete. In addition, the prolonged nature of some frauds in-
troduces external market variables that affect the amount of market reaction
following disclosure.58 ' Therefore, the Ninth Circuit allows the jury to as-
sign a value to the stock along a timeline based upon an "appropriate mix"
of "various methods," including expert testimony regarding capitalization of
earnings.58 2 The jury, in analyzing the mix of evidence, attempts to deter-
mine the price-value disparity reflected in the materiality of the defendant's
misrepresentations. 8 3
The Ninth Circuit further demonstrated that recovery of damages rests
upon the quantification of the materiality of the defendant's conduct through
the case of "in-and-out" plaintiffs. "In-and-out" plaintiffs purchase stock
after the material misstatements or omissions, but resell the stock before dis-
closure. In that situation, the plaintiff who purchases stock worth $10 per
share at an inflated market price of $20 and then resells the stock at an
inflated market price of $20 per share seemingly does not suffer any
576. Id. at 1343.
577. Id. at 1341-42 nn.l-2.
578. Id.
579. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
816 (1976).
580. Id. at 909 n.25.
581. Id.
582. Id.
583. Id.
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losses."84 Even if the market price of the stock declines before resale to $15
per share, that pre-disclosure decline must be attributable to external market
forces unrelated to the defendant's misstatements.58 5 Accordingly, it would
appear that these in-and-out traders have suffered no out-of-pocket losses.
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit has held that the in-and-out plaintiff may
recover under the out-of-pocket rule even in the absence of corrective
disclosures.5 6
For in-and-out traders, the price-value disparity must be measured both at
the time of purchase and at the time of resale.58 7 If the plaintiff purchases
stock worth $10 per share at an inflated market price of $20 per share, that
plaintiff has suffered out-of-pocket losses at the date of purchase of $10 per
share. If external market forces cause the market price to decline to $15 per
share, then the plaintiff has suffered, on the date of resale, losses of $5 per
share. The price-value disparity on the date of the transaction is $10 per
share. The price-value disparity on the date of resale is only $5 per share.
The Ninth Circuit holds that the in-and-out trader is entitled to recover the
amount of the original price-value disparity that is not recouped in the mar-
ket place, or $5 per share.18 8
Moreover, the in-and-out trader may recover damages even where his re-
sale price exceeds the original purchase price. Whatever market gains the
plaintiff recovered are unrelated to the defendant's conduct. Therefore, the
plaintiff is still entitled to recover the price-value disparity created by the
defendant's wrongdoing.58 9 Although the court justifies the recovery of
damages in those cases under the out-of-pocket rule, which measures the
price-value disparity at the transaction date, the plaintiffs have not suffered
out-of-pocket losses. Instead, the court employs the out-of-pocket device as
a method of placing a "cost" on the defendant's misrepresentations in an
effort to quantify their materiality.590 Even where the defendant's misstate-
ments have not resulted in out-of-pocket trading losses, plaintiffs may re-
cover because the defendant's misstatements were material. Damages are
recoverable to the extent that the defendant's misstatements or omissions
create a disparity between the price at which a reasonable investor would
trade stock and the stock's real value.
584. See, e.g., Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1345 (9th Cir. 1976)
(Sneed, J., concurring).
585. Id.
586. Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1437 (9th Cir. 1987).
587. Id. at 1438 n.4.
588. See id. (providing a comparable example); Green, 541 F.2d at 1345-46.
589. Green, 541 F.2d at 1346.
590. Id.
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J. The Tenth Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit embraces the
out-of-pocket rule as the customary measure of damages in a rule lOb-5
case.5 9 ' Yet the circuit also recognizes an exception to that measure where
disgorging the defendant's profits is necessary to prevent unjust enrich-
ment.592 The court's citation in Hackbart v. Holmes5 93 to Affiliated Ute Cit-
izens v. United States594 indicates its acceptance of a measure of damages
based on the defendant's profits caused by the wrong, where that measure
exceeds out-of-pocket losses.5 95 In the Tenth Circuit, defrauded purchasers
and sellers of securities may recover the amount of the defendant's profits
attributable to the defendant's material misstatements or omissions.
596
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit allows a plaintiff to elect rescissory damages.
In Esplin v. Hirschi,5 97 the court held that a defrauded buyer is entitled to
recover the difference between the price paid for the securities and the value
of the securities determined on the date of the discovery of the fraud.598
Similarly, in Richardson v. MacArthur,5 99 the Tenth Circuit concluded that
rescissory damages should reflect the disparity between the purchase price
and the stock's value at the time the plaintiff would seek rescission, within a
reasonable time after discovery of the fraud.'
Finally, in Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,"° ' the Tenth Circuit estab-
lished a "cover" measure of damages for a defrauded seller. Here, plaintiffs
sold their Texas Gulf Sulphur (TGS) stock after defendant Texas Gulf
Sulphur falsely denied rumors of a major ore discovery, but before it issued a
corrective disclosure admitting the find." 2 After cautioning that its stan-
dard of recovery was fashioned for "unprecedented circumstances," the
court declared:
We believe the measure of damages used should award the rea-
sonable investor the amount it would have taken him to invest in
591. Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1121 (10th Cir. 1982) (citing Estate Counseling
Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962)).
592. Hackbart, 675 F.2d at 1122 (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128 (1972)).
593. 675 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1982).
594. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
595. Hackbart, 675 F.2d at 1122; see also Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 155.
596. Hackbart, 675 F.2d at 1122.
597. 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969).
598. Id. at 104-05.
599. 451 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1971) (stock purchaser sued a corporation to recover losses due
to alleged fraud by corporation's employee who sold the stock).
600. Id. at 43-44.
601. 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
602. Id. at 95-96.
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the TGS market within a reasonable period of time after he became
informed of the [fraud] .... The award proposed would permit
one to 'cover' by reinvestment and suffer neither loss nor forced
sale.
The damages then should be based on the highest value of TGS
stock between [disclosure] and a reasonable time thereafter. 603
According to the court, the unprecedented circumstance that justified this
unique remedy was the unavailability of a restitutionary remedy: no privity
existed between the parties, and the defendants were not unjustly
enriched. '
The real basis for the cover measure in Mitchell, however, was its capacity
to reflect the disparity between the plaintiffs' sale price and the real value of
TGS stock. The price at which the plaintiffs could have reinvested in TGS
after disclosure represented the market's informed judgment of the actual
value of TGS. The disparity between that informed price and the unin-
formed market price accepted by the plaintiffs, according to the court, ap-
proximated the value of the concealed information." ° The nondisclosure of
the ore discovery was so material that, if a reasonable investor had known
about the information, he would have retained his TGS stock and sold at the
highest post-disclosure value. 6 The cover measure of damages has utility,
therefore, in quantifying the materiality of misstatements or omissions that
induce a plaintiff to forfeit entirely all profits reasonably determinable. In
the Tenth Circuit, the cover measure, like rescission, disgorgement, and out-
of-pocket relief, is a tool that trial courts may use to approximate the materi-
ality of the defendant's misstatements or omissions.
K The Eleventh Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit presumes
that the proper measure of damages in a rule lOb-5 case is "the difference
between the purchase price paid for the security and the value the security
would have had absent the misstatements [or] omissions." '  Under this
out-of-pocket rule, the price-value disparity is determined as of the date of
the transaction.6° 8 In calculating the fair value of securities at the time of
603. Id. at 105.
604. Id.
605. See id.
606. Id.
607. Alna Capital Assocs. v. Wagner, 758 F.2d 562, 566 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing Huddleston
v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 555-56 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in relevant part, 459 U.S.
375 (1983)).
608. Aina Capital Assocs. v. Wagner, 532 F. Supp. 591, 603 (S.D. Fla. 1982), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 758 F.2d 562 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
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the transaction in Alna Capital Assocs. v. Wagner, the court began with the
purchase price and then reduced that price, in accordance with expert testi-
mony, to account for the likely reduction in market price attributable to
each misstatement or omission.6 9 Although the fair value calculation rested
on a number of factors, the Eleventh Circuit expressly held that the valua-
tion process must reflect the premium over market price running to buyers
of a controlling interest in the corporation.610 The calculation results in a
measurement of the disparity created by the defendant's conduct between
market price and true value. The court quantified the materiality of the mis-
statements or omissions.61'
The Eleventh Circuit has recognized, but not affirmatively accepted, the
rescissory alternative to out-of-pocket damages in rule lOb-5 cases. In
Silverberg v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc.,612 the court declined to
reach the issue of the propriety of the lower court's rescission instruction in
a rule lOb-5 case.613 The circuit court found that the jury's verdict was inde-
pendently supported by pendent state law theories.614
While the Eleventh Circuit declined to pass on the merits of this instruc-
tion in a rule lOb-5 case, it did remark: "[W]e do not mean to imply that the
measure of damages in the instant case was necessarily improper .... Vari-
ous federal courts have recognized the appropriateness of this measure in
certain situations. '61 5  Moreover, the court took "special note" of the
United States Supreme Court's admonition of the federal courts to use their
discretion in federal securities actions to create relief that will remedy the
harm done.616 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit at least acknowledged the
609. Alna Capital, 758 F.2d. at 566.
610. Id. at 566-67.
611. Id.
612. 710 F.2d 678 (llth Cir. 1983).
613. Id. at 687 n.15. The trial court instructed the jury that in computing an award for
damages, it could include "the difference between the purchase price paid for the.., stock...
and the price at which such stock was or could have been sold by the plaintiff when he learned
of the alleged fraud." Id. at 685. Because the instruction was proper as to a common law
fraud count, the court declined to address its propriety under a rule lob-5 claim. Id. at 685-86.
614. Id. at 685. The lower court instructed the jury that:
If you find for the plaintiff, you should determine and write on the verdict form, in
dollars, the total amount of loss or damage which the greater weight of the evidence
shows he sustained as the result of the incident conplained of. Those elements
which you should consider in arriving at the amount of money damages which will
constitute fair and adequate compensation for the loss or damage allegedly incurred
include the difference between the purchase price paid for the ... stock ... and the
price at which such stock was or could have been sold by the plaintiff when he learned
of the alleged fraud ....
Id.
615. Id. at 687 n.15.
616. Id. (citing J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433-34 (1964)).
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case law suggesting that "rescission may be an available remedy in some
actions under the federal securities law.", 6 17
If courts awarded rescission under rule lOb-5 in the Eleventh Circuit,
however, the measure of the plaintiff's recovery would be limited to the
losses proximately caused by the defendant's conduct. Because rescission
endeavors to unwind the transaction, the plaintiff generally may recover his
purchase price without having to show losses caused by the defendant's
fraud.6 8 Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit has held that even where the
plaintiff seeks a rescissory remedy under rule lOb-5, he must demonstrate
that the defendant's material misstatements or omissions proximately caused
his losses.61 9 The proximate cause element, according to the court, prevents
rule lOb-5 from becoming a system of investor insurance.62 ° Under the re-
scissory measure, therefore, a plaintiff may recover the difference between
the transaction price and the postdiscovery value of the stock, provided that
the defendant's conduct caused the disparity. Rescission, like the out-of-
pocket measure, becomes the portion of the price-value disparity created by
the defendant's misstatements or omissions. Rescission is likewise proper
only to the extent that it quantifies the materiality of those misstatements or
omissions.
L. The District of Columbia Circuit
The law regarding damages for rule lOb-5 violations within the District of
Columbia Circuit emanates from the National Student Marketing Securities
Litigation. 62 ' After the SEC established that the former president and coun-
sel of a merged corporation had failed to disclose material information in an
unsigned comfort letter before consummating a merger,62 2 several private
actions were pursued that eventually resulted in a structured settlement. In
the context of litigation over the administration of the settlement, the district
court had occasion to address the proper measure of damages.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia has sug-
gested that "securities law damage" guidelines require that a plaintiff re-
cover the difference between the price paid and the fair market value of the
stock traded.62 3 Fair market value represents the price which a willing
617. Rousseff v. E.F. Hutton Co., 843 F.2d 1326, 1328 (11th Cir. 1988).
618. See, e.g., Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647 (1986); see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 77-152.
619. Rousseff, 843 F.2d at 1329.
620. Id.
621. See SEC v. National Student Mktg., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
622. Id.
623. See In re National Student Mktg. Litig., 598 F. Supp. 575, 582 (D.D.C. 1984).
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buyer would pay a willing seller when neither is under any compulsion and
both are reasonably informed as to the relevant facts.624 In an active mar-
ket, that fair market value requires an analysis of market price and factors
external to the fraud. Absent an active market, the fair market value of
stock must be determined "based on an assessment of all available evidence
of value."'625 Moreover, it is proper to discount the value of stock to reflect
its lack of marketability.6 26
While suggesting that the out-of-pocket measure is the rule in securities
fraud actions, the district court has also recognized rescissory relief,
62 7
although the court has placed limits on its availability. Observing that re-
scission is an equitable remedy, the court has concluded that it must be as-
serted "promptly" after discovery of the fraud.628 Hence, a plaintiff must
elect rescission a reasonable time after discovery of the fraud.62 9 What con-
stitutes a reasonable time in seeking rescission depends on the circumstances
of each case. The court has declared, however, that "[t]he key inquiry is
whether the rescinder acted with due diligence in asserting the equitable
remedy."
630
While both out-of-pocket damages based on a plaintiff's losses and rescis-
sion based on a defendant's gain are available in the District of Columbia
Circuit, the courts have placed market valuation limits on the former, and
equitable limits on the latter, which restrict recovery to price swings created
by defendant's material misstatements or omissions. The goal is to quantify
those material misstatements or omissions.
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court and the federal circuit courts agree that
the out-of-pocket rule represents the traditional measure of damages under
rule l0b-5. The plaintiff-seller under the rule may recover the difference be-
tween the price received for the stock and its fair value, measured at the time
of the transaction. Defrauded buyers of securities may also pursue this mea-
sure of recovery. Courts borrow the out-of-pocket measure from tort law
624. Id. at 582.
625. Id. A variety of factors should be considered, including the value of comparable com-
panies, the value of intangible assets such as managerial skill, capitalized future earnings and
the bid and asking prices for the stock. In assessing the value of these factors, the court should
appoint a special master or weigh expert testimony. Id.
626. Id. at 582-83.
627. In re National Student Mktg. Litig., 445 F. Supp. 157, 163 (D.D.C. 1978).
628. Id. Promptness is particularly essential given the speculative nature of securities. See
also supra notes 407-423 and accompanying text.
629. In re National Students, 445 F. Supp. at 163.
630. Id. at 164.
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which endeavors to make the plaintiff whole by returning to the plaintiff the
losses proximately caused by the defendant's fraud.
Calculating the disparity between the price paid for stock and its true,
real, or fair value presents difficulties for the courts. A court must first de-
fine the consideration paid for stock. It then must ascertain the fair value of
the stock as of the date of the transaction. Fair value represents the market
price that the stock would have fetched in a fully informed market. Because
securities fraud presumes a materially misinformed market, the determina-
tion of fair value requires an analysis of the materiality of the information
withheld at the time of the transaction. In some cases, the best evidence of
the materiality of the information will be the market price of the stock
within a reasonable time after the disclosure. In others, the materiality is
best gauged by the resale price. Expert testimony and special masters are
used to measure that materiality. Courts also employ an appropriate market
index so that the damages do not include losses caused by external market
forces. The courts seek, by this inquiry, to ascertain the disparity created by
a defendant's omission or misstatement between price paid and fair value.
Out-of-pocket damages, as used by the lower federal courts, quantify the
materiality of that omission or misstatement.
The courts also concur that a defrauded buyer or seller of securities may
elect to recover as damages the amount of the defendant's profit directly
attributable to his material misstatements or omissions where that amount
exceeds the plaintiff's out-of-pocket losses. Such profits, however, must be a
proximate consequence of the fraud and not due to any special efforts on the
defendants part. Courts have analogized this measure of recovery to the
disgorgement of a defendant's unjust enrichment. Courts have also called
this recovery a rescissory measure of damages because it seeks to return both
parties to their pretransaction status. The measure is justified by section
29(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, which allows the avoid-
ance of contracts entered into in violation of rule lOb-5, and by the analogy
between securities fraud and breach of contract. Critics have noted that this
measure, which creates excessive damage awards and allows a plaintiff to
speculate at a defendant's expense about stock even after the plaintiff be-
comes aware of the fraud, leaves the plaintiff secure in knowing that he can
always recover the purchase price. These criticisms have led the courts to
place creative limits on the disgorgement and rescission remedies. The lim-
its, which are borrowed from tort law causation concepts, do not permit a
plaintiff to recover a defendant's profits not caused by the fraud. Moreover,
courts require a plaintiff to deduct from the rescissory awards any value
received as a result of the fraud. These limitations alone have generated
criticism because they impose legal concepts on equitable recovery.
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Nonetheless, the federal courts generally approve, and may continually
move in the direction of encouraging, a profit-based measure of damages
under rule lOb-5. Whether considered rescission or disgorgement, this mea-
sure attempts to return to a plaintiff that portion of a defendant's profits
caused by the defendant's misstatements or omissions. Courts, as well as
testifying experts, have used a number of devices to arrive at this figure. A
court will award a plaintiff the full purchase price when the defendant has
induced the plaintiff to enter the market in the first place; that is, where the
omissions or misstatements are so material that they induced an investment
rather than a price. The difference between the purchase price and the plain-
tiff-buyer's resale price, a reasonable time after discovery of the fraud, will be
used when the defendant concealed facts so material that a reasonable inves-
tor could have deduced from them that the resale price was much lower than
the potential fruits of an unrealized speculation. Conversely, the disparity
between purchase price and the plaintiff-seller's cost of covering by repur-
chasing the stock a reasonable time after discovery of the fraud will be used
when the misstatements and omissions induced the plaintiff to forfeit the
repurchase opportunity. The resale measure and the cover measure both
limit rescissory recovery to a measure of the materiality of the challenged
misstatements or omissions. Not surprisingly, they have been analogized to
the Uniform Commercial Code's damage provisions which foster beneficial
postbreach commercial activity by limiting damages to a measure of the pre-
cise wrong.
The judicial use of equitable limits on rescissory relief creates the same
effect. Although privity is no longer required for rescission, promptness and
diligence remain a requirement. Requiring the plaintiff to make a prompt
election of rescission mitigates the damages to the price-value disparity. If
rescission is prompt, that disparity can be determined at a date close to the
transaction date, or better still, at a date that reflects a fully informed market
price. Under the labels of the resale measure, the cover measure, or equita-
ble limits on rescission, courts fashion relief that quantifies the materiality of
the defendant's omissions or misstatements. Therefore, while courts state
generally that the out-of-pocket measure or rescissory measure of damages
are viable alternatives, they have applied those measures as a tool to a single
end: quantifying materiality. Because reasonable investors do not base in-
vestment decisions on speculation, the benefit-of-the-bargain measure has
been widely rejected as a proxy for the materiality of the challenged conceal-
ments. In the rare case where that measure has been used, the court has
made clear that the misrepresentation involved affected a fixed term of the
"benefit" of the plaintiff's bargain. Where, in the unusual case, the misstate-
ment is so material that it affects a benefit that a reasonable investor consid-
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ered significant, the benefit-of-the-bargain measure may be a useful tool in
gauging the materiality of the misstatement.
Erratic in theory but consistent in practice, the lower federal courts have
followed the Supreme Court's implicitly suggested yardstick for damages:
the materiality of the defendant's nondisclosures or misstatements. The
plaintiff may recover damages that quantify the materiality of the challenged
conduct in a rule lOb-5 action.
That measure of recovery based on materiality is consistent with the pre-
cise goals of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Because a rule lOb-5 violation is
predicated upon a material misstatement or omission, damages that are also
predicated on that misstatement or omission necessarily fit the violation.
Furthermore, because the measure of damages can never exceed the amount
by which the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff's harm, the measure
will rarely result in a windfall. Because, on the other hand, the measure of
damages rests upon the precise misstatement or omission made by the de-
fendant, that measure deters precisely the conduct targeted by section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5.
Finally, a measure of damages based upon the quantification of the mate-
riality of the defendant's misstatement or omission affords the district courts
both wide discretion and clear guidance in measuring damages. A court's
goal in calculating damages is clear: determine the degree, if any, to which
the defendant's misstatement or omission created a disparity between the
transaction price and the value of the securities at the time of the transac-
tion. The court, however, maintains wide discretion in selecting the best
method to achieve that goal.
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